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to draw on our joint work in section 3.8. I would furthermore like 
to acknowledge generous research funding from the Netherlands 
Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO), who awarded me three 
grants over the last 15 years that allowed me to further develop my 
research on the capability approach: a four-year postdoctoral scholarship 
(2002–2006) to work on the capability approach and theories of justice; 
a VIDI grant (2006–2011) to work on demographic changes and social 
justice using the capability approach as one of the normative tools; 
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interdisciplinary analysis of practical self-understanding. Thanks also 
to the team at Open Book Publishers — in particular Lucy Barnes, 
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This book is dedicated to my family — to my husband Roland Pierik 
and our children Aaron and Ischa. This book contains not only almost 
half a million characters typed and retyped by me, but also visible and 
less visible contributions from my three (little) men. Obviously, as a 
fellow political philosopher with interdisciplinary leanings, there are 
insights from Roland in various places in this book, including some 
direct citations. Moreover, Roland helped me not to let the best be the 
enemy of the good, and kept encouraging me to finish this book. If I 
waited until I was happy with each sentence and paragraph, this book 
probably would never see the light of day. Ischa’s contribution may be 
the least visible, yet it is there. It is his unconventional view of human 
affairs that keeps prompting me not to accept norms or practices that 
are unjust or make no sense. Aaron provided the artwork for the cover. 
The woven piece very well represents the multi-dimensional nature 
of the capability approach, as well as the fact that life is made up by 
one’s own choice of functionings, which follows a dynamic and always 
unfinished pattern. If one has enough bright and colourful functionings, 
they can be woven together to become something bigger than the mere 
functionings taken separately — a flourishing life worth living.
1. Introduction
1.1 Why the capability approach? 
Many people who encounter the capability approach for the first time 
find the ideas embedded within it intuitively attractive. The basic claim 
of the capability approach is that, when asking normative questions, 
we should ask what people are able to do and what lives they are able 
to lead. That claim resonates with widespread ideas among citizens, 
academics, and politicians about how to make policies, views about 
what social justice requires, or bottom-up views about development and 
social progress. Perhaps the most important contribution the capability 
approach makes is to prompt us to ask alternative questions, and to 
focus on different dimensions when we make observations or when we 
gather the relevant data for making evaluations or judgements. 
What is the capability approach? This book will answer that question 
in detail. But let us start with a first, preliminary description, taken from 
a quote by Amartya Sen, who introduced the theoretical idea of the 
capability approach in his 1979 Tanner Lecture (Sen 1980a) and soon 
after in empirical work (Sen and Sengupta 1983; Sen 1985a). According 
to Sen, the capability approach “is an intellectual discipline that gives a 
central role to the evaluation of a person’s achievements and freedoms 
in terms of his or her actual ability to do the different things a person 
has reason to value doing or being” (Sen 2009a, 16). As we will see later 
in this book, I will propose a definition and an account of the capability 
approach that does not exactly equal Sen’s but rather can be interpreted 
© 2017 Ingrid Robeyns, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0130.01
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as a generalisation of Sen’s definition.1 Yet Sen’s definition is a good way 
to start, since it highlights that the capability approach is concerned 
with aspects of people’s lives such as their health, the education they 
can enjoy and the support they enjoy from their social networks; it is 
also concerned with what people can do, such as being able to work, 
raise a family, travel, or be politically active. The capability approach 
cares about people’s real freedoms to do these things, and the level of 
wellbeing that they will reach when choosing from the options open to 
them. It is a rich, multidimensional approach.
Here’s an example illustrating the difference the capability approach 
makes. Everyone agrees that poverty needs to be combatted — but 
who are the people that suffer from poverty? Which conceptual and 
normative framework do we use when we identify the poor? Which 
definition of poverty do we use when we analyse the incidence of 
poverty in a country? As empirical research has shown, it does matter 
whether one uses the widespread income-based metric, or whether 
one takes a capability perspective and focuses on a set of thresholds of 
basic functionings, the lack of which indicates a dimension of poverty. 
Caterina Ruggeri Laderchi (1997) used data from a Chilean household 
survey to investigate the extent to which an income-based measure is 
able to capture some basic functionings that could arguably be seen as 
central to poverty analysis: basic education, health and nutrition. She 
found that the income variable in itself is insignificant as a determinant 
of the shortfall in health, schooling and child nutrition and that the role 
that income plays is highly non-linear and depends on a number of 
other personal, household and regional characteristics. In other words, 
looking at the income level in a household to determine whether the 
members of that household are poor may be an unreliable indicator for 
the prevalence of poverty. The difference between, on the one hand, 
the income-based measurements and, on the other hand, measurements 
based on a selection of basic indicators that reflect how people are 
doing has also been confirmed by a large number of other studies in 
the last twenty-five years.2 It is for that income-based approach that the 
1  The exact definition and description of the capability approach that I will develop 
in this book is broader than Sen’s own. The reason, as will become clear in due 
course, is that the “having reason to value” clause in Sen’s definition is, in my view, 
a special case of the general definition of the capability approach. 
2  See, among others, Klasen 2000; Laderchi, Saith and Stewart 2003; Qizilbash 2002; 
Reddy, Visaria and Asali 2009; Alkire et al. 2015.
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capability approach offers an alternative — but, as will be explained in 
this book, it is also an alternative to many other approaches and theories, 
such as the happiness approach or resources-based theories of justice. 
While the capability approach has been used to identify the poor, 
it has also been used for many other purposes. Over the last twenty-
five years, the range of fields in which the capability approach has been 
applied and developed has expanded dramatically, and now includes 
global public health, development ethics, environmental protection 
and ecological sustainability, education, technological design, welfare 
state policies and many, many more.3 Nor has the use of the capability 
approach been restricted to empirical research only. Some of its purposes 
have been theoretical, such as the construction of theories of justice 
(Anderson 1999; Nussbaum 2000; Nussbaum 2006b; Claassen 2016), or 
the development of a riches-line, which allows us to identify the rich 
(Robeyns 2017b). Other uses of the capability approach have combined 
theoretical and empirical research, such as Jonathan Wolff and Avner 
De-Shalit’s (2007) study of disadvantage. 
For all these endeavours, the capability approach asks: What are 
people really able to do and what kind of person are they able to be? It asks 
what people can do and be (their capabilities) and what they are 
actually achieving in terms of beings and doings (their functionings). 
Do the envisioned institutions, practices and policies focus on people’s 
capabilities, that is, their opportunities to do what they value and be the 
kind of person they want to be? Do people have the same capabilities in 
life?4 Or do global economic structures, domestic policies or brute bad 
luck make people’s capabilities unequal, and if so, is that unfair and 
should we do something about that? Do development projects focus on 
3  See section 1.4 for a more detailed discussion of the scope of the capability approach, 
and some references to the various fields in which it is now applied and developed. 
4  Some capability scholars, in particular Martha Nussbaum, have extended the 
capability approach to include the functionings of non-human animals. In this 
book, I restrict the discussion to human functionings and human capabilities. This 
is not to deny that the functionings of non-human animals are important, nor 
that for some ethical questions we need to consider both humans and non-human 
animals. There is a literature that analyses whether the capability approach can 
plausibly be extended to include non-human animals, which will not be discussed 
here, given the focus on humans (e.g. Nussbaum 2006b; Schinkel 2008; Cripps 2010; 
Wissenburg 2011; Holland and Linch 2016). Note that there is also a large literature 
on ‘the capabilities of firms’, which is not related to how the term ‘capabilities’ is 
used in the capability approach. In this book, the term ‘capabilities’ refers only to 
the capabilities of members of the human species. 
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expanding people’s capabilities, or do they have another public policy 
goal (such as economic growth), or are they merely serving the interests 
of a dominant group? The capability approach thus offers a different 
perspective than alternative approaches that focus on the accumulation 
of material resources, or the mental states of people, such as their overall 
satisfaction with their lives. 
1.2 The worries of the sceptics 
Although the capability approach appeals to many readers, others have 
wondered whether this theory is really any different from other more 
established theories, or whether the capability approach is promising as 
a theory with sufficient bite. For example John Rawls (1999, 13), while 
acknowledging that the idea of basic capabilities is important, calls it “an 
unworkable idea” for a liberal conception of justice. John Roemer (1996, 
191–93) has criticized the capability approach for being insufficiently 
specified — a complaint that is also echoed in the critique made by 
Pratab Bhanu Mehta (2009). Others have questioned the practical 
significance of the capability approach for policy making and empirical 
assessment. For instance, Robert Sugden (1993, 1953) has questioned 
the usefulness of the capability approach for welfare economics — a 
critique to which we will return in section 4.10. In addition, at seminars 
and other scholarly gatherings, an often-heard criticism is that the 
capability approach is old wine in new bottles — it aims to do what the 
non-economic social sciences have been doing all along. If that is the 
case, then why should we bother?5 
There are two types of answer to the sceptics. The first is conceptual 
or theoretical and that answer will be given in the remainder of this 
book. In a nutshell, the reason the capability approach is worth our time 
and attention is that it gives us a new way of evaluating the lives of 
individuals and the societies in which these people live their lives. The 
attention is shifted to public values currently not always considered most 
important — such as wellbeing, freedom and justice. It is an alternative 
discourse or paradigm, perhaps even a ‘counter-theory’ to a range 
of more mainstream discourses on society, poverty and prosperity. 
5  Several more specific critiques on the capability approach will be discussed in 
chapter 4.
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Moreover, it brings insights from several disciplines together, and gives 
scholars a common interdisciplinary language. Nevertheless, it doesn’t 
follow that the capability approach will always offer a framework that 
is to be preferred over other frameworks: as this book will show, the 
capability approach can contribute something, but we should be careful 
not to overplay our hand and believe that it can do a better job for all 
ethical questions. 
The second answer to the sceptic is empirical — to show the sceptic 
what difference the capability approach makes. The earlier mentioned 
study by Ruggeri Laderchi (1997) and dozens of similar studies do 
exactly that. In 2006, I provided a survey of the studies in which the 
capability approach had been put into practice (Robeyns 2006b) — a task 
that I think is no longer feasible today in a single paper or chapter, given 
that the empirical literature of applications of the capability approach 
has grown dramatically. But in order to illustrate in somewhat greater 
depth this kind of answer to the sceptic, let us focus on one type of 
empirical application of the capability approach: namely how we 
perceive and evaluate our lives at a macro level, and how we evaluate 
the social arrangements in which we live those lives. 
1.3 A yardstick for the evaluation of prosperity 
and progress 
For many decades, the dominant way to measure prosperity and social 
progress has been to focus on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or Gross 
National Product (GNP) per capita. The more we produce, the more 
developed our country has been taken to be. Yet a large literature has 
emerged showing that GDP per capita is limited and often flawed as a 
measure of social and economic progress (Fleurbaey 2009; Stiglitz, Sen 
and Fitoussi 2010; Fleurbaey and Blanchet 2013; Coyle 2015). 
In one of the very first empirical applications of the capability 
approach, Amartya Sen (1985a) used some very simple statistics to 
illustrate how deceiving GDP per capita can be as a measure of prosperity 
and progress.6 Sen showed that, in the early 1980s, the (roughly 
6  An even earlier empirical study, in which the capability approach is referred to 
as the right evaluative framework, was done by Amartya Sen and Sunil Sengupta 
(1983).
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equivalent) GNP per capita of Brazil and Mexico was more than seven 
times the (roughly equivalent) GNP per capita of India, China and Sri 
Lanka — yet performances in life expectancy, infant mortality and child 
death rates were best in Sri Lanka, better in China compared to India 
and better in Mexico compared to Brazil. Important social indicators 
related to life, premature death and health, can thus not be read from 
the average national income statistic. Another finding was that India 
performs badly regarding basic education but has considerably higher 
tertiary education rates than China and Sri Lanka. Thus, Sen concluded 
that the public policy of China and especially Sri Lanka towards 
distributing food, public health measures, medical services and school 
education have led to their remarkable achievements in the capabilities 
of survival and education. What can this application teach us about 
the capability approach? First, the ranking of countries based on GNP 
per capita can be quite different from a ranking based on the selected 
functionings. Second, growth in GNP per capita should not be equated 
with growth in living standards. 
Sen has often made use of the power of comparing the differences 
in the ranking of countries based on GDP per capita with indicators 
of some essential functionings. Recently Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen 
(2013, 46–50) used the capability approach to develop an analysis of 
India’s development policies. For example, as table 1.1 shows, they 
compared India with the fifteen other poorest countries outside sub-
Saharan Africa in terms of development indicators.7 
Of those sixteen countries, India ranks on top in terms of GDP 
per capita, but ranks very low for a range of functionings, such as life 
expectancy at birth, infant mortality, undernourishment, schooling 
and literacy. Other countries, with fewer financial means, were able to 
achieve better outcomes in terms of those functionings. Once again, the 
point is made that focussing on income-based metrics such as disposable 
income at the household level, or GDP per capita at the national level, 
gives limited information on the lives people can lead. 
7  Those other countries are Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burma, Cambodia, Haiti, 
Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Moldova, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan, Vietnam and Yemen. 
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Table 1.1 Selected Indicators for the World’s Sixteen Poorest 










GDP per capita, 2011  
(PPP Constant 2005 international $) 3,203 2,112 1
Life expectancy at birth, 2011 (years) 65 67 9
Infant mortality rate, 2011  
(per 1,000 live births) 47 45 10
Under-5 mortality rate, 2011
(per 1,000 live births) 61 56 10
Total fertility rate, 2011
(children per woman) 2.6 2.9 7
Access to improved sanitation, 2010 (%) 34 57 13
Mean years of schooling, age 25+, 2011 4.4 5.0 11
Literacy rate, age 14–15 years, 2010 (%)
Female 74 79 11
Male 88 85 9
Proportion of children below 5 years who are undernourished, 2006–2010 (%)
Underweight 43 30 15
Stunted 48 41 13
Child immunization rates, 2011 (%)
DPT 72 88 13
Measles 74 87 11
Source: Drèze and Sen (2013, 47). 
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This type of illustration of the power of the capability approach, whereby 
at the macro level the quality of life in a country is compared with GDP 
per capita, is not restricted to poor countries only. For example, the 
capability approach has recently also been taken up by the ‘Better Life 
Initiative’ of the OECD, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development. The aim of this initiative is to track wellbeing, both 
in the present day and historically, by looking at ten dimensions of 
wellbeing: per capita GDP, real wages, educational attainment, life 
expectancy, height, personal security, the quality of political institutions, 
environmental quality, income inequality and gender inequality. 
Several of these dimensions can be conceptualized through a capability 
lens and others (such as per capita GDP or real wages) are needed for 
a comparison between capability dimensions and income dimensions, 
or can be seen as core capability determinants or capability inputs. In a 
recent report, which reconstructed the outcomes on those dimensions 
between 1820 and 2000, it was found that some dimensions, such as 
education and health outcomes, are strongly correlated with per capita 
GDP, but others are not — such as the quality of political institutions, 
homicide rates and exposure to conflicts (Van Zanden et al. 2014). 
Another example that illustrates the difference the capability 
approach can make is the analysis of gender inequality, for which it 
is clear that we are missing out the most important dimensions if we 
only focus on how income is distributed. There are two main problems 
with an income-based approach to gender inequalities. The first is that 
it is often assumed that income within households will be shared. Yet 
that assumption makes most of the economic inequalities between 
women and men invisible (Woolley and Marshall 1994; Phipps and 
Burton 1995; Robeyns 2006a). Moreover, gender scholars across the 
disciplines have argued that one of the most important dimensions 
of gender inequality is the distribution of burdens between men 
and women (paid work, household work and care work); the fact 
that women are expected to do the lion’s share of unpaid household 
work and care work makes them financially vulnerable and restricts 
their options. Any account of gender inequality that wants to focus 
on what really matters should talk about the gender division of paid 
and unpaid work, and the capability approach allows us to do that, 
since both paid and unpaid work can be conceptualized as important 
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capabilities of human beings (e.g. Lewis and Giullari 2005; Robeyns 
2003, 2010; Addabbo, Lanzi and Picchio 2010). 
Moreover, for millions of girls and women worldwide, the most 
important capability that is denied to them is extremely basic — the 
capability to live in the first place. As Sen showed in an early study and 
as has been repeatedly confirmed since, millions of women are ‘missing’ 
from the surface of the Earth (and from the population statistics), since 
newborn girls have been killed or fatally neglected, or female foetuses 
have been aborted, because they were females in a society in which 
daughters are more likely to be seen as a burden, especially when 
compared to sons (Sen 1990b, 2003b, 1992b; Klasen 1994; Klasen and 
Wink 2003). In sum, tracking the gap between women’s achievements 
in income and wealth or labour market outcomes will not reveal 
some crucial dimensions of gender inequality, whereas the capability 
approach draws attention to these non-income-based dimensions. 
Using the capability approach when thinking about prosperity 
and social progress has another advantage: it will impede policy 
makers from using mistaken assumptions about human beings in 
their policies, including how we live together and interact in society 
and communities, what is valuable in our lives and what kind of 
governmental and societal support is needed in order for people (and 
in particular the disadvantaged) to flourish. For example, in their study 
of disadvantage in affluent societies, in particular the UK and Israel, 
Jonathan Wolff and Avner De-Shalit discuss the effects of a government 
policy of clearing a slum by moving the inhabitants to newly built tower 
blocks. While there may be clear material advantages to this policy — in 
particular, improving the hygiene conditions in which people live — a 
capabilitarian analysis will point out that this policy damages the social 
aspects of people’s wellbeing, since social networks and communities are 
broken up and cannot simply be assumed to be rebuilt in the new tower 
blocks (Wolff and De-Shalit 2007, 168, 178–79). Since social relationships 
among people are key to their wellbeing, this may well have additional 
derivative effects on other dimensions of people’s lives, such as their 
mental health. Understanding people as beings whose nature consists 
of a plurality of dimensions can help governments to think carefully 
through all the relevant effects of their policies.
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1.4 Scope and development  
of the capability approach 
The previous section provides one type of answer to those who are 
sceptical about the capability approach, namely by showing what 
difference it makes in practice. The other strand in answering the 
sceptic who asks “Why bother?” is to explain in detail how one should 
understand the capability approach as a conceptual and theoretical 
frame and how it differs from other theoretical frameworks. After all, a 
proper understanding of what the capability approach precisely is (and 
is not) should also help in making clear what difference it can make. 
While this book is not framed as a reply to the sceptic, implicitly such 
an argument is made in the chapters to come. 
Nevertheless, we should not simply assume that the added value 
of the capability approach is equal across cases, fields and disciplines. 
In some areas, the difference between the capability approach and the 
dominant ways of thinking and evaluating are so significant that we can 
rightly speak of a ‘counter-theory’. In other debates and discussions, the 
difference that the capability approach makes to the prevailing modes 
of analysis has been more limited. Moreover, the development of the 
capability approach itself is uneven within different disciplines. 
In some debates, the capability approach has been so much 
studied, developed or applied that we should no longer speak of “the 
potential of the capability approach” or “the promises of the capability 
approach”, since the work that has been done has made quite clear what 
difference the capability approach actually makes. The prime example 
is the literature and debate on the very idea of what development is. 
The capability approach has made a crucial foundational contribution 
to the growth of the human development paradigm which is now well-
known, especially through the work of the Human Development Reports, 
which are annually published by the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP). In addition, the most well-known of Sen’s 
books among the wider public is Development as Freedom, which uses 
the capability approach as a key element of his alternative vision on 
development (Sen 1999a). In economics, Sabina Alkire, James Foster and 
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their collaborators have made major contributions to the development 
of poverty measures based on the capability approach, with the 
development of the Multidimensional Poverty Index (Alkire and 
Foster 2011; Alkire et al. 2015). In the area of development studies, the 
capability approach is no longer a new and emerging alternative (as it 
was twenty to thirty years ago), but rather one of the major established 
frameworks.8 
Another area is philosophical thinking about the metric of distributive 
justice (that is: what we ought to compare between individuals when 
we make statements about whether certain inequalities between people 
are unjust). In this literature too, the capability approach has by now 
established itself as an important alternative.9 And while work on 
development and on justice perhaps stands out, there are now significant 
bodies of literature on the capability approach in many fields, such 
as health economics and public health,10 technology,11 sustainability 
analysis and environmental policy studies,12 disability studies,13 and 
8  For some examples from the huge body of literature in development economics, 
development studies and development ethics that builds on the capability 
approach, see Alkire (2002); Clark (2002, 2005); Conradie (2013); Crocker (2008); 
Deneulin (2006a, 2006b, 2014); Drydyk (2011, 2013); Gasper (2004); Ibrahim (2011); 
Klasen (2000); Qizilbash (1996) and Qizilbash and Clark (2005).
9  See e.g. Anderson (1999, 2010); Nussbaum (1988); Nussbaum (2000; 2006b); 
Richardson (2000); Kaufman (2007); Wolff and De-Shalit (2007); Brighouse and 
Robeyns (2010); Arneson (2010, 2013); Claassen (2014, 2016); Nielsen and Axelsen 
(2017). See also section 3.13. 
10  E.g. Grewal et al. (2006); Ruger (2006, 2010); Coast et al. (2008); Coast, Smith and 
Lorgelly (2008); Venkatapuram (2009, 2011, 2013); Bleichrodt and Quiggin (2013); 
Entwistle and Watt (2013); Mitchell et al. (2016, 2017).
11  E.g. Oosterlaken (2009, 2011, 2015); Zheng (2009); Zheng and Stahl (2011); Kleine 
(2010, 2011, 2013); Fernández-Baldor et al. (2014).
12  E.g. Anand and Sen (1994, 2000); Robeyns and Van der Veen (2007); Scholtes (2010); 
Schlosberg and Carruthers (2010); Rauschmayer, Omann and Frühmann (2012); 
Schlosberg (2012); Crabtree (2013); Voget-Kleschin (2013, 2015); Schultz et al. (2013); 
Holland (2014).
13  E.g. Nussbaum (2002a); Burchardt (2004); Zaidi and Burchardt (2005); Terzi (2005, 
2007, 2008); Wasserman (2005); Mitra (2006); Qizilbash (2011); Harnacke (2013); 
Robeyns (2016c).
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the vast amount of literature in educational studies that works with the 
capability approach.14 
However, in other academic fields it is more disputed to what extent 
the capability approach has been shown to make a real difference. For 
example, in ethical theories within the systematic/analytical strand of 
philosophy, the capability approach hasn’t yet been much developed. 
Similarly, one can doubt whether the capability approach has 
contributed to a significant change in mainstream economic thinking. 
The development of the capability approach within different academic 
disciplines and discussions thus differs significantly, and the effect the 
capability approach has had on developing new policies also differs 
drastically between different policy fields. 
In the debates where the capability approach is now well-established, 
the development of that literature has often raised new questions. For 
example, in philosophical theories of justice there are now enough 
convincing arguments that the capability approach makes a difference, 
but the very possibility of a capability theory of justice has also allowed 
us to be much more explicit about which questions remain unaddressed 
in case one wants to make a substantive theory of (distributive) justice 
(Freeman 2006; Robeyns 2016d). This is a ‘normal’ way in which a 
paradigm develops. It therefore shouldn’t be surprising that we have 
just as many questions about the capability approach as we had a few 
years ago. We may even have more, but they are different to those that 
were raised a decade or two ago. 
Whatever the unevenness in its uptake and development between 
disciplines, and independently of the new questions that the capability 
approach has raised, the current state of the literature which I will present 
in this book confirms that the capability approach is here to stay. It makes 
a difference in many debates. It is one of those rare theories that strongly 
connects disciplines and offers a truly interdisciplinary language. And it 
leads to recommendations on how to organise society and choose policies 
that are often genuine alternatives for prevailing views. 
14  E.g. Terzi (2008); Walker and Unterhalter (2007); Lozano et al. (2012); Boni and 
Walker (2013); Apsan Frediani, Boni and Gasper (2014); Unterhalter (2003a, b, 2009, 
2013); Hart (2009, 2012); Peppin Vaughan (2011, 2016); Peppin Vaughan and Walker 
(2012); Saito (2003); Nussbaum (2002b, 2006a); Walker (2003, 2005, 2008, 2010, 
2012a, 2012b), Loots and Walker (2015, 2016); Mutanga and Walker (2015); Wilson-
Strydom and Walker (2015).
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1.5 A guide for the reader
This book has an extremely simple structure. There are five chapters — an 
introduction (this chapter), a short concluding chapter (chapter 5) and 
three very long chapters in the middle. In chapter 2 we start with a 
rather simple explanation of the capability approach, and then present 
a more detailed account of capability theories, focusing in particular on 
their structure and properties. I will present the capability approach 
by describing it as having a modular structure — whereby each specific 
capability theory combines the core elements of the non-optional module 
with a range of non-core modules. This way of looking at the capability 
approach helps those who want to apply the capability approach to a 
particular question or problem to see clearly which elements are needed 
for such an application; it also makes it very clear that the capability 
approach can be specified in diverse ways. One could see chapter 2 as 
trying to provide the anatomy of the capability approach — to try to see 
behind its skin, to detect what its various organs are, how they interact 
and which ones are essential, whereas others may be more tangential. 
In chapter 3 we discuss further details and try to clear up some 
misunderstandings. The capability approach is a field that is notoriously 
prone to misunderstandings, in part because of its interdisciplinary 
nature, but also because the terminology differs somewhat between 
different authors. Chapter 3 tries to present the literature as neutrally as 
possible and describes how it has been evolving. 
Chapter 4 then zooms in on a range of critiques that have been 
made of the capability approach, such as the argument that it is too 
individualistic, or that it cannot properly account for power. In this 
chapter, my own voice will be more prominent, as I will engage with 
these claims, agreeing with some of them (and, as philosophers do, 
giving reasons why I agree), but also arguing against some other critiques. 
Here, it will become clear what the value is of the distinction between the 
general capability approach and more specific capability theories, which 
I introduced elsewhere (Robeyns 2016b) and explain again in section 
2.3. As it turns out, some of the critiques are valid against particular 
capability theories, but make no sense against the capability approach in 
general. I hope that the adoption of this distinction between capability 
theories or applications on the one hand, and capability approach on 
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the other, will clear the capability literature of many confusing and 
unnecessary criticisms, so that we can devote our energy to those that 
are powerful and with which we need to engage. Moreover, let us not 
forget that the capability approach is a tool and not an end in itself; we 
should master it as well as we can, perhaps also as efficiently as we can, 
and then move on to use it in the work that really matters. 
2. Core Ideas and the Framework
2.1 Introduction
The previous chapter listed a range of fields in which the capability 
approach has been taken up, and in chapters 3 and 4 we focus in more 
detail on how the capability approach can (or cannot) make a difference 
for thinking about wellbeing, social and distributive justice, human 
rights, welfare economics and other topics. This broad uptake of the 
capability approach across disciplines and across different types of 
knowledge production (from theoretical and abstract to applied or 
policy oriented) is testimony to its success. But how is the capability 
approach understood in these different fields, and is it possible to 
give a coherent and clarifying account of how we can understand the 
capability approach across those fields?1 In other words, how should we 
understand the capability approach as an overarching framework, that 
unites its more specific uses in different fields and disciplines? 
1  In developing the account of the capability approach as presented in this book, I 
have started in an inductive way by trying to generalize from how the capability 
approach has been used in the literature. However, that literature has been critically 
scrutinized, and in some cases I have come to the conclusion that some ideas in 
this broad ‘capabilities literature’ do not survive careful analysis, and should be 
rejected. Put differently, my methodology has been to be as inclusive as possible, 
but not at the cost of endorsing (what I believe to be) confusions or errors. 
© 2017 Ingrid Robeyns, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0130.02
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This chapter gives an account of that general framework. It provides 
explanations and insights into what the capability approach is, what its 
core claims are, and what additional claims we should pay attention to. 
This chapter will also answer the question: what do we mean exactly 
when we say that the capability approach is a framework or an approach? 
In other words, in this chapter, I will give an account (or a 
description) of the capability approach at the most general level. I will 
bracket additional details and questions about which disagreement or 
confusion exists; chapter 3 will offer more detailed clarifications and 
chapter 4 will discuss issues of debate and dispute. Taken together, these 
three chapters provide my understanding of the capability approach. 
Chapter 2 is structured as follows. In the next section, we look at a 
preliminary definition of the capability approach. Section 2.3 proposes 
to make a distinction between ‘the capability approach’ and ‘a capability 
theory’. This distinction is crucial — it will help us to clarify various 
issues that we will look at in this book, and it also provides some answers 
to the sceptics of the capability approach whom we encountered in the 
previous chapter. Section 2.4 describes, from a bottom-up perspective, 
the many ways in which the capability approach has been developed 
within particular theories, and argues why it is important to acknowledge 
the great diversity within capabilitarian scholarship. Sections 2.5 to 2.11 
present an analytic account of the capability approach, and show what is 
needed to develop a particular capability theory, application or analysis. 
In 2.5, I propose the modular view of the capability approach, which 
allows us to distinguish between three different types of modules that 
make up a capability theory. The first, the A-module, consists of those 
properties that each capability theory must have (section 2.6). This is the 
non-optional core of each capability theory. The B-modules are a set of 
modules in which the module itself is non-optional, but there are different 
possible choices regarding the content of the module (section 2.7). For 
example, we cannot have a capability theory or application without 
having chosen a purpose for that theory or application — yet there are 
many different purposes among which we can choose. The third group 
of modules, the C-modules, are either non-optional but dependent on 
a choice made in the B-modules, or else are completely optional. For 
example, if the purpose you choose is to measure poverty, then you 
need to decide on some empirical methods in the C-modules; but if your 
 232. Core Ideas and the Framework
aim is to make a theory of justice, you don’t need to choose empirical 
methods and hence the C-module for empirical methods (module C3) 
is not relevant for your capability application (section 2.8).2 In the next 
section, 2.9, I discuss the possibility of hybrid theories — theories that 
give a central role to functionings and capabilities yet violate some 
other core proposition(s). Section 2.11 rounds up the discussion of the 
modular view by discussing the relevance and advantages of seeing the 
capability approach from this perspective. 
Section 2.12 summarises the conceptual aspects that have been 
explained by presenting a visualisation of the conceptual framework of 
the capability approach. Section 2.13 uses the modular view to illuminate 
the observation, which has been made by several capability scholars, 
that the capability approach has been used in a narrow and in a broad 
sense, and explains what difference lies behind this distinction. In the 
broader use of the capability approach, supporting or complementary 
theories or additional normative principles are added to the core of the 
approach — yet none of them is itself essential to the capability approach. 
These are choices made in B-modules or the C-modules. The modular 
view of the capability approach that will be central to this chapter can 
thus help to formulate in a sharper manner some observations that have 
already been made in the capability literature. The chapter closes by 
looking ahead to the next chapter. 
2.2 A preliminary definition  
of the capability approach
The capability approach has in recent decades emerged as a new 
theoretical framework about wellbeing, freedom to achieve wellbeing, 
and all the public values in which either of these can play a role, such 
as development and social justice. Although there is some scholarly 
disagreement on the best description of the capability approach (which 
will be addressed in this chapter), it is generally understood as a 
2  To the reader who finds this ultra-brief summary of the modular account of the 
capability approach here unclear: please bear with me until we have reached the 
end of this chapter, when the different modules will have been unpacked and 
explained in detail. 
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conceptual framework for a range of evaluative exercises, including 
most prominently the following: (1) the assessment of individual levels 
of achieved wellbeing and wellbeing freedom; (2) the evaluation and 
assessment of social arrangements or institutions;3 and (3) the design of 
policies and other forms of social change in society.
We can trace some aspects of the capability approach back to, 
among others, Aristotle, Adam Smith, Karl Marx and John Stuart Mill,4 
yet it is Sen who pioneered the approach and a growing number of 
other scholars across the humanities and the social sciences who have 
significantly developed it — most significantly Martha Nussbaum, who 
has developed the capability approach into a partial theory of social 
justice.5 Nussbaum also understands her own capabilities account as a 
version of a theory of human rights.6 The capability approach purports 
that freedom to achieve wellbeing is a matter of what people are able to 
do and to be, and thus the kind of life they are effectively able to lead. The 
capability approach is generally conceived as a flexible and multipurpose 
framework, rather than a precise theory (Sen 1992a, 48; Alkire 2005; 
Robeyns 2005b, 2016b; Qizilbash 2012; Hick and Burchardt 2016, 78). 
The open-ended and underspecified nature of the capability approach is 
crucial, but it has not made it easier for its students to understand what 
kind of theoretical endeavour the capability approach exactly is. How 
should we understand it? Isn’t there a better account possible than the 
3  Amartya Sen often uses the term “social arrangement”, which is widely used in the 
social choice literature and in some other parts of the literature on the capability 
approach. Yet this term is not very widely used in other disciplines, and many 
have wondered what “social arrangement” exactly means (e.g. Béteille 1993). Other 
scholars tend to use the term “institutions”, using a broad definition — understood 
as the formal and informal rules in society that structure, facilitate and delineate 
actions and interactions. “Institutions” are thus not merely laws and formal rules 
such as those related to the system of property rights or the social security system, 
but also informal rules and social norms, such as social norms that expect women 
to be responsible for raising the children and caring for the ill and elderly, or forbid 
members of different castes to work together or interact on an equal footing. 
4  See Nussbaum (1988, 1992), Sen (1993a, 1999a, 14, 24); Walsh (2000); Qizilbash 
(2016); Basu and López-Calva (2011, 156–59).
5  A partial theory of justice is a theory that gives us an account of some aspects 
of what justice requires, but does not comment on what justice requires in other 
instances or areas. 
6  On the relationship between capabilities and human rights, see section 3.14.
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somewhat limited description of the capability approach as ‘an open, 
flexible and multi-purpose framework’? Answering these questions will 
be the task of this chapter.7 
The open and underspecified nature of the capability approach also 
explains why the term ‘capability approach’ was adopted and is now 
widely used rather than ‘capability theory’. Yet as I will argue in section 
2.3, we could use the terms ‘capability theory’ and ‘capability approach’ 
in a more illuminating way to signify a more substantive difference, 
which will help us to get a better grip on the capability literature. 
It may be helpful to introduce the term ‘advantage’ here, which is a 
technical term used in academic debates about interpersonal comparisons 
and in debates about distributive justice.8 A person’s advantage is 
those aspects of that person’s interests that matter (generally, or in a 
specific context). Hence ‘advantage’ could refer to a person’s achieved 
wellbeing, or it could refer to her opportunity to achieve wellbeing, or 
it could refer to her negative freedoms, or to her positive freedoms, or 
to some other aspect of her interests. By using the very general term 
‘advantage’, we allow ourselves to remain agnostic between the more 
particular specifications of that term;9 our analysis will apply to all 
the different ways in which ‘advantage’ could be used. This technical 
term ‘advantage’ thus allows us to move the arguments to a higher 
level of generality or abstraction, since we can focus, for example, on 
which conditions interpersonal comparisons of advantage need to meet, 
without having to decide on the exact content of ‘advantage’.
7  For earlier attempts to describe the capability approach, see amongst others 
Deneulin (2014); Gasper (2007, 1997); Alkire, Qizilbash and Comim (2008); Qizilbash 
(2012); Robeyns (2005b, 2016b).
8  A ‘technical term’ is a term which is used in a specialist debate, and has a meaning 
that is defined within that debate. In many cases, the term refers to something other 
than its referent in common-sense language (that is, a layperson’s use of language). 
9  To ‘remain agnostic’ means that, for the purpose of that analysis, one does not 
make a choice between different options, and hence proceeds with an analysis that 
should be valid for all those options. This does not mean that one cannot make a 
choice, or really believes that all available options are equally good, but rather that 
one wants to present an analysis that is applicable to as wide a range of choices as 
possible. 
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Within the capability approach, there are two different specifications 
of ‘advantage’: achieved wellbeing, and the freedom to achieve 
wellbeing. The notions of ‘functionings’ and ‘capabilities’ — which will 
be explained in detail in section 2.6.1 — are used to flesh out the account 
of achieved wellbeing and the freedom to achieve wellbeing.10 Whether 
the capability approach is used to analyse distributive injustice, or 
measure poverty, or develop curriculum design — in all these projects 
the capability approach prioritises certain people’s beings and doings 
and their opportunities to realize those beings and doings (such as their 
genuine opportunities to be educated, their ability to move around or 
to enjoy supportive social relationships). This stands in contrast to other 
accounts of advantage, which focus exclusively on mental categories 
(such as happiness) or on the material means to wellbeing (such as 
resources like income or wealth).11 
Thus, the capability approach is a conceptual framework, which is 
in most cases used as a normative framework for the evaluation and 
assessment of individual wellbeing and that of institutions, in addition 
to its much more infrequent use for non-normative purposes.12 It can 
be used to evaluate a range of values that draw on an assessment of 
people’s wellbeing, such as inequality, poverty, changes in the wellbeing 
of persons or the average wellbeing of the members of a group. It can 
also be used as an evaluative tool providing an alternative for social 
cost-benefit analysis, or as a framework within which to design and 
10  Following Amartya Sen (1985c), some would say there are four different ideas 
of advantage in the capability approach: achieved wellbeing, freedom to achieve 
wellbeing, achieved agency, and freedom to achieve agency. Yet whether the 
capability approach should always and for all purposes consider agency freedom 
to be an end in itself is disputed, and depends in large measure on what one wants 
to use the capability approach for. 
11  Of course, it doesn’t follow that mental categories or the material means play 
no role at all; but the normative priority lies with functionings and capabilities, 
and hence happiness or material resources play a more limited role (and, in the 
case of resources, a purely instrumental role). The relations between functionings/
capabilities and resources will be elaborated in 3.12; the relationship between 
functionings/capabilities and happiness will be elaborated in more detail in 
section 3.8.
12  On whether the capability approach can be used for explanatory purposes, see 
section 3.10.
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evaluate policies and institutions, such as welfare state design in 
affluent societies, or poverty reduction strategies by governments and 
non-governmental organisations in developing countries.
What does it mean, exactly, if we say that something is a normative 
analysis? Unfortunately, social scientists and philosophers use these 
terms slightly differently. My estimate is that, given their numerical 
dominance, the terminology that social scientists use is dominant 
within the capability literature. Yet the terminology of philosophers is 
more refined and hence I will start by explaining the philosophers’ use 
of those terms, and then lay out how social scientists use them.
What might a rough typology of research in this area look like? 
By drawing on some discussions on methods in ethics and political 
philosophy (O. O’Neill 2009; List and Valentini 2016), I would like 
to propose the following typology for use within the capability 
literature. There are (at least) five types of research that are relevant 
for the capability approach. The first type of scholarship is conceptual 
research, which conducts conceptual analysis — the investigation of 
how we should use and understand certain concepts such as ‘freedom’, 
‘democracy’, ‘wellbeing’, and so forth. An example of such conceptual 
analysis is provided in section 3.3, where I offer a (relatively simple) 
conceptual analysis of the question of what kind of freedoms (if any) 
capabilities could be. The second strand of research is descriptive. Here, 
research and analyses provide us with an empirical understanding 
of a phenomenon by describing it. This could be done with different 
methods, from the thick descriptions provided by ethnographic methods 
to the quantitative methods that are widely used in mainstream social 
sciences. The third type of research is explanatory analysis. This research 
provides an explanation of a phenomenon — what the mechanisms are 
that cause a phenomenon, or what the determinants of a phenomenon 
are. For example, the social determinants of health: the parameters 
or factors that determine the distribution of health outcomes over 
the population. A fourth type of research is evaluative, and consists of 
analyses in which values are used to evaluate a state of affairs. A claim is 
evaluative if it relies on evaluative terms, such as good or bad, better or 
worse, or desirable or undesirable. Finally, an analysis is normative if it is 
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prescriptive — it entails a moral norm that tells us what we ought to do.13 
Evaluative analyses and prescriptive analyses are closely intertwined, 
and often we first conduct an evaluative analysis, which is followed by 
a prescriptive analysis, e.g. by policy recommendations, as is done, for 
example, in the evaluative analysis of India’s development conducted 
by Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen (2013). However, one could also make 
an evaluative analysis while leaving the prescriptive analysis for 
someone else to make, perhaps leaving it to the agents who need to 
make the change themselves. For example, one can use the capability 
approach to make an evaluation or assessment of inequalities between 
men and women, without drawing prescriptive conclusions (Robeyns 
2003, 2006a). Or one can make a prescriptive analysis that is not based 
on an evaluation, because it is based on universal moral rules. Examples 
are the capability theories of justice by Nussbaum (2000; 2006b) and 
Claassen (2016).
The difference with the dominant terminology used by economists 
(and other social scientists) is that they only distinguish between two 
types of analysis: ‘positive’ versus ‘normative’ economics, whereby 
‘positive’ economics is seen as relying only on ‘facts’, whereas ‘normative 
economics’ also relies on values (e.g. Reiss 2013, 3). Hence economists 
do not distinguish between what philosophers call ‘evaluative analysis’ 
and ‘normative analysis’ but rather lump them both together under 
the heading ‘normative analysis’. The main take-home message is that 
the capability approach is used predominantly in the field of ethical 
analysis (philosophers’ terminology) or normative analysis (economists’ 
terminology), somewhat less often in the fields of descriptive analysis 
and conceptual analysis, and least in the field of explanatory analysis. 
We will revisit this in section 3.10, where we address whether the 
capability approach can be an explanatory theory. 
13  Alkire (2008) calls these normative applications “prospective analysis”, and argues 
that we need to distinguish the evaluative applications of the capability approach 
from the “prospective applications” of the capability approach. I agree, but since we 
should avoid introducing new terms when the terms needed are already available, 
it would be better to use the term ‘prescriptive applications’ or, as philosophers do, 
‘normative analysis’, rather than introducing ‘prospective applications’ as a new 
term. 
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2.3 The capability approach  
versus capability theories
The above preliminary definition highlights that the capability 
approach is an open-ended and underspecified framework, which 
can be used for multiple purposes. It is open-ended because the general 
capability approach can be developed in a range of different directions, 
with different purposes, and it is underspecified because additional 
specifications are needed before the capability approach can become 
effective for a particular purpose — especially if we want it to be 
normative (whether evaluative or prescriptive). As a consequence, ‘the 
capability approach’ itself is an open, general idea, but there are many 
different ways to ‘close’ or ‘specify’ this notion. What is needed for this 
specifying or closing of the capability approach will depend on the 
aim of using the approach, e.g. whether we want to develop it into a 
(partial) theory of justice, or use it to assess inequality, or conceptualise 
development, or use it for some other purpose. 
This distinction between the general, open, underspecified capability 
approach, and its particular use for specific purposes is absolutely 
crucial if we want to understand it properly. In order to highlight that 
distinction, but also to make it easier for us to be clear when we are 
talking about the general, open, underspecified capability approach, 
and when we are talking about a particular use for specific purposes, 
I propose that we use two different terms (Robeyns 2016b, 398). Let us 
use the term ‘the capability approach’ for the general, open, underspecified 
approach, and let us employ the term ‘a capability theory’ or ‘a capability 
analysis, capability account or capability application’ for a specific use of 
the capability approach, that is, for a use that has a specific goal, such 
as measuring poverty and deriving some policy prescriptions, or 
developing a capabilitarian cost-benefit analysis, or theorising about 
human rights, or developing a theory of social justice. In order to 
improve readability, I will speak in what follows of ‘a capability theory’ 
as a short-hand for ‘a capability account, or capability application, or 
capability theory’.14
14  I kindly request readers who are primarily interested in the capability approach 
for policy design and (empirical) applications to read ‘capability application’ every 
time the term ‘capability theory’ is used. 
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One reason why this distinction between ‘capability approach’ and 
‘capability theory’ is so important, is that many theories with which the 
capability approach has been compared over time are specific theories, 
not general open frameworks. For example, John Rawls’s famous 
theory of justice is not a general approach but rather a specific theory 
of institutional justice (Rawls 2009), and this has made the comparison 
with the capability approach at best difficult (Robeyns 2008b). The 
appropriate comparison would be Rawls’s theory of justice with a 
properly developed capability theory of justice, such as Nussbaum’s 
Frontiers of Justice (Nussbaum 2006b), but not Rawls’s theory of justice 
with the (general) capability approach. 
Another reason why the distinction between ‘capability approach’ 
and ‘capability theory’ is important, is that it can help provide an 
answer to the “number of authors [who] ‘complain’ that the capability 
approach does not address questions they put to it” (Alkire 2005, 123). 
That complaint is misguided, since the capability approach cannot, by 
its very nature, answer all the questions that should instead be put to 
particular capability theories. For example, it is a mistake to criticise 
Amartya Sen because he has not drawn up a specific list of relevant 
functionings in his capability approach; that critique would only have 
bite if Sen were to develop a particular capability theory or capability 
application where the selection of functionings is a requirement.15 
In short, there is one capability approach and there are many 
capability theories, and keeping that distinction sharply in mind should 
clear up many misunderstandings in the literature. 
However, if we accept the distinction between capability theories 
and the capability approach, it raises the question of what these 
different capability theories have in common. Before addressing that 
issue, I first want to present a bottom-up description of the many 
modes in which capability analyses have been conducted. This will 
give us a better sense of what the capability approach has been used 
for, and what it can do for us. 
15  Yet even for capability theories, it is unlikely that Sen would agree that he has to 
draw up a list of capabilities, since he is a proponent of a procedural method for 
selecting capabilities. At the beginning of this century, there was a fierce discussion 
in the capability literature about whether it was a valid critique of Sen’s work that 
it lacked a specific list (Nussbaum 2003a; Robeyns 2003; Sen 2004a; Qizilbash 2005). 
Luckily that debate seems to be settled now. For an overview of the different ways 
in which dimensions can be selected in the capability approach, see section 2.7.2.
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2.4 The many modes of capability analysis 
If the capability approach is an open framework, then what are the ways 
in which it has been closed to form more specific and powerful analyses? 
Scholars use the capability approach for different types of analysis, 
with different goals, relying on different methodologies, with different 
corresponding roles for functionings and capabilities. Not all of these 
are capability theories; some are capability applications, both empirical 
as well as theoretical. We can observe that there is a rich diversity of 
ways in which the capability approach has been used. Table 2.1 gives 
an overview of these different usages, by listing the different types of 
capability analyses.
Normative theorising within the capability approach is often done 
by moral and political philosophers. The capability approach is then 
used as one element of a normative theory, such as a theory of justice 
or a theory of disadvantage. For example, Elizabeth Anderson (1999) 
has proposed the outlines of a theory of social justice (which she calls 
“democratic equality”) in which certain basic levels of capabilities that 
are needed to function as equal citizens should be guaranteed to all. 
Martha Nussbaum (2006b) has developed a minimal theory of social 
justice in which she defends a list of basic capabilities that everyone 
should be entitled to, as a matter of human dignity.
While most normative theorising within the capability approach 
has related to justice, other values have also been developed and 
analysed using the capability approach. Some theorists of freedom 
have developed accounts of freedom or rights using the capability 
approach (van Hees 2013). Another important value that has been 
studied from the perspective of the capability approach is ecological 
sustainability (e.g. Anand and Sen 1994, 2000; Robeyns and Van der 
Veen 2007; Lessmann and Rauschmayer 2013; Crabtree 2013; Sen 
2013). Efficiency is a value about which very limited conceptual 
work is done, but which nevertheless is inescapably normative, and 
it can be theorised in many different ways (Le Grand 1990; Heath 
2006). If we ask what efficiency is, we could answer by referring to 
Pareto optimality or x-efficiency, but we could also develop a notion 
of efficiency from a capability perspective (Sen 1993b). Such a notion 
would answer the question ‘efficiency of what?’ with ‘efficiency in the 
space of capabilities (or functionings, or a mixture)’.
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Quantitative social scientists, especially economists, are mostly 
interested in measurement. This quantitative work could serve 
different purposes, e.g. the measurement of multidimensional 
poverty analysis (Alkire and Foster 2011; Alkire et al. 2015), or the 
measurement of the disadvantages faced by disabled people (Kuklys 
2005; Zaidi and Burchardt 2005). Moreover, some quantitative social 
scientists, mathematicians, and econometricians have been working 
on investigating the methods that could be used for quantitative 
capability analyses (Kuklys 2005; Di Tommaso 2007; Krishnakumar 
2007; Krishnakumar and Ballon 2008; Krishnakumar and Nagar 2008).
Thick description or descriptive analysis is another mode of 
capability analysis. For example, it can be used to describe the realities 
of schoolgirls in countries that may have formal access to school for both 
girls and boys, but where other hurdles (such as high risk of rape on the 
way to school, or the lack of sanitary provisions at school) mean that this 
formal right is not enough to guarantee these girls the corresponding 
capability (Unterhalter 2003b). 
Finally, the capability approach can be used for conceptual work 
beyond the conceptualisation of values, as is done within normative 
philosophy. Sometimes the capability approach lends itself well to 
providing a better understanding of a certain phenomenon. For example, 
we could understand education as a legal right or as an investment in 
human capital, but we could also conceptualise it as the expansion of a 
capability, or develop an account of education that draws on both the 
capability approach and human rights theory. This would not only help 
us to look differently at what education is; a different conceptualisation 
would also have normative implications, for example related to the 
curriculum design, or to answer the question of what is needed to 
ensure that capability, or of how much education should be guaranteed 
to children with low potential market-related human capital (McCowan 
2011; Nussbaum 2012; Robeyns 2006c; Walker 2012a; Walker and 
Unterhalter 2007; Wigley and Akkoyunlu-Wigley 2006). 
Of course, texts and research projects often have multiple goals, and 
therefore particular studies often mix these different goals and methods. 
Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen’s (1996, 2002, 2013) comprehensive 
analyses of India’s human development achievements are in part an 
evaluative analysis based on various social indicators, but also in part 
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a prescriptive analysis. Similarly, Nussbaum’s (2000) book Women and 
Human Development is primarily normative and philosophical, but 
also includes thick descriptions of how institutions enable or hamper 
people’s capabilities, by focussing on the lives of particular women. 
What is the value of distinguishing between different uses of 
the capability approach? It is important because functionings and 
capabilities — the core concepts in the capability approach — play 
different roles in each type of analysis. In quality of life measurement, 
the functionings and capabilities are the social indicators that reflect a 
person’s quality of life. In thick descriptions and descriptive analysis, the 
functionings and capabilities form part of the narrative. This narrative 
can aim to reflect the quality of life, but it can also aim to understand 
some other aspect of people’s lives, such as by explaining behaviour 
that might appear irrational according to traditional economic analysis, 
or revealing layers of complexities that a quantitative analysis can rarely 
capture. In philosophical reasoning, the functionings and capabilities 
play yet another role, as they are often part of the foundations of a 
utopian account of a just society or of the goals that morally sound 
policies should pursue. 
The flexibility of functionings and capabilities, which can be applied 
in different ways within different types of capability analysis, means that 
there are no hard and fast rules that govern how to select the relevant 
capabilities. Each type of analysis, with its particular goals, will require 
its own answer to this question. The different roles that functionings 
and capabilities can play in different types of capability analyses have 
important implications for the question of how to select the relevant 
capabilities: each type of analysis, with its particular goals, will require 
its own answer to this question. The selection of capabilities as social 
indicators of the quality of life is a very different undertaking from 
the selection of capabilities for a utopian theory of justice: the quality 
standards for research and scholarship are different, the epistemic 
constraints of the research are different, the best available practices in 
the field are different. Moral philosophers, quantitative social scientists, 
and qualitative social scientists have each signed up to a different set 
of meta-theoretical assumptions, and find different academic practices 
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acceptable and unacceptable. For example, many ethnographers tend to 
reject normative theorising and also often object to what they consider 
the reductionist nature of quantitative empirical analysis, whereas many 
economists tend to discard the thick descriptions by ethnographers, 
claiming they are merely anecdotal and hence not scientific. 
Two remarks before closing this section. First, providing a typology 
of the work on the capability approach, as this section attempts to do, 
remains work in progress. In 2004, I could only discern three main 
modes of capability analysis: quality of life analysis; thick description/
descriptive analysis; and normative theories — though I left open the 
possibility that the capability approach could be used for other goals 
too (Robeyns 2005a). In her book Creating Capabilities, Nussbaum 
(2011) writes that the capability approach comes in only two modes: 
comparative qualify of life assessment, and as a theory of justice. I don’t 
think that is correct: not all modes of capability analysis can be reduced 
to these two modes, as I have argued elsewhere in detail (Robeyns 2011, 
2016b). The different modes of capability analysis described in table 2.1 
provide a more comprehensive overview, but we should not assume 
that this overview is complete. It is quite likely that table 2.1 will, in 
due course, have to be updated to reflect new types of work that uses 
the capability approach. Moreover, one may also prefer another way 
to categorise the different types of work done within the capability 
literature, and hence other typologies are possible and may be more 
illuminating. 
Second, it is important that we fully acknowledge the diversity of 
disciplines, the diversity of goals we have for the creation of knowledge, 
and the diversity of methods used within the capability approach. At 
the same time, we need not forget that some aspects of its development 
might need to be discipline-specific, or specific for one’s goals. As a 
result, the capability approach is at the same time multidisciplinary, 
interdisciplinary, but also forms part of developments within disciplines 
and methods. These different ‘faces’ of the capability approach all need 
to be fully acknowledged if we want to understand it in a nuanced and 
complete way. 
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2.5 The modular view of the capability approach
It is time to take stock. What do we already know about the capability 
approach, and what questions are raised by the analysis so far? 
The capability approach is an open approach, and depending on 
its purpose can be developed into a range of capability theories or 
capabilitarian applications. It is focused on what people can do and 
be (their capabilities) and on what they are actually achieving in terms 
of beings and doings (their functionings). However, this still does 
not answer the question of what kind of framework the capability 
approach is. Can we give an account of a capability theory that is more 
enlightening regarding what exactly makes a theory a capabilitarian 
theory, and what doesn’t?
In this book, I present an account of the capability approach that, 
on the one hand, makes clear what all capability theories share, yet on 
the other hand allows us to better understand the many forms that a 
capability theory or capability account can take — hence to appreciate 
the diversity within the capability approach more fully. The modular 
view that I present here is a modified (and, I hope, improved) version 
of the cartwheel model that I have developed elsewhere (Robeyns 
2016b). The modular view shifts the focus a little bit from the question 
of how to understand the capability approach in general, to the 
question of how the various capability accounts, applications and 
theories should be understood and how they should be constructed. 
After all, students, scholars, policy makers and activists are often not 
concerned with the capability approach in general, but rather want to 
know whether it would be a smart idea to use the capability approach 
to construct a particular capability theory, application or account for 
the problem or question they are trying to analyse. In order to answer 
the question of whether, for their purposes, the capability approach is 
a helpful framework to consider, they need to know what is needed 
for a capability theory, application or account. The modular view that 
will follow will give those who want to develop a capability theory, 
application or analysis a list of properties their theory has to meet, 
a list of choices that need to be made but in which several options 
regarding content are possible, and a list of modules that they could 
take into account, but which will not always be necessary. 
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Recall that in order to improve readability, I use the term ‘a capability 
theory’ as a short-hand for ‘a capability account, or capability analysis, 
or capability application, or capability theory’. A capability theory is 
constructed based on three different types of module, which (in order 
to facilitate discussion) will be called the A-module, B-modules and 
C-modules. The A-module is a single module which is compulsory 
for all capability theories. The A-module consists of a number of 
propositions (definitions and claims) which a capability theory should 
not violate. This is the core of the capability approach, and hence entails 
those properties that all capability theories share. The B-modules consist 
of a range of non-optional modules with optional content. That is, if 
we construct a capability theory, we have to consider the issue that the 
module addresses, but there are several different options to choose from 
in considering that particular issue. For example, module B1 concerns the 
‘purpose’ of the theory: do we want to make a theory of justice, or a more 
comprehensive evaluative framework for societal institutions, or do we 
want to measure poverty or inequality, or design a curriculum, or do we 
want to use the capability approach to conceptualise ‘social progress’ 
or ‘efficiency’ or to rethink the role of universities in the twenty-first 
century? All these purposes are possible within the capability approach. 
The point of seeing these as B-modules is that one has to be clear about 
one’s purpose, but there are many different purposes possible. The 
C-modules are either contingent on a particular choice made in a 
B-module, or they can be fully optional. For example, one can offer a 
comprehensive evaluation of a country’s development path, and decide 
that as part of this evaluation, one wants to include particular accounts 
of the history and culture of that country, since this may make more 
comprehensible the reasons why that country has taken this particular 
development path rather than another. The particular historical account 
that would be part of one’s capability theory would then be optional.16
16  To say that the insertion of those theories is fully optional is not the same as saying 
that capability theories that will be developed with different types of additional 
complementary theories will all be equally good. For example, historians are very 
likely to think that most theories, even normative theories, have to be historically 
informed, and hence the relevant historical knowledge will need to be added to 
a capability theory. But these are matters of dispute that have to be debated, and 
cannot be settled by narrowing down the definition of a capability theory. 
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Given this three-fold structure of the modular view of capability 
theories, let us now investigate what the content of the compulsory 
module A is, as well as what the options are within the B-modules and 
C-modules. 
2.6 The A-module: the non-optional core  
of all capability theories
What, then, is the content of the A-module, which all capability theories 
should share? Table 2.2 presents the keywords for the eight elements of 
the A-module. 
Table 2.2 The content of the compulsory module A
A1: Functionings and capabilities as core concepts
A2: Functionings and capabilities are value-neutral categories 
A3: Conversion factors 
A4: The distinction between means and ends
A5: Functionings and/or capabilities form the evaluative space
A6: Other dimensions of ultimate value
A7: Value pluralism
A8: Valuing each person as an end
2.6.1 A1: Functionings and capabilities
Functionings and capabilities are the core concepts in the capability 
approach. They are also the dimensions in which interpersonal 
comparisons of ‘advantage’ are made (this is what property A5 
entails).17 They are the most important distinctive features of all 
capabilitarian theories. There are some differences in the usage of these 
notions between different capability theorists,18 but these differences 
do not affect the essence of these notions: capabilities are what people 
are able to be and to do, and functionings point to the corresponding 
achievements. 
17  See section 2.2 for an explanation of the technical term ‘advantage’. 
18  For some core differences in the way Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen use the 
terms ‘functionings’ and ‘capabilities’, see section 3.2.
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Capabilities are real freedoms or real opportunities, which do 
not refer to access to resources or opportunities for certain levels of 
satisfaction. Examples of ‘beings’ are being well-nourished, being 
undernourished, being sheltered and housed in a decent house, being 
educated, being illiterate, being part of a supportive social network; 
these also include very different beings such as being part of a criminal 
network and being depressed. Examples of the ‘doings’ are travelling, 
caring for a child, voting in an election, taking part in a debate, taking 
drugs, killing animals, eating animals, consuming great amounts of fuel 
in order to heat one’s house, and donating money to charity. 
Capabilities are a person’s real freedoms or opportunities to achieve 
functionings.19 Thus, while travelling is a functioning, the real 
opportunity to travel is the corresponding capability. A person who 
does not travel may or may not be free and able to travel; the notion 
of capability seeks to capture precisely the fact of whether the person 
could travel if she wanted to. The distinction between functionings 
and capabilities is between the realized and the effectively possible, in 
other words, between achievements, on the one hand, and freedoms or 
opportunities from which one can choose, on the other.
Functionings are constitutive of human life. At least, this is a 
widespread view, certainly in the social sciences, policy studies, and 
in a significant part of philosophy — and I think it is a view that is 
helpful for the interdisciplinary, practical orientation that the vast 
majority of capability research has.20 That means one cannot be a human 
being without having at least a range of functionings; they make the 
lives of human beings both lives (as opposed to the existence of innate 
objects) and human (in contrast to the lives of trees or animals). Human 
functionings are those beings and doings that constitute human life and 
that are central to our understandings of ourselves as human beings. 
It is hard to think of any phenomenological account of the lives of 
19  See also section 3.3 which discusses in more depth the kind of freedoms or 
opportunities that capabilities are. 
20  The exceptions are those philosophers who want to develop normative theories 
while steering away from any metaphysical claims (that is, claims about how things 
are when we try to uncover their essential nature). I agree that the description of 
‘functionings’ and ‘capabilities’ in this section makes metaphysical claims, but I 
think they are very ‘minimal’ (in the sense that they are not wildly implausible, and 
still leave open a wide variety of theories to be developed) and hence we should not 
be troubled by these metaphysical assumptions.
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humans — either an account given by a human being herself, or an 
account from a third-person perspective — which does not include a 
description of a range of human functionings. Yet, not all beings and 
doings are functionings; for example, flying like a bird or living for two 
hundred years like an oak tree are not human functionings. 
In addition, some human beings or doings may not be constitutive 
but rather contingent upon our social institutions; these, arguably, 
should not qualify as ‘universal functionings’ — that is, functionings 
no matter the social circumstances in which one lives — but are rather 
‘context-dependent functionings’, functionings that are to a significant 
extent dependent on the existing social structures. For example, ‘owning 
a house’ is not a universal functioning, yet ‘being sheltered in a safe way 
and protected from the elements’ is a universal functioning. One can also 
include the capability of being sheltered in government-funded housing 
or by a rental market for family houses, which is regulated in such a 
way that it does not endanger important aspects of that capability. 
Note that many features of a person could be described either as a 
being or as a doing: we can say that a person is housed in a pleasantly 
warm dwelling, or that this person does consume lots of energy to keep her 
house warm. Yet other functionings are much more straightforwardly 
described as either a being or a doing, for example ‘being healthy’ (a 
being) or ‘killing animals’ (a doing). 
A final remark. Acknowledging that functionings and capabilities 
are the core concepts of the capability approach generates some further 
conceptual questions, which have not all been sufficiently addressed in 
the literature. An important question is whether additional structural 
requirements that apply to the relations between various capabilities 
should be imposed on the capability approach in general (not merely 
as a particular choice for a specific capability theory). Relatively little 
work has been done on the question of the conceptual properties 
of capabilities understood as freedoms or opportunities and on the 
question of the minimum requirements of the opportunity set that 
make up these various capabilities. But it is clear that more needs to 
be said about which properties we want functionings, capabilities, and 
capability sets to meet. One important property has been pointed out 
by Kaushik Basu (1987), who argued that the moral relevance lies not in 
the various capabilities each taken by themselves and only considering 
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the choices made by one person. Rather, the moral relevance lies in 
whether capabilities are truly available to us given the choices made by 
others, since that is the real freedom to live our lives in various ways, 
as it is truly open to us. For example, if a teenager lives in a family in 
which there are only enough resources for one of the children to pursue 
higher education, then he only truly has the capability to pursue higher 
education if none of his older siblings has made that choice before him.21 
2.6.2 A2: Functionings and capabilities  
are value-neutral categories
Functionings and capabilities are defined in a value-neutral way. Many 
functionings are valuable, but not all functionings necessarily have a 
positive value. Instead, some functionings have no value or even have 
a negative value, e.g. the functioning of being affected by a painful, 
debilitating and ultimately incurable illness, suffering from excessive 
levels of stress, or engaging in acts of unjustifiable violence. In those 
latter cases, we are better off without that functionings outcome, 
and the functionings outcome has a negative value. Functionings are 
constitutive elements of human life, which consist of both wellbeing 
and ill-being. The notion of functionings should, therefore, be value-
neutral in the sense that we should conceptually allow for the idea of 
‘bad functionings’ or functionings with a negative value (Deneulin and 
Stewart 2002, 67; Nussbaum 2003a, 45; Stewart 2005, 190; Carter 2014, 
79–81). 
There are many beings and doings that have negative value, but they 
are still ‘a being’ or ‘a doing’ and, hence, a functioning. Nussbaum made 
that point forcefully when she argued that the capability to rape should 
not be a capability that we have reason to protect (Nussbaum 2003: 
44–45). A country could effectively enable people to rape, for example, 
either when rape is not illegal (as it is not between husband and wife in 
many countries), or when rape is illegal, but de facto never leads to any 
21  Arguably, some of that work is being done by social choice theorists and others 
working with axiomatic methods, but unfortunately almost none of the insights 
of that work have spread among the disciplines within the capability literature 
where axiomatic and other formal methods are not used (and, presumably, not well 
understood). See, for example, Pattanaik (2006); Xu (2002); Gotoh, Suzumura and 
Yoshihara (2005); Gaertner and Xu (2006, 2008).
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punishment of the aggressor. If there is a set of social norms justifying 
rape, and would-be rapists help each other to be able to rape, then 
would-be rapists in that country effectively enjoy the capability to rape. 
But clearly, rape is a moral bad, and a huge harm to its victims; it is thus 
not a capability that a country should want to protect. This example 
illustrates that functionings as well as capabilities can be harmful or 
have a negative value, as well as be positive or valuable. At an abstract 
and general level, ‘functionings’ and ‘capabilities’ are thus in themselves 
neutral concepts, and hence we cannot escape the imperative to decide 
which ones we want to support and enable, and which ones we want to 
fight or eliminate. Frances Stewart and Séverine Deneulin (2002, 67) put 
it as follows: 
[…] some capabilities have negative values (e.g. committing murder), 
while others may be trivial (riding a one-wheeled bicycle). Hence there is 
a need to differentiate between ‘valuable’ and non-valuable capabilities, 
and indeed, within the latter, between those that are positive but of lesser 
importance and those that actually have negative value.
The above examples show that some functionings can be unequivocally 
good (e.g. being in good health) or unequivocally bad (e.g. being 
raped or being murdered). In those cases, there will be unanimity on 
whether the functionings outcome is bad or good. But now we need to 
add a layer of complexity. Sometimes, it will be a matter of doubt, or of 
dispute, whether a functioning will be good or bad — or the goodness 
or badness may depend on the context and/or the normative theory we 
endorse. An interesting example is giving care, or ‘care work’.22 Clearly 
being able to care for someone could be considered a valuable capability. 
For example, in the case of child care, there is much joy to be gained, and 
many parents would like to work less so as to spend more time with 
their children. But care work has a very ambiguous character if we try 
to answer whether it should be considered to be a valuable functioning 
from the perspective of the person who does the care. Lots of care is 
performed primarily because there is familial or social pressure put on 
someone (generally women) to do so, or because no-one else is doing it 
22  On the complex nature of ‘care’, and what the need to care and be cared for requires 
from a just society, see e.g. Tronto (1987); Kittay (1999); Nussbaum (2006b); Folbre 
(1994); Folbre and Bittman (2004); Engster (2007); Gheaus (2011); Gheaus and 
Robeyns (2011). 
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(Lewis and Giullari 2005). There is also the hypothesis that care work 
can be a positive functioning if done for a limited amount of time, but 
becomes a negative functioning if it is done for many hours. Hence, from 
the functionings outcome in itself, we cannot conclude whether this is 
a positive element of that person’s quality of life, or rather a negative 
element; in fact, sometimes it will be an ambiguous situation, which 
cannot easily be judged (Robeyns 2003). 
One could wonder, though, whether this ambiguity cannot simply 
be resolved by reformulating the corresponding capability slightly 
differently. In theory, this may be true. If there are no empirical 
constraints related to the observations we can make, then one could in 
many cases rephrase such functionings that are ambiguously valued into 
another capability where its valuation is clearly positive. For example, 
one could say that the functioning of providing care in itself can be 
ambiguous (since some people do too much, thereby harming their own 
longer-term wellbeing, or do it because no-one else is providing the care 
and social norms require them to do it). Yet there is a closely related 
capability that is clearly valuable: the capability to provide hands-on 
care, which takes into account that one has a robust choice not to care if 
one does not want to, and that one does not find oneself in a situation in 
which the care is of insufficient quantity and/or quality if one does not 
deliver the care oneself. If such a robust capability to care is available, it 
would be genuinely valuable, since one would have a real option not 
to choose the functioning without paying an unacceptable price (e.g. 
that the person in need of care is not properly cared for). However, 
the problem with this solution, of reformulating functionings that are 
ambiguously valuable into capabilities that are unequivocally valuable, 
is the constraints it places on empirical information. We may be able to 
use these layers of filters and conditions in first-person analyses, or in 
ethnographic analyses, but in most cases not in large-scale empirical 
analyses. 
Many specific capability theories make the mistake of defining 
functionings as those beings and doings that one has reason to value. 
But the problem with this value-laden definition is that it collapses two 
aspects of the development of a capability theory into one: the definition 
of the relevant space (e.g. income, or happiness, or functionings) and, 
once we have chosen our functionings and capabilities, the normative 
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decision regarding which of those capabilities will be the focus of our 
theory. We may agree on the first issue and not on the second and still 
both rightly believe that we endorse a capability theory — yet this is 
only possible if we analytically separate the normative choice for 
functionings and capabilities from the additional normative decision 
of which functionings we will regard as valuable and which we will 
not regard as valuable. Collapsing these two normative moments into 
one is not a good idea; instead, we need to acknowledge that there 
are two normative moves being made when we use functionings and 
capabilities as our evaluative space, and we need to justify each of those 
two normative moves separately. 
Note that the value-laden definition of functionings and capabilities, 
which defines them as always good and valuable, may be less 
problematic when one develops a capability theory of severe poverty or 
destitution. We all agree that poor health, poor housing, poor sanitation, 
poor nutrition and social exclusion are dimensions of destitution. So, for 
example, the dimensions chosen for the Multidimensional Poverty Index 
developed by Sabina Alkire and her colleagues — health, education and 
living standard — may not elicit much disagreement.23 But for many 
other capability theories, it is disputed whether a particular functionings 
outcome is valuable or not. The entire field of applied ethics is filled with 
questions and cases in which these disputes are debated. Is sex work 
bad for adult sex workers, or should it be seen as a valuable capability? 
Is the capability of parents not to vaccinate their children against polio 
or measles a valuable freedom? If employees in highly competitive 
organisations are not allowed to read their emails after working hours, 
is that then a valuable capability that is taken away from them, or are we 
protecting them from becoming workaholics and protecting them from 
the pressure to work all the time, including at evenings and weekends? 
As these examples show, we need to allow for the conceptual possibility 
that there are functionings that are always valuable, never valuable, 
valuable or non-valuable in some contexts but not in others, or where 
23  The Multidimensional Poverty Index is developed by the Oxford Poverty and 
Human Development Initiative (OPHI), under the leadership of Sabina Alkire. See 
http://www.ophi.org.uk/multidimensional-poverty-index/ for a clear introduction 
of the Multidimensional Poverty Index. For scholarly papers on the Index, as well 
as other work done by the scholars in OPHI, see http://www.ophi.org.uk/resources/
ophi-working-papers/
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we simply are not sure. This requires that functionings and capabilities 
are conceptualised in a value-neutral way, and hence this should be a 
core requirement of the capability approach. 
2.6.3 A3: Conversion factors
A third core idea of the capability approach is that persons have different 
abilities to convert resources into functionings. These are called conversion 
factors: the factors which determine the degree to which a person can 
transform a resource into a functioning. This has been an important 
idea in Amartya Sen’s version of the capability approach (Sen 1992a, 
19–21, 26–30, 37–38) and for those scholars influenced by his writings. 
Resources, such as marketable goods and services, but also goods and 
services emerging from the non-market economy (including household 
production) have certain characteristics that make them of interest to 
people. In Sen’s work in welfare economics, the notion of ‘resources’ was 
limited to material and/or measurable resources (in particular: money 
or consumer goods) but one could also apply the notion of conversion 
factors to a broader understanding of resources, including, for example, 
the educational degrees that one has. 
The example of a bike is often used to illustrate the idea of conversion 
factors. We are interested in a bike not primarily because it is an object 
made from certain materials with a specific shape and colour, but 
because it can take us to places where we want to go, and in a faster way 
than if we were walking. These characteristics of a good or commodity 
enable or contribute to a functioning. A bike enables the functioning 
of mobility, to be able to move oneself freely and more rapidly than 
walking. But a person might be able to turn that resource into a valuable 
functioning to a different degree than other persons, depending on the 
relevant conversion factors. For example, an able-bodied person who 
was taught to ride a bicycle when he was a child has a high conversion 
factor enabling him to turn the bicycle into the ability to move around 
efficiently, whereas a person with a physical impairment or someone 
who never learnt to ride a bike has a very low conversion factor. The 
conversion factors thus represent how much functioning one can get 
out of a resource; in our example, how much mobility the person can 
get out of a bicycle. 
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There are several different types of conversion factors, and the 
conversion factors discussed are often categorized into three groups 
(Robeyns 2005b, 99; Crocker and Robeyns 2009, 68). All conversion 
factors influence how a person can be or is free to convert the 
characteristics of the resources into a functioning, yet the sources of 
these factors may differ. Personal conversion factors are internal to the 
person, such as metabolism, physical condition, sex, reading skills, or 
intelligence. If a person is disabled, or if she is in a bad physical condition, 
or has never learned to cycle, then the bike will be of limited help in 
enabling the functioning of mobility. Social conversion factors are factors 
stemming from the society in which one lives, such as public policies, 
social norms, practices that unfairly discriminate, societal hierarchies, 
or power relations related to class, gender, race, or caste. Environmental 
conversion factors emerge from the physical or built environment in 
which a person lives. Among aspects of one’s geographical location are 
climate, pollution, the likelihood of earthquakes, and the presence or 
absence of seas and oceans. Among aspects of the built environment 
are the stability of buildings, roads, and bridges, and the means of 
transportation and communication. Take again the example of the 
bicycle. How much a bicycle contributes to a person’s mobility depends 
on that person’s physical condition (a personal conversion factor), the 
social mores including whether women are generally allowed to ride a 
bicycle (a social conversion factor), and the availability of decent roads 
or bike paths (an environmental conversion factor). Once we start to be 
aware of the existence of conversion factors, it becomes clear that they 
are a very pervasive phenomenon. For example, a pregnant or lactating 
woman needs more of the same food than another woman in order to 
be well-nourished. Or people living in delta regions need protection 
from flooding if they want to enjoy the same capability of being safely 
sheltered as people living in the mountains. There are an infinite number 
of other examples illustrating the importance of conversion factors. The 
three types of conversion factor all push us to acknowledge that it is 
not sufficient to know the resources a person owns or can use in order 
to be able to assess the wellbeing that he or she has achieved or could 
achieve; rather, we need to know much more about the person and the 
circumstances in which he or she is living. Differences in conversion 
factors are one important source of human diversity, which is a central 
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concern in the capability approach, and will be discussed in more detail 
in section 3.5.
Note that many conversion factors are not fixed or given, but can 
be altered by policies and choices that we make. And the effects of a 
particular conversion factor can also depend on the social and personal 
resources that a person has, as well as on the other conversion factors. 
For example, having a physical impairment that doesn’t allow one to 
walk severely restricts one’s capability to be mobile if one finds oneself 
in a situation in which one doesn’t have access to a wheelchair, and in 
which the state of the roads is bad and vehicles used for public transport 
are not wheelchair-accessible. But suppose now the built environment 
is different: all walking-impaired people have a right to a wheelchair, 
roads are wheelchair-friendly, public transport is wheelchair-accessible 
and society is characterised by a set of social norms whereby people 
consider it nothing but self-evident to provide help to fellow travellers 
who can’t walk. In such an alternative social state, with a different 
set of resources and social and environmental conversion factors, the 
same personal conversion factor (not being able to walk) plays out very 
differently. In sum, in order to know what people are able to do and be, 
we need to analyse the full picture of their resources, and the various 
conversion factors, or else analyse the functionings and capabilities 
directly. The advantage of having a clear picture of the resources needed, 
and the particular conversion factors needed, is that it also gives those 
aiming to expand capability sets information on where interventions 
can be made. 
2.6.4 A4: The means-ends distinction
The fourth core characteristic of the capability approach is the means-
ends distinction. The approach stresses that we should always be clear, 
when valuing something, whether we value it as an end in itself, or as a 
means to a valuable end. For the capability approach, when considering 
interpersonal comparisons of advantage, the ultimate ends are people’s 
valuable capabilities (there could be other ends as well; see 2.6.6). This 
implies that the capability approach requires us to evaluate policies and 
other changes according to their impact on people’s capabilities as well 
as their actual functionings; yet at the same time we need to ask whether 
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the preconditions — the means and the enabling circumstances — for 
those capabilities are in place. We must ask whether people are able 
to be healthy, and whether the means or resources necessary for this 
capability, such as clean water, adequate sanitation, access to doctors, 
protection from infections and diseases and basic knowledge on health 
issues are present. We must ask whether people are well-nourished, and 
whether the means or conditions for the realization of this capability, 
such as having sufficient food supplies and food entitlements, are 
being met. We must ask whether people have access to a high-quality 
education system, to real political participation, and to community 
activities that support them, that enable them to cope with struggles in 
daily life, and that foster caring friendships. Hence we do need to take 
the means into account, but we can only do so if we first know what the 
ends are. 
Many of the arguments that capability theorists have advanced 
against alternative normative frameworks can be traced back to the 
objection that alternative approaches focus on particular means to 
wellbeing rather than the ends.24 There are two important reasons why 
the capability approach dictates that we have to start our analysis from 
the ends rather than the means. Firstly, people differ in their ability to 
convert means into valuable opportunities (capabilities) or outcomes 
(functionings) (Sen 1992a, 26–28, 36–38). Since ends are what ultimately 
matter when thinking about wellbeing and the quality of life, means can 
only work as fully reliable proxies of people’s opportunities to achieve 
those ends if all people have the same capacities or powers to convert 
those means into equal capability sets. This is an assumption that goes 
against a core characteristic of the capability approach, namely claim 
A3  — the inter-individual differences in the conversion of resources 
into functionings and capabilities. Capability scholars believe that these 
inter-individual differences are far-reaching and significant, and hence 
this also explains why the idea of conversion factors is a compulsory 
option in the capability approach (see 2.6.3). Theories that focus on 
24  This is a critique that the capability approach shares with the happiness approach, 
which also focusses on what it considers to be an end in itself — happiness. Still, 
capability scholars have reasons why they do not endorse the singular focus on 
happiness, as the happiness approach proposes. See section 3.8.
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means run the risk of downplaying the normative relevance of not only 
these conversion factors, but also the differences in structural constraints 
that people face (see 2.7.5). 
The second reason why the capability approach requires us to start 
from ends rather than means is that there are some vitally important 
ends that do not depend very much on material means, and hence 
would not be picked up in our analysis if we were to focus on means 
only. For example, self-respect, supportive relationships in school or in 
the workplace, or friendship are all very important ends that people 
may want; yet there are no crucial means to those ends that one could 
use as a readily measurable proxy. We need to focus on ends directly if 
we want to capture what is important. 
One could argue, however, that the capability approach does not 
focus entirely on ends, but rather on the question of whether a person is 
being put in the conditions in which she can pursue her ultimate ends. 
For example, being able to read could be seen as a means rather than an 
end in itself, since people’s ultimate ends will be more specific, such as 
reading street signs, the newspaper, or the Bible or Koran. It is therefore 
somewhat more precise to say that the capability approach focuses on 
people’s ends in terms of beings and doings expressed in general terms: 
being literate, being mobile, being able to hold a decent job. Whether a 
particular person then decides to translate these general capabilities into 
the more specific capabilities A, B or C (e.g. reading street signs, reading 
the newspaper or reading the Bible) is up to them. Whether that person 
decides to stay put, travel to the US or rather to China, is in principle 
not important for a capability analysis: the question is rather whether 
a person has these capabilities in more general terms.25 Another way 
of framing this is to say that the end of policy making and institutional 
design is to provide people with general capabilities, whereas the ends 
of persons are more specific capabilities.26 
Of course, the normative focus on ends does not imply that the 
capability approach does not at all value means such as material or 
25  However, while a focus on available options rather than realised choices is 
the default normative focus of capability theories, there are some capability 
applications where, for good reasons, the focus is on achieved functionings rather 
than capabilities. This will be elaborated in the next section. 
26  On the distinction between general capabilities and specific capabilities, see 3.2.4.
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financial resources. Instead, a capability analysis will typically focus 
on resources and other means. For example, in their evaluation of 
development in India, Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen (2002, 3) have 
stressed that working within the capability approach in no way 
excludes the integration of an analysis of resources such as food. In 
sum, all the means of wellbeing, like the availability of commodities, 
legal entitlements to them, other social institutions, and so forth, are 
important, but the capability approach presses the point that they are 
not the ends of wellbeing, only their means. Food may be abundant in 
the village, but a starving person may have nothing to exchange for it, 
no legal claim on it, or no way of preventing intestinal parasites from 
consuming it before he or she does. In all these cases, at least some 
resources will be available, but that person will remain hungry and, 
after a while, undernourished.27
Nevertheless, one could wonder: wouldn’t it be better to focus 
on means only, rather than making the normative analysis more 
complicated and more informationally demanding by also focusing on 
functionings and capabilities? Capability scholars would respond that 
starting a normative analysis from the ends rather than means has at 
least two advantages, in addition to the fundamental reason mentioned 
earlier that a focus on ends is needed to appropriately capture inter-
individual differences. 
First, if we start from being explicit about our ends, the valuation 
of means will retain the status of an instrumental valuation rather than 
risk taking on the nature of a valuation of ends. For example, money or 
economic growth will not be valued for their own sake, but only in so far 
as they contribute to an expansion of people’s capabilities. For those who 
have been working within the capability framework, this has become a 
deeply ingrained practice — but one only needs to read the newspapers 
for a few days to see how often policies are justified or discussed without 
a clear distinction being made between means and ends. 
Second, by starting from ends, we do not a priori assume that 
there is only one overriding important means to those ends (such as 
27  The relationship between means and capabilities is analysed in more depth in 
section 3.12.
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income), but rather explicitly ask the question: which types of means are 
important for the fostering and nurturing of a particular capability, or 
set of capabilities? For some capabilities, the most important means will 
indeed be financial resources and economic production, but for others it 
may be a change in political practices and institutions, such as effective 
guarantees and protections of freedom of thought, political participation, 
social or cultural practices, social structures, social institutions, public 
goods, social norms, and traditions and habits. As a consequence, an 
effective capability-enhancing policy may not be increasing disposable 
income, but rather fighting a homophobic, ethnophobic, racist or sexist 
social climate.
2.6.5 A5: Functionings and capabilities  
as the evaluative space 
If a capability theory is a normative theory (as is often the case), then 
functionings and capabilities form the entire evaluative space, or are 
part of the evaluative space.28 A normative theory is a theory that entails 
a value judgement: something is better than or worse than something 
else. This value judgement can be used to compare the position of 
different persons or states of affairs (as in inequality analysis) or it can 
be used to judge one course of action as ‘better’ than another course of 
action (as in policy design). For all these types of normative theories, we 
need normative claims, since concepts alone cannot ground normativity. 
The first normative claim which each capability theory should 
respect is thus that functionings and capabilities form the ‘evaluative 
space’. According to the capability approach, the ends of wellbeing 
freedom, justice, and development should be conceptualized in terms 
of people’s functionings and/or capabilities. This claim is not contested 
28  I am using the term ‘normative’ here in the way it is used by social scientists, hence 
encompassing what philosophers call both ‘normative’ and ‘evaluative’. For these 
different uses of terminology, see section 2.2. It is also possible to use the notions 
of ‘functionings’ and ‘capabilities’ for non-normative purposes (see section 3.10). In 
that case, the basic notions from the core are all that one takes from the capability 
approach; one does not need this normative part of the core. I will suggest in the 
concluding chapter 5 that explanatory applications of the capability approach are 
part of how it could be fruitfully developed in the future. 
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among scholars of the capability approach; for example, Sabina Alkire 
(2005, 122) described the capability approach as the proposition “that 
social arrangements should be evaluated according to the extent of 
freedom people have to promote or achieve functionings they value”. 
However, if we fully take into account that functionings can be positive 
but also negative (see 2.6.2), we should also acknowledge that our lives 
are better if they contain fewer of the functionings that are negative, 
such as physical violence or stress. Alkire’s proposition should therefore 
minimally be extended by adding “and to promote the weakening of 
those functionings that have a negative value”.29 
However, what is relevant is not only which opportunities are 
open to us individually, hence in a piecemeal way, but rather which 
combinations or sets of potential functionings are open to us. For example, 
suppose you are a low-skilled poor single parent who lives in a society 
without decent social provisions. Take the following functionings: (1) 
to hold a job, which will require you to spend many hours on working 
and commuting, but will generate the income needed to properly feed 
yourself and your family; (2) to care for your children at home and give 
them all the attention, care and supervision they need. In a piecemeal 
analysis, both (1) and (2) are opportunities open to that parent, but 
they are not both together open to her. The point about the capability 
approach is precisely that it is comprehensive; we must ask which sets 
of capabilities are open to us, that is: can you simultaneously provide 
for your family and properly care for and supervise your children? Or 
are you rather forced to make some hard, perhaps even tragic choices 
between two functionings which are both central and valuable? 
Note that while most types of capability analysis require 
interpersonal comparisons, one could also use the capability approach 
to evaluate the wellbeing or wellbeing freedom of one person at one 
point in time (e.g. evaluate her situation against a capability yardstick) 
or to evaluate the changes in her wellbeing or wellbeing freedom over 
29  Moreover, further extensions of this proposition may be needed. One issue is that 
we should not only focus on capabilities that people value, but also on capabilities 
that they do not, but should, value (see section 2.7.2). Another issue is that the 
evaluative space should not necessarily be restricted to capabilities only, but could 
also be functionings, or a combination of functionings and capabilities (see section 
2.6.5). 
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time. The capability approach could thus also be used by a single person 
in her deliberate decision-making or evaluation processes, but these 
uses of the capability approach are much less prevalent in the scholarly 
literature. Yet all these normative exercises share the property that they 
use functionings and capabilities as the evaluative space — the space 
in which personal evaluations or interpersonal comparisons are made. 
2.6.6 A6: Other dimensions of ultimate value
However, this brings us straight to another core property of module 
A, namely that functionings and/or capabilities are not necessarily the 
only elements of ultimate value. Capabilitarian theories might endorse 
functionings and/or capabilities as their account of ultimate value but 
may add other elements of ultimate value, such as procedural fairness. 
Other factors may also matter normatively, and in most capability 
theories these other principles or objects of evaluation will play a role. 
This implies that the capability approach is, in itself, incomplete as an 
account of the good since it may have to be supplemented with other 
values or principles.30 Sen has been a strong defender of this claim, 
for example, in his argument that capabilities capture the opportunity 
aspect of freedom but not the process aspect of freedom, which is also 
important (e.g. Sen 2002a, 583–622).31 
At this point, it may be useful to reflect on a suggestion made by 
Henry Richardson (2015) to drop the use of the word ‘intrinsic’ when 
describing the value of functionings and capabilities — as is often 
done in the capability literature. For non-philosophers, saying that 
something has ‘intrinsic value’ is a way to say that something is much 
more important than something else, or it is used to say that we don’t 
need to investigate what the effects of this object are on another object. 
If we think that something doesn’t have intrinsic value, we would hold 
that it is desirable if it expands functionings and capabilities; economic 
30  For example, if Henry Richardson (2007) is right in arguing that the idea of 
capabilities cannot capture basic liberties, then one need not reject the capability 
approach, but instead could add an insistence on basic liberties to one’s capability 
theory, as Richardson (2007, 394) rightly points out. 
31  This distinction, and its relevance, will be discussed in more detail in section 3.3. 
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growth is a prominent example in both the capability literature and in 
the human development literature. Yet in philosophy, there is a long-
standing debate about what it means to say of something that it has 
intrinsic value, and it has increasingly been contested that it is helpful to 
speak of ‘intrinsic values’ given what philosophers generally would like 
to say when they use that word (Kagan 1998; Rabinowicz and Rønnow-
Rasmussen 2000). 
In philosophy, the term ‘intrinsic’ refers to a metaphysical claim; 
something we claim to be intrinsically valuable only derives its value 
from some internal properties. Yet in the capability approach, this is not 
really what we want to say about functionings (or capabilities). Rather, 
as Richardson rightly argues, we should be thinking about what we 
take to be worth seeking for its own sake. Richardson prefers to call 
this ‘thinking in terms of final ends’; in addition, one could also use the 
terminology ‘that which has ultimate value’ (see also Rabinowicz and 
Rønnow-Rasmussen 2000, 48).32 This has the advantage that we do not 
need to drop the widely used, and in my view very useful, distinction 
between instrumental value and ultimate value. Those things that have 
ultimate value are the things we seek because they are an end (of policy 
making, decision making, evaluations); those things that do not have 
ultimate value, hence that are not ends, will be valued to the extent that 
they have instrumental value for those ends. 
Of course, non-philosophers may object and argue they are using 
‘intrinsic value’ and ‘ultimate value’ as synonyms. But if we want to 
develop the capability approach in a way that draws on the insights 
from all disciplines, we should try to accommodate this insight from 
philosophy into the interdisciplinary language of the capability 
approach, especially if there is a very easy-to-use alternative available 
to us. We can either, as Richardson proposes, speak of the selected 
functionings and capabilities as final ends, or we can say that the selected 
functionings and capabilities have ultimate value — that is, they have 
value as ends in themselves and not because they are useful for some 
32  “[…] the relevant values can be said to be ‘end-point values’, insofar as they are 
not simply conducive to or necessary for something else that is of value. They are 
‘final’, then, in this sense of being ‘ultimate’” (Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen 
2000, 48).
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further end. It is of course possible for a capability to have ultimate value 
and for the corresponding functioning to have instrumental value. For 
example, being knowledgeable and educated can very plausibly be seen 
as of ultimate value, but is also of instrumental value for various other 
capabilities, such as the capability of being healthy, being able to pursue 
projects, being able to hold a job, and so forth. 
However, the question is whether it is possible to change the use of 
a term that is so widespread in some disciplines yet regarded as wrong 
from the point of view of another discipline. It may be that the best 
we can hope for is to become aware of the different usages of the term 
‘intrinsic value’, which in the social sciences is used in a much looser 
way than in philosophy, and doesn’t have the metaphysical implications 
that philosophers attribute to it. 
2.6.7 A7: Value pluralism
There are at least two types of value pluralism within the capability 
approach. One type is the other objects of ultimate value, which was 
briefly addressed in the previous section. This is what Sen called in 
his Dewey lectures principle pluralism (Sen 1985c, 176). Expanding 
capabilities and functionings is not all that matters; there are other 
moral principles and goals with ultimate value that are also important 
when evaluating social states, or when deciding what we ought to do 
(whether as individuals or policy makers). Examples are deontic norms 
and principles that apply to the processes that lead to the expansion 
of capability sets. This value pluralism plays a very important role 
in understanding the need to have the C-module C4, which will be 
discussed in section 2.8.4.
It is interesting to note that at some stage in Sen’s development of 
the capability approach, his readers lost this principle-pluralism and 
thought that the capability approach could stand on its own. But a 
reading of Sen’s earlier work on the capability approach shows that all 
along, Sen felt that capabilities can and need to be supplemented with 
other principles and values. For example, in his 1982 article ‘Rights and 
Agency’, Sen argues that “goal rights, including capability rights, and 
other goals, can be combined with deontological values […], along with 
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other agent-relative considerations, in an integrated system” (Sen 1982, 
4). Luckily, the more recent publications in the secondary literature 
on the capability approach increasingly acknowledge this principle 
pluralism; the modules A7 and C4 of the modular view presented in 
this book suggest that it is no longer possible not to acknowledge this 
possibility. 
The second type of value-pluralism relates to what is often called 
the multidimensional nature of the capability approach. Functionings 
and capabilities are not ‘values’ in the sense of ‘public values’ (justice, 
efficiency, solidarity, ecological sustainability, etc.) but they are objects 
of ultimate value — things that we value as ends in themselves. Given 
some very minimal assumptions about human nature, it is obvious that 
these dimensions are multiple: human beings value the opportunity to 
be in good health, to engage in social interactions, to have meaningful 
activities, to be sheltered and safe, not be subjected to excessive levels of 
stress, and so forth. Of course, it is logically conceivable to say that for a 
particular normative exercise, we only look at one dimension. But while 
it may be consistent and logical, it nevertheless makes no sense — for at 
least two reasons.
First, the very reason why the capability approach has been offered 
as an alternative to other normative approaches is to add informational 
riches — to show which dimensions have been left out of the other types of 
analysis, and why adding them matters. It also makes many evaluations 
much more nuanced, allowing them to reflect the complexities of life 
as it is. For example, an African-American lawyer may be successful in 
her professional life in terms of her professional achievements and the 
material rewards she receives for her work, but she may also encounter 
disrespect and humiliation in a society that is sexist and racist. Being 
materially well-off doesn’t mean that one is living a life with all the 
capabilities to which one should be entitled in a just society. Only multi-
dimensional metrics of evaluation can capture those ambiguities and 
informational riches. 
Second, without value pluralism, it would follow that the happiness 
approach is a special case of the capability approach — namely a 
capability theory in which only one functioning matters, namely being 
happy. Again, while this is strictly speaking a consistent and logical 
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possibility, it makes no sense given that the capability approach was 
conceived to form an alternative to both the income metric and other 
resourcist approaches on the one hand, and the happiness approach 
and other mental metric approaches on the other. Thus, in order to make 
the capability approach a genuine alternative to other approaches, we 
need to acknowledge several functionings and capabilities, rather than 
just one. 
2.6.8 A8: The principle of each person as an end
A final core property of each capability theory or application is that 
each person counts as a moral equal. Martha Nussbaum calls this 
principle “the principle of each person as an end”. Throughout her 
work she has offered strong arguments in defence of this principle 
(Nussbaum 2000, 56):
The account we strive for [i.e. the capability approach] should preserve 
liberties and opportunities for each and every person, taken one by one, 
respecting each of them as an end, rather than simply as the agent or 
supporter of the ends of others. […] We need only notice that there is a 
type of focus on the individual person as such that requires no particular 
metaphysical position, and no bias against love or care. It arises naturally 
from the recognition that each person has just one life to live, not more 
than one. […] If we combine this observation with the thought […] 
that each person is valuable and worthy of respect as an end, we must 
conclude that we should look not just to the total or the average, but to 
the functioning of each and every person. 
Nussbaum’s principle of each person as an end is the same as what is also 
known as ethical or normative individualism in debates in philosophy 
of science. Ethical individualism, or normative individualism, makes a 
claim about who or what should count in our evaluative exercises and 
decisions. It postulates that individual persons, and only individual 
persons are the units of ultimate moral concern. In other words, when 
evaluating different social arrangements, we are only interested in the 
(direct and indirect) effects of those arrangements on individuals.
As will be explained in more detail in section 4.6, the idea of ethical 
individualism is often conflated with other notions of individualism, 
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such as the ontological idea that human beings are individuals who can 
live and flourish independently of others. However, there is no such 
claim in the principle of ethical individualism. The claim is rather one 
about whose interests should count. And ethical individualism claims 
that only the interests of persons should count. Ultimately, we care about 
each individual person. Ethical individualism forces us to make sure we 
ask questions about how the interests of each and every person are served or 
protected, rather than assuming that because, for example, all the other 
family members are doing fine, the daughter-in-law will be doing fine 
too. If, as all defensible moral theories do, we argue that every human 
being has equal moral worth, then we must attach value to the interests 
of each and every one of the affected persons. Thus, my first conclusion 
is that ethical individualism is a desirable property, since it is necessary 
to treat people as moral equals.
But ethical individualism is not only a desirable property, it is also an 
unavoidable property. By its very nature the evaluation of functionings 
and capabilities is an evaluation of the wellbeing and freedom to achieve 
wellbeing of individual persons. Functionings are ‘beings’ and ‘doings’: 
these are dimensions of a human being, which is an embodied being, 
not merely a mind or a soul. And with the exception of the conjoined 
twins, and the case of the unborn child and the pregnant mother, bodies 
are physically separated from each other.33 We are born as a human 
being with a body and future of her own, and we will die as a human 
being with a body and a past life narrative that is unique. This human 
being, that lives her life in an embodied way, thus has functionings that 
are related to her person, which is embodied. It is with the functionings 
and capabilities of these persons that the capability approach is 
concerned with.34 However, as I will explain in detail in section 4.6, 
from this it does not follow that the capability approach conceptualises 
people in an atomistic fashion, and thus that the capability approach is 
‘individualistic’ — meant in a negative, pejorative way. And it also does 
not imply that a capabilitarian evaluation could not also evaluate the 
33  As Richardson (2016, 5) puts it, “all capabilities […] are dependent on the body. 
Without relying on one’s body there is nothing one can do or be”. 
34  Some have argued in favour of what they call ‘collective capabilities’, which I will 
discuss in section 3.6.
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means (including social institutions, structures, and norms) as well as 
conversion factors, as well as non-capabilitarian elements of value — as 
long as we are clear what the role or status of each of those elements is.35
Note that the use of the term ‘normative individualism’ is deeply 
disputed. Some scholars see no problem at all in using that term, 
since they use it in a technical sense that they believe should not be 
conflated with any pejorative use of the term ‘individualism’ in daily 
life. Other scholars resist the term ‘ethical individualism’, since they 
cannot separate it from (a) the notions of ontological and explanatory 
individualism, and/or (b) from the pejorative meaning that the term 
‘individualism’ has in daily life, which is probably close to a term such 
as ‘egoism’. While the first group is, in my view, right, the second group 
conveys important information about how the capability approach will 
be perceived in a broader setting, including outside academia. It may 
therefore be recommendable to replace the term ‘ethical or normative 
individualism’ with the term ‘the principle of each person as an end’ 
whenever possible. 
2.7 The B-modules: non-optional modules with 
optional content
I believe that the best way to understand the capability approach is 
by taking the content of the A-module as non-optional. All capability 
theories need to endorse the content of the A-module (ideally in an 
explicit way) or at a very minimum should not have properties that 
violate the content of the A-module. But there are also properties of a 
capability theory where the module is non-optional, yet there is choice 
involved in the content of the module. This doesn’t mean that ‘anything 
goes’ in terms of the choice of the content, but it does mean that within 
each module, there is a range of options to choose from. These are 
the B-modules, each of which contains a range of possible content, 
35  However, the question remains whether the capability approach is fully compatible 
with indigenous world views and normative frameworks, as well as thick forms 
of communitarianism. This is a question that doesn’t allow for a straightforward 
answer, and requires more analysis. For some first explorations of the compatibility 
of indigenous world views with the capability approach, see Binder and Binder 
(2016); Bockstael and Watene (2016); Watene (2016).
60 Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice
from which the capability theorist can decide what content to adopt. 
However, the range of content of the B-modules must not contradict the 
A-module. The following table lists the non-optional B-modules with 
optional content. 
Table 2.3 The B-modules: non-optional modules  
with optional content
B1: The purpose of the capability theory
B2: The selection of dimensions
B3: An account of human diversity
B4: An account of agency
B5: An account of structural constraints
B6: The choice between functionings, capabilities, or both
B7: Meta-theoretical commitments
2.7.1 B1: The purpose of the capability theory
The first module, which is itself non-optional, but where the content 
can be chosen, is the purpose of the theory. For example, one could 
use the capability approach to construct a theory of justice, to develop 
an international empirical comparison, to reform an educational 
curriculum, to develop alternative welfare economics, or to evaluate the 
effects of laws on people’s capabilities. Questions of scope and reach 
also need to be addressed in this module. For example, is a theory of 
justice a political or a comprehensive theory? Is such a theory domestic 
or global? Other questions that need to be addressed involve the 
intended audience. Is one constructing an academic theory where great 
attention is given to detail and even the smallest distinctions are taken 
as relevant, or is one addressing policy makers or societal organisations 
for whom every detail does not matter and the time to think and read 
may be much more constrained, while the accessibility of the ideas is 
much more important? 
Of course, one could argue that B1 is not specific to capability theories, 
and also holds for, say, deontological theories, or utilitarian theories, 
or theories that use care ethics as their basic normative foundation. 
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While that is true, there are two reasons to highlight B1, the purpose of 
the capability theory, in the account that I am developing. The first is 
that it will help us to be explicit about the purpose. There are plenty of 
pieces published in the capability literature in which the purpose of the 
application or theory is not made explicit, and as a consequence it leads 
to people based in different disciplines or fields talking alongside each 
other. Second, it seems that the need to be explicit about the purpose 
(including the audience) of one’s capability theory or application is 
stronger in the capability literature than in other approaches, because 
in comparison to those other approaches it has a much more radically 
multidisciplinary uptake. 
2.7.2 B2: The selection of dimensions
The second B-module is the selection of capabilities and/or functionings. 
We need to specify which capabilities matter for our particular capability 
theory. This is a deeply normative question, and touches the core of 
the difference that the capability approach can make. After all, the 
dimensions that one selects to analyse will determine what we will 
observe — and also, equally importantly, what we will not observe 
since the dimensions are not selected. 
There is, by now, a large body of literature discussing the various 
ways in which one can make that selection, including some overview 
articles that survey the different methods for particular purposes (e.g. 
Alkire 2002; Robeyns 2005a; Byskov forthcoming). These methods 
explicitly include various participatory, deliberative and/or democratic 
approaches, which are widely used in capability applications. 
There are two crucial factors determining which selection procedure 
is suitable. The first is the purpose of the capability theory (hence the 
choice made in B1). If we develop an account of wellbeing for thinking 
about how our lives are going, we are not constrained by questions such 
as the legitimate scope of government intervention, whereas a theory of 
political justice would need to take that element into account. Another 
example is if we would like to use the capability approach to think about 
what is universally demanded by moral principles, hence to develop 
the capability approach into a theory of morality: there the selection 
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may be constrained by a method of moral justification for categorically 
binding principles, which is much more demanding than a method 
that justifies principles we offer to each other as rationally defensible 
proposals in the public realm. At the empirical and policy level, similar 
questions arise. For example, one could take the international human 
rights treaties as reflecting a given political consensus, and use those to 
select capabilities (Vizard 2007). Or, one’s main goal may be to analyse 
what difference the capability approach makes for poverty or inequality 
analysis in comparison with income metrics, in which case one may opt 
for a method that makes the normativity explicit but nevertheless stays 
close to existing practices in the social sciences, assuming the epistemic 
validity of those practices (Robeyns 2003).
The second factor determining which selection procedure is suitable 
is the set of constraints one takes as given in the normative analysis one is 
making. In an ideal world, there would always be cooperation between 
scholars with different disciplinary expertise, who would understand 
each other well, and who would be able to speak the language of the 
other disciplines involved in developing the capability theory. In an 
ideal world, there would also be no time constraints on the amount of 
time one has to develop a capability theory, and no financial constraints 
on the data gathering, or social, psychological or political constraints 
on the types of question one can ask when conducting a survey. One 
would be able always to conduct one’s own fieldwork if one wanted, 
one would have access to all the empirical knowledge one needed, and 
one would not be constrained in gathering the information one wanted 
to gather. Clearly, the methods for such an ideal world would be very 
different from the methods that are used in practice — where database-
driven selection may be the best one can do. 
Still, whichever method one uses, what always remains important, 
and very much in the spirit of the capability approach, is not to act in a 
mechanical way, or to see the question of the selection of dimensions as 
a technocratic exercise. Even if one cannot, for example, collect certain 
data, one could nevertheless still mention the dimensions that one would 
have wanted to include if it had been possible, and perhaps provide 
some reasonable informed guess of what difference the inclusion of that 
dimension would have made. 
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2.7.3 B3: Human diversity
Within the capability approach human diversity is a core characteristic, 
and indeed a core motivation for developing the capability approach 
in the first place. Yet the account of human diversity that one endorses 
can differ. For example, scholars with a background in structuralist 
sociology or Marxism often believe that the social class to which one 
belongs is a very important factor in human diversity, which has great 
influence on which options lie open to a person, but also on how a 
person’s character and aspirations are formed. For those scholars, class 
interacts with, and in some cases even outweighs, all other identity 
aspects. For others, such as libertarians, these differences are not so 
important.36 They would not attach much (normative or explanatory) 
importance to one’s gender, ethnicity, race, social class, and so forth: 
everyone is, first and foremost, an individual whose personal ambitions 
and projects matter. Yet, whether one is a Marxist or a libertarian or one 
of the many other positions one can take, one always, either implicitly 
or explicitly, endorses a view on human nature and on human diversity. 
That choice should be made in capability theories, since the capability 
approach rejects the use of an implicit, unacknowledged account of 
human diversity. Hence such an account belongs to the B-modules: one 
has to have an account of human diversity, but, as long as one is willing 
to defend one’s account and it survives critical analysis, there are several 
accounts that one can opt for. 
Note that if one puts all the modules A, B and C together, a picture 
will emerge about the great importance attached to human diversity in 
the capability approach; this will be analysed in more detail in section 3.5.
2.7.4 B4: Agency 
Another B-module is the acknowledgement of agency. As a working 
definition, we can use Sen’s definition of an agent as “someone who 
acts and brings about change, and whose achievements can be judged in 
36  For an introduction to libertarianism, see Vallentyne and Van der Vossen (2014). 
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terms of her own values and objectives, whether or not we assess them 
in terms of some external criteria as well” (Sen 1999a, 19). 
Applications of the capability approach should endorse some account 
of agency, except if there are good reasons why agency should be taken 
to be absent, or why in a particular capability application agency is 
simply not relevant (for example, when one wants to investigate the 
correlation between an income metric and some achieved functionings). 
But clearly, as with other key ethical concepts such as ‘wellbeing’ or 
‘freedom’, the concept of ‘agency’ can be fleshed out in many different 
ways. The capability approach is not committed to one particular account 
of agency. Similar to the acknowledgement of structural constraints, 
there is no agreed-upon or standard claim about how much agency, or 
what particular type, should be assumed; the claim is minimalistic in 
the sense that, as with the structural constraints which will be discussed 
in the next section, agency cannot simply be ignored and must be 
accounted for. One can give agency a key role in a capability theory (e.g. 
Crocker 2008; Claassen 2016) or a more restricted role, perhaps also using 
different terminology. One can also develop the account of agency by 
spelling out some of its preconditions, which may include capabilities. 
For example, Tom de Herdt (2008) analysed the capability of not 
having to be subjected to public shame as a precondition of agency, and 
showed how this may be relevant for social policymaking by illustrating 
its importance in a food relief programme in Kinshasa. For empirical 
scholars and policy scholars, an empirically sound account of agency 
will be crucial; for moral philosophers, a more theoretical account of 
what conceptualisation of agency is morally relevant will be needed. 
Thus, the precise content of this B-module will differ significantly 
between different capability theories and applications  — but, in all 
cases, some acknowledgement of agency will be needed.37 
37  Martha Nussbaum explicitly refrains from integrating the notion of ‘agency’ in her 
capability theory (Nussbaum 2000, 14). However, this does not mean that there isn’t 
an account of agency in her theory, since the inclusion of the capability of practical 
reason on her list of central human capabilities can be understood as corresponding 
to one particular conceptualisation of agency. 
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2.7.5 B5: Structural constraints 
The fifth B-module is the account of structural constraints: the institutions, 
policies, laws, social norms and so forth, that people in different social 
positions face. Those differences in the structural constraints that people 
face can have a great influence on their conversion factors, and hence 
on their capability sets. For example, if relationships between people 
of the same sex are criminalised, then gay people may have all the 
means and resources they would wish, but they will still not be able to 
enjoy a happy family life. Or if people of colour face explicit or implicit 
discrimination on the labour market, then they will not be able to use 
the same labour-market resources (their degrees, training, experience) 
to generate the same levels of capabilities in the professional sphere of 
life, compared with groups that face no (or less) discrimination.
In addition, structural constraints also play a role in the shaping 
of people’s capabilities that are not heavily dependent on material 
resources. If one group of people is, for cultural, historical or religious 
reasons, stigmatized as outcasts, then they will be treated with 
disrespect by other groups in society. The same holds for all groups 
that suffer from stigma, such as, for example, people with psychiatric 
disorders or other mental health issues. These structural constraints will 
also affect the capabilities that do not rely on resources directly, such as 
opportunities for friendships or for a healthy sense of self-confidence. 
Which of those structural constraints will be important for a 
particular capability analysis will depend on the context. For example, 
in her study of the living standards of waste pickers, scavengers, and 
plastic recycling and scrap trading entrepreneurs in Delhi, Kaveri Gill 
(2010) showed that caste plays a very important role in the capability 
sets of different castes. For example, those at the very bottom of the 
hierarchical ladder of waste workers — the waste pickers — have no 
opportunities for upward mobility due to social norms and societal 
discrimination related to their caste. In this study, social norms related 
to caste are key as a structural constraint; in other studies, it may be the 
anatomy of twenty-first century capitalism, or gender norms in gender-
stratified societies, or some other set of structural constraints. 
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In sum, structural constraints can have a very important role in 
shaping people’s capability sets, and therefore have to be part of 
capability theories. Structural constraints vary depending on one’s 
caste, class, ethnicity, age, gender, sexual orientation, (dis)abilities, and 
the economic system in which one lives. These structural constraints 
are very likely to have an influence on a person’s capability set (and in 
most cases also do have that influence). Having an account of structural 
constraints is therefore non-optional: every capability theory has one, 
although sometimes this account will be very implicit. For example, I 
will argue in section 4.10 that part of the critique of mainstream welfare 
economics is that it has a very weak or minimal account of structural 
constraints. Heterodox welfare economists who are embracing the 
capability approach are not only doing so because they think the 
endorsement of the capability account of wellbeing is better than the 
preferences-based accounts that are dominant in mainstream economics, 
but often also because they hope that the minimal account of structural 
constraints in welfare economics can be replaced by a richer account 
that is better informed by insights from the other social sciences and 
from the humanities. 
2.7.6 B6: The choice between functionings,  
capabilities, or both 
In developing a capability theory, we need to decide whether we think 
that what matters are capabilities, functionings, or a combination of 
both. The core proposition that functionings and capabilities form 
the evaluative space (A5), was not decisive regarding the question of 
whether it is only functionings, or only capabilities, or a mixture of both, 
that form this space. 
There are various arguments given in the literature defending a 
range of views that only capabilities matter; or that primarily secured 
functionings matter; or that for particular capability theories it is 
impossible only to focus on capabilities; or that we sometimes have good 
reasons to focus on functionings. These various claims and arguments 
will be reviewed in section 3.4; as will be argued in that section, there 
are good reasons why people could reasonably disagree on whether the 
capability analysis they are conducting should focus on functionings or 
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capabilities or a mixture. It follows that a choice must be made, but that 
there are various options to choose from. 
2.7.7 B7: Meta-theoretical commitments
Finally, each capability theory will embrace some meta-theoretical 
commitments. Yet often, these meta-theoretical commitments are 
shared commitments within one’s discipline or one’s school within 
that discipline, and as a graduate student one has become socialised 
in accepting these meta-theoretical commitments as given. As a 
consequence, it often happens that scholars are not even aware that 
there are such things as meta-theoretical commitments. For example, 
if one wants to conduct a measurement exercise (a choice made in the 
module B1) then one may be committed to the methodological principle 
of parsimony (to build a model with as few assumptions and as elegantly 
as possible) or, instead, to providing a measurement that is embedded 
into a rich narrative description aimed at a better understanding. Or, 
if one wants to construct a theory of justice (again, a choice made in 
the module B1), then one may aim for an ideal or non-ideal theory 
of justice, or for a partial or a comprehensive account of justice. Or 
one may espouse certain views about the status of theories of justice 
or meta-ethical claims related to, for example, the role that intuitions 
are permitted to play as a source of normativity. Some debates within 
the capability approach, but also between capability scholars and 
those working in other paradigms, would be truly enlightened if we 
made the meta-theoretical commitments of our theories, accounts and 
applications more explicit.
2.8 The C-modules: contingent modules
In addition to the compulsory content of the core A-module, and the 
optional content of the non-optional B-modules, a capability theory 
could also add a third type of module, which I will call the contingent 
modules. These are either modules that need to be taken on board due 
to some choices that have been made in a B-module, or else they are 
entirely optional, independent of what one has chosen in the B-modules. 
The following table gives an overview of the contingent modules. 
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Table 2.4 The C-modules: contingent modules
C1: Additional ontological and explanatory theories
C2: Weighing dimensions
C3: Methods for empirical analysis
C4: Additional normative principles and concerns
2.8.1 C1: Additional ontological and explanatory theories 
Two capabilitarian thinkers could each aspire to make a theory of justice, 
yet embrace very different views on human nature and on the degree to 
which certain outcomes can be explained solely by people’s choices or 
are also affected by structural constraints. This can matter a lot for the 
particular capability theories that one develops. 
For example, in earlier work, I showed that the capability approach’s 
answer to whether there is anything wrong with the traditional gender 
division of labour depends a lot on the social ontological claims related to 
gender that are (implicitly) endorsed as well as the explanatory views of 
how that division of labour came about (Robeyns 2008c). If one believes 
that the fact that women end up doing most of the unpaid and care 
work, while men end up doing most of the paid labour market work, is 
a result of differences in talents, dispositions and preferences, then one 
would judge that the different functionings outcomes that result for men 
and women within households provide them with maximal levels of 
wellbeing given the formal institutional background that they face. But 
if one endorses a feminist explanation of this division of labour between 
men and women within households, then one is likely to stress power 
differences, the role of societal expectations and social norms in decision 
making, and so forth (e.g. Okin 1989; Folbre 1994). The same observed 
functionings outcomes in households with a traditional gender division 
of labour would then be evaluated differently. 
Similarly, Miriam Teschl and Laurent Derobert argue that a range of 
different accounts of social and personal identity are possible, and this 
may also impact on how we interpret a person forfeiting a capability that 
we would all deem valuable (Teschl and Derobert 2008). If we believe that 
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our religious identities are a matter of rational deliberation and decision-
making, then we will judge the choice to physically self-harm because of 
one’s religion differently than if we have an account of identity where 
there is much less scope for choice and rational deliberation regarding 
our religious affiliation or other group memberships. 
In short, different ontological and explanatory options are available 
in module C1, and they may have effects on various other elements or 
dimensions of the capability theory that are being constructed. However, 
we should be careful and not mistakenly conclude that ‘anything goes’ 
when we add additional ontological theories, since there should not be 
any conflicts with the propositions of the A-module — and, in addition, 
some ontological and explanatory accounts are much better supported 
by critical analysis and empirical knowledge. 
2.8.2 C2: Weighing dimensions 
For some capability theories, the prioritising, weighing or aggregating 
of dimensions (functionings and capabilities) may not be needed. For 
example, one may simply want to describe how a country has developed 
over time in terms of a number of important functionings, as a way of 
giving information about the evolution of the quality of life that may 
give different insights than the evolution of GDP (e.g. Van Zanden 
et al. 2014). Weighing dimensions is therefore not required for each 
capability theory or capability application, in contrast to the selection of 
dimensions, which is inevitable. 
However, for some other choices that one can make in B1, the 
capabilitarian scholar or practitioner needs to make choices related to 
the weighing of the different dimensions. If that is the case, then there are 
different methods for how one could weigh. When considering which 
weighing method to use, the same factors are relevant as in the case of 
selecting the dimensions: the purposes of one’s capability theory, and 
the constraints one has to take into account when choosing a method. 
In contrast to the overview works that have been written on how to 
select dimensions (e.g. Alkire 2002; Robeyns 2005a; Byskov forthcoming), 
capability scholars have written much less about which methods one 
could use to decide on the weights given to each dimension, specifically 
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focussing on functionings or capabilities as the dimensions. What 
lessons and insights can we learn from what has so far been argued in 
this literature on the weighing of dimensions? (Alkire 2016; Alkire et al. 
2015, chapter 6; Robeyns 2006b, 356–58)
First, the selection of weights for the capability approach is structurally 
similar to other multidimensional metrics (in the case of evaluations) 
or decision-making procedures (in case one needs to decide to which 
capabilities to give priority in policies or collective decision making). 
Hence one should consult existing discussions in other debates where 
multidimensionality plays an important role. Let us first look at the 
group of applications in which the capability approach is used to make 
decisions about what we, collectively, ought to do. That may be in an 
organisation; or at the level of a community that needs to decide whether 
to spend tax revenues on investing more in public green spaces, or in 
social services for particular groups, or in taking measures to prevent 
crime, or in anything else that can likely be understood as leading to 
positive effects on our capabilities. In those cases, we can learn from 
social choice theory, and from theories of democratic decision making, 
how we could proceed.38 Decisions could be made by voting, or by 
deliberation, or by deliberation and/or voting among those who are the 
representatives of the relevant population. 
Second, the applications of the capability approach that involve a 
multidimensional metric of wellbeing or wellbeing freedom could 
use (most of) the weighing methods that have been discussed for 
multidimensional metrics in general. Koen Decancq and María Ana 
Lugo (2013) have reviewed eight different approaches to set weights 
for multidimensional metrics, which they categorize in three classes: 
data-driven weights in which the weights are a function of the 
distribution of the various dimensions in the population surveyed; 
normative approaches in which either experts decide on the weights, 
or the weights are equal or arbitrary; and hybrid weights that are in 
38  In the case of democratic theory, the discussion is often about which laws to 
implement, but the same insights apply to policy making. Both the literature on 
democratic theory (e.g. Dryzek 2000; Gutmann and Thompson 2004) and social 
choice theory (e.g. Arrow, Sen and Suzumura 2002, 2010; Sen 1999c, 2017; Gaertner 
2009) are vast and will not be further discussed here. 
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part data-driven but in addition depend on some normative decision. 
Note that in the data-driven and hybrid approaches, the selection of 
dimensions and the weights tends to be done through a process in 
which the selection of dimensions and the determination of the weights 
go hand in hand. One example is the proposal by Erik Schokkaert 
(2007) of using happiness as the master-value by which we weigh the 
various capabilities that together form the multidimensional account of 
wellbeing. In this proposal, if the functionings do not contribute to one’s 
happiness, they are given a zero weight and hence no longer count in 
the wellbeing index. In methods such as this one, there are two rounds 
of the selections of the dimensions: the first before one collects the data, 
and the second when one uses econometric techniques to determine 
the contribution that the various functionings make to the master-value 
(here: life-satisfaction) and uses those as weights; those functionings 
that will make no contribution will receive a weight of zero, which is 
the same as being deleted as a dimension in the wellbeing index. 
Third, for non-empirical applications, we can categorize methods 
to determine weights in the same way as we could categorise methods 
for the selection of dimensions. Morten Fibieger Byskov (forthcoming) 
distinguishes between ad-hoc methods (such as the data-driven methods 
discussed by Decancq and Lugo), procedural methods, or foundational 
methods. A theoretical capability application could include answers to 
all B-modules (including the selection of dimensions) yet decide that 
the weighing of those dimensions should be done in a procedural way, 
e.g. via a democratic decision-making process. Alternatively, one could 
introduce one master-value that will determine which capabilities are 
relevant, and also what weights they should be given. One example is 
the empirical work done by Erik Schokkaert (2007), which was discussed 
above. Another example, which is theoretical, is Rutger Claassen’s 
capabilitarian theory of justice, in which the selection and weighing 
of capabilities is done based on their contribution to that person’s 
“navigational agency” (Claassen 2016). 
Note that in the case in which one has essentially a monistic theory 
in which there is a master-value, one may doubt whether this doesn’t 
violate property A7 from the A-module. At first value, it seems that it 
does. But proponents of a monistic theory may respond that all theories 
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or measures ultimately must choose one principle or value that tells 
us something about the relative weight of the different dimensions. In 
Nussbaum’s work, they argue, there is also an implicit master-value, 
namely human dignity. It seems to me that this issue is not sufficiently 
analysed and the dispute not settled. One question one could raise 
is whether all master-values have the same function. It seems to be 
different whether the capabilities constitute the dimensions of a good life 
(as in the case of flourishing), or whether they contribute to the master-
value. For the time being, we should in any case flag this as an issue to 
which more attention should be paid in the further development of our 
understanding of the capability approach. 
2.8.3 C3: Methods for empirical analysis. 
If in B1 one chooses an empirical study, one needs to know which 
methods to use. This is the task of the module C3. For example, the study 
could contain choices about which multivariate analysis tools to use or 
whether certain existing data sets are capturing functionings, capabilities, 
or merely rough indicators. In C3, we also make methodological choices 
related to empirical analysis: does a particular capability issue require 
quantitative analysis, qualitative analysis, or a combination? In part, the 
contours of the empirical analysis will be influenced by one’s ambitions 
and goals: is one trying to measure functionings and/or capabilities 
directly, or is one measuring resources and conversion factors in order 
to infer the capability set? 
For empirical capability applications, these are of course huge 
methodological questions that need to be answered. These empirical 
methods questions may be particularly challenging for the capability 
approach for two reasons. First, because it is a radically multidimensional 
approach, and multidimensional analysis is by its very nature more 
complicated than a one-dimensional analysis. Second, in many cases, the 
relevant dimensions will include dimensions on which the collection of 
data is difficult, or on which no data are available — such as the quality 
of our social networks, the degree to which we do not suffer from 
excessive levels of stress, or our mental health. Nevertheless, as Alkire 
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(2005, 129) rightly points out in her discussion on what is needed for 
the empirical operationalisation of the capability approach, one has to 
adopt the best existing empirical research (and its methods) that exists, 
and either master those new techniques that have been developed in 
other fields, or else engage in collaborations. Hick and Burchardt (2016, 
88) raise the related point that there is a need for capability scholars 
to reach out and engage with related fields where similar themes and 
problems are faced. Only after that route has been travelled can we 
know the limits of empirical analyses of the capability approach. 
2.8.4 C4: Additional normative principles and concerns 
Finally, module C4 provides room for additional normative concerns or 
moral principles that capability scholars aim to add to their capability 
theory. For example, in a particular capability theory, a principle of 
non-discrimination may play a role or, alternatively, one may want to 
work out a capabilitarian theory that subscribes to the non-domination 
principle as it has been defended by Republican political theory (Pettit 
2001, 2009). Or, if one ascribes to a rich account of empowerment that 
stresses the relevance of ‘power’ and hence strongly incorporates 
relational aspects (e.g. Drydyk 2013; Koggel 2013), then one may add 
a principle related to enhancing people’s empowerment, or prioritising 
the empowerment of the worst-off, as an additional normative principle 
to be added in module C4. Again, there are several elements belonging 
to module C4 that could be added to a capability theory. 
2.9 The modular view of the  
capability account: a summary
In the previous sections, we have looked at the different elements of 
the modular account of the capability approach, consisting of the core 
A-module, the compulsory B-modules with optional content, and the 
contingent C-modules. For an easily accessible overview, the different 
elements of the modular view of the capability approach are summarised 
in table 2.5. 
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Table 2.5 The modular view of the capability approach
The A-module: the non-optional core
A1: Functionings and capabilities as core concepts
A2: Functionings and capabilities are value-neutral categories 
A3: Conversion factors 
A4: The distinction between means and ends
A5: Functionings and/or capabilities form the evaluative space
A6: Other dimensions of ultimate value
A7: Value pluralism
A8: Valuing each person as an end 
The B-modules: non-optional modules with optional content
B1: The purpose of the capability theory
B2: The selection of dimensions
B3: An account of human diversity
B4: An account of agency
B5: An account of structural constraints
B6: The choice between functionings, capabilities, or both
B7: Meta-theoretical commitments
The C-modules: contingent modules
C1: Additional ontological and explanatory theories
C2: Weighing dimensions
C3: Methods for empirical analysis
C4: Additional normative principles and concerns
What, exactly, is the status of this characterisation of the capability 
approach? Is this list of modules and the core properties exhaustive, 
and is this a proposal to change the current definitions on offer in the 
literature? 
The answers have been given throughout the sections so far, but 
now that we have gone through the different modules and know their 
content, it is worthwhile to repeat and summarize this in a very explicit 
manner. The modular view is an attempt at understanding the plurality 
of capability theories on offer in the literature, doing justice to this 
plurality, yet at the same time avoiding the idea that ‘anything goes’. 
By distinguishing between three types of modules — the A-module, 
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the content of which one must adopt, the B-modules, which are non-
optional but have optional content, and the C-modules, which are 
contingent — we can get a better grasp of the peculiar nature of the 
capability approach: not exactly a precise theory, but also not something 
that can be anything one likes it to be. I hope that this way of looking at 
the anatomy of the capability approach will help us to understand what 
the approach is, but also provide more guidance to those who want to 
use the general capability approach as a guiding theoretical framework 
to work on particular theoretical or empirical issues and problems. 
The content of the A-module, the B-modules and C-modules is, 
as with everything in scholarship, a proposal that can be modified 
to accommodate new insights. If someone has convincing arguments 
why one element or module should be deleted, modified, or added, 
then that should be done. Given what we know from the history of 
scholarship, it is rather unlikely that no further modifications will be 
proposed in the future. 
2.10 Hybrid theories
In the previous sections, we have seen which modules are core in a 
capability theory, which ones need to be addressed but have optional 
content, and which ones may or may not be necessary to add to a 
particular capability theory. One question that this modular view raises is 
what we should think of a theory or an application that uses the addition 
of normative principles that are in contradiction with a property of the 
A-module. For example, suppose one would want to add the normative 
principle that institutions and personal behaviour should honour the 
traditions of one’s local community. There may be aspects of those 
traditions that are in tension with the principle of treating each person 
as an end, for example, because women are not given the same moral 
status in those traditions as men. What should we then say? Would such 
a theory no longer be a capability theory, even if the bulk of the theory is 
trying to think about the quality of life and desirable institutions in terms 
of the enhancement of functionings and capabilities? 
I propose that we introduce the notion of a hybrid theory — theories 
or applications that use the notions of ‘functionings’ and ‘capabilities’ 
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yet do not endorse all propositions in the A-module. Let me stress that 
categorizing these theories as ‘hybrid’ entails no value judgement, 
whether positive or negative; rather, it is only a matter of clarifying the 
possibilities of having capability theories but in addition also hybrid 
theories which use part of the A-module yet also insert elements from 
other ethical frameworks that go against some propositions in the 
A-module. Thus, appreciating the possibility of hybrid views enlarges 
the diversity of theories that are possible.
Can we give an example of such a hybrid theory? Perhaps surprisingly, 
an example may be Amartya Sen’s theorising about justice. According to 
the interpretation by Antoinette Baujard and Muriel Gilardone (2017), 
Sen’s (2006, 2009c) recent work on justice does not endorse functionings 
and/or capabilities as the metric of justice, but should rather be seen 
as a procedural or democratic account of justice, in which the idea of 
having functionings and capabilities as the evaluative space is merely 
a suggestion, which should be put to the public who eventually, in a 
process of public reasoning, have to decide what justice is about. If that 
interpretation is correct, then Sen is unwilling to commit to proposition 
A5 (‘functionings and capabilities form the evaluative space’) when 
theorising about justice, since that is something to be decided by a 
process of public reasoning.39 Clearly, when Sen theorises about justice, 
he has certain meta-theoretical commitments (module B7) that make 
it inconsistent for him to endorse A5, namely the meta-theoretical 
commitment that the nature of justice will be decided by a democratic 
process. Whether that is a plausible meta-theoretical position, has been 
subject of debate in the capability literature (e.g. Claassen 2011; Byskov 
2017) but need not concern us here. The point that is relevant for us is 
that Sen’s theorizing about justice could be seen as a public reasoning-
capability theory of justice. 
39  Note that for other capability applications or capability theories, such as making quality 
of life assessment studies, Sen has no problem endorsing proposition A5. Moreover, 
one could also ask whether regarding his earlier publications on justice it would be 
implausible to interpret Sen’s writings as an endorsement of A5. In my view (and 
pace Baujard and Gilardone’s interpretation), Sen has made several statements in 
earlier work that could be seen as an endorsement of all propositions of module A 
for the case of theorizing about justice (e.g. Sen 1980, 1990a, 2000). 
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Other potential candidates for hybrid theories are the theories that 
we discussed in section 2.8.2, in which functionings and capabilities 
play an important role, yet in the theory or measurement construction 
those functionings and capabilities turn out not to be of ultimate value, 
but rather to be instrumental for some further end that is normatively 
prior to the functionings and capabilities themselves. There is, in 
those cases, a master-value that determines how important (if at all) 
those capabilities are: capabilities that we could value, but which do 
not contribute to the master-value, will then not be given any ultimate 
value. As we discussed there, it is unclear whether those theories that 
endorse a master-value violate module A7 (value pluralism) or not. If 
we conclude they do, then the best way to understand these views is to 
regard them as hybrid theories too. 
2.11 The relevance and implications of the 
modular view
Understanding the capability approach as having a modular structure 
leads to a number of insights. Let me highlight three important ones: 
countering the risk of inflation, whereby we have no criteria for deciding 
when a theory is or is not a capability theory; appreciating the diversity 
of capability theories that are possible; and getting a better sense of how 
Sen’s and Nussbaum’s writings relate to each other. 
First, the modular view can help us to contain the risk of inflation: too 
many things being labelled as belonging to the ‘capability approach’, 
whereas they do not meet the essential characteristics of the A-module. 
The modular view of the capability approach which I presented gives us 
a description that includes all the work in the capability approach that 
should legitimately be included. There are, of course, other descriptions 
of the capability approach available in the literature. Yet to my mind 
most of these descriptions (including my own previous attempts at 
describing the approach) were insufficiently detailed and illuminating. 
If a description is too vague, we run the risk of inflation. 
For example, one could aim to work on multi-dimensional poverty 
analysis and highlight the fact that we should be interested in the 
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combination of achievements that people are able to have. This would 
point at two important insights in the capability approach — namely 
its multidimensional character, as well as focussing on opportunity 
sets rather than on outcomes. But if the opportunities one focusses on 
are not capabilities, but rather opportunities to access certain bundles 
of commodities, then it would be an unjustified inflation to call this a 
capability application; rather, it would be another type of opportunity-
based multidimensional inequality measure. 
Second, to understand that capability theories have a modular 
structure is crucial in understanding the diversity of capability theories 
that are possible. Let me try to illustrate this. Module C4 states that 
additional normative principles may be part of a capability theory, and 
property A6 that functionings and capabilities are not necessarily all 
that matters in a capability theory. From this it does not follow that all 
capability scholars have to endorse each and every capability theory. 
Surely there will be capability theorists who will take issue with the 
normative principles that are added in module C4 by other capability 
theorists when they design their theory. That is perfectly fine, as long 
as both theorists recognise that (a) the capability approach entails the 
possibility to add such additional normative principles in module C4, 
and (b) the normative principles they have added in module C4 are not 
thereby required for each and every other capability theory.40 
Take the following example. One may defend a political theory of 
disadvantage which states that no-one should live in poverty, no matter 
whether people are partly causally responsible for having ended up in 
that situation. Such a theory would endorse a principle (in module C4) 
that there should be, at the level of outcomes (and hence not at the level of 
opportunities) institutionally enforced solidarity via redistribution. Let 
us call those who endorse this principle the S-theorists (S for solidarity). 
This is a strong normative claim: many other normative political theories 
40  I believe that Martha Nussbaum makes a mistake when she argues that a 
commitment to the normative principle of political liberalism is essential to the 
capability approach, hence to each and every capability theory. For my arguments 
why this is a mistake, see Robeyns (2016b). Political liberalism is an additional 
normative commitment that is not a property of the A-module, but rather a choice 
in module C4. 
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rather defend that everyone should have a genuine opportunity to 
live a decent life, but still attribute some responsibility to all persons 
for realising that life. Let us call these theorists the O-theorists (O for 
opportunity). Both the S-theorists and the O-theorists can agree that 
we should understand people’s wellbeing in terms of functionings and 
capabilities. The S-theorists and the O-theorists are both capabilitarians. 
They have to acknowledge that the other group’s theory is a capability 
theory, without having to endorse the other theory. In other words, a 
capability theorist can agree that the normative position or theory that 
someone else is defending is a capability theory, without having to 
endorse that specific theory. There is absolutely no inconsistency in this 
situation. 
Thirdly, the modular view of the capability approach endorses 
the view that Martha Nussbaum’s work on the capability approach 
should be understood as a capability theory, that is, a theory in 
which specific choices are made regarding the modules. It is not, as 
Nussbaum (2011) suggests in her Creating Capabilities, a version of 
the capability approach structurally on a par with Sen’s more general 
capability approach. What Sen has tried to do in his work on the 
capability approach, is to carve out the general capability approach, as 
well as to give some more specific capability applications. Admittedly, 
Sen’s work on the capability approach (rather than his work on a 
variety of capability applications) would have benefited from a more 
systematic description of how he saw the anatomy of the capability 
approach. To my mind, that has been missing from his work, and that 
is what I have tried to develop here and in an earlier paper (Robeyns 
2016b). Yet everything put together, I agree with the understanding 
of Mozaffar Qizilbash, who concludes an analysis of the difference 
between Nussbaum’s and Sen’s work on the capability approach by 
saying that “On this reading […] Nussbaum’s capabilities approach 
emerges as one particular application or development of Sen’s original 
formulation of the approach” (Qizilbash 2013, 38). 
It is a mistake to understand the capability literature as a field 
with two major thinkers who have each proposed one version 
of the capability approach, which have then inspired the work by 
many other scholars. Rather, there is only one capability approach 
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which is a generalisation of the work by Sen together with further 
developments by many others. In addition, there are many dozens 
capability theories — about justice, human rights, social choice theory, 
welfare economics, poverty measurement, relational egalitarianism, 
curriculum design, development project assessment, technological 
design, and so forth. Clearly, Nussbaum has been one of the most 
prolific and important contributors; she has pushed the boundaries of 
capabilitarian theories and has rightly advanced the agenda to achieve 
more clarity on the essential characteristics that any capability theory 
should meet. However, she has offered us a more specific capability 
theory, rather than another version of the approach, even if it is the 
capability theory that is by far the most influential capability theory 
among philosophers. Establishing the anatomy of the capability 
approach and its relation to particular capability theories is very 
important, because it vastly expands the scope of the capability 
approach, and increases the potential types of capability applications 
and capabilitarian theories. 
In sum, there is much pluralism within the capability approach. 
Someone who considers herself a capabilitarian or capability thinker 
does not need to endorse all capability theories. In fact, it is impossible 
to endorse all capability theories, since different choices made in 
module C1 (ontological and explanatory theories that are endorsed) 
and module C4 (additional normative principles) can be in conflict with 
each other. It is presumably coherent to be a Marxist capabilitarian, and 
it is presumably also coherent to be a libertarian capabilitarian, but it is 
not coherent to endorse the views taken by those two positions, since 
they are incompatible. 
2.12 A visualisation of the core  
conceptual elements
We have now covered enough ground in understanding the core 
concepts of the capability approach to construct a visualisation of 
these concepts. Figure 2.1 below gives a graphical representation of the 
different elements of the capability approach, and how they relate. Note 
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that the arrows do not indicate normative importance but rather indicate 
which parts of this conceptual system are determinants of, or have an 
influence on, other parts. 
Let us start our description where economists generally start (and 
often also end): with resources. In the capability approach, the term 
‘resources’ is interpreted in a broader sense than the understanding 
of that term elsewhere in the social sciences. Economics and the 
quantitative empirical social sciences have traditionally focussed 
on material resources only: either income and wealth, or else on 
the consumption that these financial means (or unpaid production) 
generated. One important lesson learnt from feminist economics is that 
about half of economic production happens outside the market and the 
formal economy, which is the reason why the box at the far left in Figure 
2.1 also includes resources created by non-market production (Folbre 
2008; Folbre and Bittman 2004). 
Both the resources and the consumption could be conceptualised as 
capability inputs: they are the means to the opportunities to be the person 
one wants to be, and do what one has reason to value doing. The means 
do not all have the same power to generate capabilities; this depends on 
a person’s conversion factors, as well as the structural constraints that 
she faces. Those structural constraints can have a great influence on the 
conversion factors as well as on the capability sets directly. 
From this visualisation, we can also see the difference between the 
social conversion factors and the structural constraints. The structural 
constraints affect a person’s set of conversion factors, including the social 
conversion factors she faces. But recall that those conversion factors tell 
us something about the degree to which people can turn resources into 
capabilities. Conversion factors are thus, conceptually and empirically, 
closely related to the capability inputs — that is, the resources that are 
needed to generate capabilities. Structural constraints affect conversion 
factors, but can also affect a person’s capability set without impacting on 
the conversion of resources in capabilities. For example, if a certain set 
of social norms characterizes a group in society as not having the same 
moral status as others, then this affects the capabilities of the members 
of that group directly, not merely in terms of what they can get out of 
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their resources. A good example is gay people, a significant percentage 
of whom are not worse off in financial terms than straight people, but 
they often cannot express their sexual orientation in public, at the risk of 
humiliation, aggression, or even risking their jobs or their lives. 
Another part of the visualisation to pay attention to is the choice 
that people make given the capability set they have. These choices are 
always constrained in some sense, and the question is which types of 
constraints a particular capability theory will take into account. Also, the 
term ‘choice’ is used here in a very thin (or, as philosophers say, ‘weak’) 
sense: it is not assumed that elaborate thinking and weighing is done 
before we decide which capabilities to use and realise into functionings. 
In fact, we have ample evidence from psychology that there are many 
other factors that influence the decisions we make, including how 
hungry or tired we are, the people in our company, or the amount of 
time we have to make a decision (Ariely 2010; Kahneman 2011). Most 
capability theories will have an (implicit) theory of choice: they will 
have views on the extent to which people’s past history (which includes 
the structural constraints they faced in their personal past) as well as 
societal processes, such as preference formation mechanisms, influence 
the choices that we make from the opportunities that are available to us. 
The last element of the visualisation is the level of satisfaction 
or dissatisfaction with one’s functionings and capability levels each 
person will have. Of course, this does not mean that we need to attribute 
ethical significance to those levels of satisfaction; rather, the point in the 
visualisation is that satisfaction with one’s functionings and capability 
levels is not the same thing as those capability sets and combination of 
functionings achievements themselves. For now, we will concentrate on 
deepening our understanding of the capability approach itself, but in 
section 3.8, we will engage in more depth with the question whether we 
should look at functionings and capabilities, rather than satisfaction, or 
some other mental metrics, such as happiness.
Two remarks are important. First, this is a stylized visualisation, and 
also a simplification. It is meant to help us see the different elements 
of the capability approach and how they relate; it is not a fine-grained 
and exhaustive picture of all the elements that determine a person’s 
capability set. One important limitation is that this is not a dynamic 
visualisation and that many arrows, indicating relationships between 
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various parts, are not present.41 In addition, the choices we make 
from our capability set at one point in time, will be determinants of 
our resources and our capability set in the future. Another important 
limitation of this visualisation is that it gives us only the resources, 
capabilities, functionings and satisfaction of one person, but, as was 
mentioned before, capability sets are interdependent; hence choices 
made from one person’s capability set will lead to changes in another 
person’s capability set. 
2.13 The narrow and broad uses  
of the capability approach 
We have now reached the end of the discussion of the modular view 
of the capability approach. Yet before closing this chapter, let us pause 
to use this modular view to clarify something that has been noted by 
several capability scholars, namely that the capability approach has 
been used and can be used in narrower or more limited ways on the one 
hand, and broader or richer ways on the other (e.g. Alkire, Qizilbash 
and Comim 2008, 4–5; Crocker and Robeyns 2009; Qizilbash 2012).42 The 
distinction has been slightly differently presented by different authors, 
but the general gist of their analyses has been that the capability 
approach can either be seen as offering something limited, or else much 
more ambitious and wide-reaching: 
[…] several interpretations of the scope of the capability approach are 
used in the wider literature […]. These can be charted between two 
poles: one narrow and broad, with the broad subsuming the narrow. 
[…] The narrow interpretation sees the approach primarily as identifying 
41  In reality, almost everything is related to almost everything else in one way or 
another, but putting all those arrows on a visualisation would make it completely 
uninformative. After all, the task of scholarship is to abstract away from distracting 
details to see more clearly. 
42  Readers who have never come across that distinction between the narrow and 
broad use of the capability approach may simply ignore this section and move on, 
since the anatomy of the capability approach that has been presented in this book 
covers the same terrain. In essence, this section is written for those who came across 
this terminology in the literature, and wonder how it relates to what has been said 
so far in this book. 
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capability and functionings as the primary informational space for 
certain exercises. The broad interpretation views the capability approach 
as providing a more extensive and demanding evaluative framework, 
for example by introducing human rights or plural principles beyond 
the expansion of capabilities — principles which embody other values 
of concerns such as equity, sustainability or responsibility. (Alkire, 
Qizilbash and Comim 2008, 4–5)
In the narrow way, the capability approach tells us what information we 
should look at if we are to judge how well someone’s life is going or has 
gone; this kind of information is needed in any account of wellbeing or 
human development, or for any kind of interpersonal comparisons. Since 
the capability approach contends that the relevant kind of information 
concerns human functionings and capabilities, the approach provides 
part of what is needed for interpersonal comparisons of advantage. 
The modular view presented in this chapter can help to make sense 
of this observation that there is both a narrower and a wider use of the 
capability approach. In the narrow use of the capability approach, the 
focus is often strictly on the evaluation of individual functioning levels 
or on both functionings and capabilities. If we look at the narrow use of 
the capability approach through the lens of the modular understanding 
of the approach, we can see that the narrow view chooses interpersonal 
comparisons as the purpose of the capability theory (module B1); and 
that it will have to make a selection of dimensions (module B2) and make 
a choice between functionings or capabilities (module B6); its choice for 
human diversity (module B3) will be reflected in the choices it makes in 
B2, but also in which groups (if any) it will compare. Its meta-theoretical 
commitments (B7) are likely related to limiting research to those things 
that can be measured. The narrow use of the capability approach will 
most likely not have much to say about agency (B4) and structural 
constraints (B5) but adopt the implicit theories of agency and structural 
constraints that are used in the empirical literatures on interpersonal 
comparisons. Finally, the narrower view must decide on how to weigh 
the dimensions (module C2) and which methods for empirical analysis 
(module C3) to make. 
In its broad uses, the capability approach not only evaluates the 
lives of individuals (as in the narrow use), but also includes other 
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considerations in its evaluations, which are ‘borrowed’ from other 
approaches or theories. For example, the broader use of the capability 
approach often pays attention to other normative considerations 
and other values than only wellbeing, such as efficiency, agency, or 
procedural fairness. 
The broad view would, in most cases, have a more ambitious purpose 
for its use of the capability approach, such as societal evaluation or policy 
design. It would also have (either implicit or explicit) richer theories 
of human diversity, agency and structural constraints, and — most 
importantly — add several additional ontological and explanatory 
theories (module C1) and additional normative principles (module C4). 
The narrow view does not include modules C1 and C4, and this can 
make a huge difference to the kind of capability theory that emerges. 
An example of the broad view is David Crocker’s (2008) book on 
development ethics, in which he has extended the capability approach 
with accounts of agency, democratic deliberation and participation 
into a more detailed account of development ethics. Yet Crocker 
acknowledges that not all versions of the capability approach embrace 
agency so explicitly. The capability approach proper need not endorse 
a strong account of agency, but there are several scholars who have 
developed particular capability theories and applications in which 
agency plays a central role (e.g. Claassen and Düwell 2013; Claassen 
2016; Trommlerová, Klasen and Leßmann 2015). 
Why is this difference between the narrow and the broad uses of 
the capability approach relevant and important? There are several 
important reasons. First, to assess a critique of the capability approach, 
we need to know whether the critique addresses the capability approach 
in its narrow use, or rather a specific version of its broad use. Second, we 
need to be clear that many of the additional normative commitments in 
the broad use of the capability approach are not essential to the capability 
approach: rather, they are optional choices made in modules B and, 
especially, module C1 (additional ontological and explanatory theories) 
and module C4 (additional normative principles and concerns). This 
insight will also be important when we address the question, in section 
4.9, of whether we can simply talk about ‘the capability approach’ and 
‘the human development paradigm’ as the same thing. 
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2.14 Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter has been to give a comprehensive 
explanation of the capability approach: what is it trying to do, what 
are the many ways in which it has been used, what are the properties 
that all capability theories share, and what is the structure that we can 
detect in the construction of capability theories and applications? In 
order to get a helicopter view, I have deliberately put aside a number 
of additional distinctions and details. They will be the focus of the next 
chapter, whereas critiques and areas of contestation and debate will be 




This chapter aims to deepen our understanding of the capability 
approach, by analysing and clarifying a range of questions that a 
student of the capability approach may have. My aim has been to 
include the most frequently asked questions raised by students of 
the capability approach, as well as a few cases which, in my view, 
currently lead to confusion in the literature. The questions and issues 
which are much more a matter of debate or contestation have been 
collected in chapter 4. Admittedly, the distinction between questions 
that require clarification on the one hand, and issues of debate on the 
other, is not a neat one. But that should not bother us: nothing much 
hangs on whether a topic is included in chapter 3 or rather in chapter 
4; what matters is that students of the capability approach are able to 
find answers to the questions they have. 
In this chapter, the following topics are clarified and analysed: 
How do the terminologies used by Sen and Nussbaum differ, and 
which additional terminological refinements have been proposed in 
the literature? (Section 3.2) Can ‘capabilities’ properly be described 
as freedom, and if so, which types of freedom are capabilities? And 
is it always a good idea to speak of capabilities in terms of freedom? 
(Section 3.3) Which considerations should play a role in making the 
relevant choices in module B6  — the choice between functionings or 
capabilities (or both) — for one’s capability theory? (Section 3.4) How 
exactly does the capability approach account for human diversity, and 
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why is human diversity given so much importance in the capability 
literature? (Section 3.5) What does the notion ‘collective capability’ refer 
to? (Section 3.6) Which notion of wellbeing does the capability approach 
give us? (Section 3.7) How does the capability approach differ from the 
happiness approach, and what are the reasons that capability scholars do 
not adopt the happiness approach? (Section 3.8) To what extent — and 
how — can the capability approach deal with adaptive preferences? 
(Section 3.9) Can a capability theory also be an explanatory theory, or is 
that not possible? (Section 3.10) Can the capability approach be used to 
study all normative questions, or is it not a suitable framework for some 
normative questions? (Section 3.11) The capability approach is often 
positioned as an alternative for resourcist theories — but what exactly 
is the role of resources in the capability approach? (Section 3.12) Finally, 
we consider how the capability approach relates to two established 
literatures: theories of justice and theories of human rights. Which 
choices in module B and module C are needed in order to construct a 
capability theory of justice? (Section 3.13) And how do capabilities and 
human rights relate to each other? (Section 3.14) 
3.2 Refining the notions of ‘capability’  
and ‘functioning’
While at a very introductory level, the terms ‘functionings’ and 
‘capability’ seem to be easy and straightforward, the terminology 
used in the literature is, alas, not always clear. There has been quite 
considerable confusion in the use of the terminology, although — if one 
takes a meta-disciplinary helicopter view — it is possible to discern that 
particular uses of certain terms are more dominant than others. The 
confusion has several sources. First, Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum 
have used the same terminology somewhat differently to each other, 
and since most capability scholars are more influenced either by Sen 
or by Nussbaum, its use in the wider literature is not standardised. 
Moreover, both Sen and Nussbaum have changed their use over time, 
without always making this explicit. Thirdly, there are differences in 
terminological choices that can be traced back to established differences 
in different disciplines, which are having their effect on the different 
disciplinary streams in the capability literature. 
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There are at least four terminological issues that need to be noted: 
(1) ‘capability’ understood as a single opportunity versus ‘capability’ 
understood as an opportunity set; (2) Nussbaum’s more complex 
terminology; (3) the quite different meanings given in the literature 
to the term ‘basic capabilities’; and (4) additional refinements — both 
some that have been proposed in the literature, as well as a proposal 
that I will put on the table, namely to take the robustness of a capability 
into account. Let’s look at these four issues in turn. 
3.2.1 Capability as an opportunity versus  
capability as an opportunity set
Let us first look at Sen’s original terminology. The major constituents 
of the capability approach are functionings and capabilities. Functionings 
are the ‘beings and doings’ of a person, whereas a person’s capability 
is “the various combinations of functionings that a person can achieve. 
Capability is thus a set of combinations of functionings, reflecting the 
person’s freedom to lead one type of life or another” (Sen 1992a, 40). 
According to Sen, a person has only one capability (or capability set), 
which consists of a combination of possible, reachable functionings. 
A person’s functionings and her capability are closely related but 
distinct, as the following quote illustrates:
A functioning is an achievement, whereas a capability is the ability 
to achieve. Functionings are, in a sense, more directly related to 
living conditions, since they are different aspects of living conditions. 
Capabilities, in contrast, are notions of freedom, in the positive sense: 
what real opportunities you have regarding the life you may lead. (Sen 
1987, 36)
Sen thus used the term ‘a capability’ for what we could also call ‘a 
capability set’. The advantage of each person corresponds to one 
capability (hence ‘a person’s overall freedom to do the things they want 
to do and be the person they want to be’). In the original terminology, 
each person had one capability, and the use of the word ‘capabilities’ 
therefore had to refer to the capabilities of various persons. 
In Sen’s original terminology, a person’s capability consisted of a 
range of potential functionings, out of which a particular combination 
of functionings could be chosen. Functionings could therefore be either 
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potential or achieved. This kind of language is most familiar to social 
choice scholars and scholars in formal welfare economics, where the 
focus of much of the analysis is on the opportunity set. 
However, many other scholars working on the capability paradigm, 
including Martha Nussbaum, have labelled these potential functionings 
‘capabilities’, and only use the term ‘functioning’ for an outcome. In 
that terminology, the capability set consists of a number of capabilities, 
in the same way as a person’s overall freedom is made up of a number 
of more specific freedoms. One does not find this usage of ‘capabilities’ 
(meaning the separate elements of one person’s capability set) in Sen’s 
earlier writings, and in his later writings he (perhaps reluctantly) uses 
the word ‘capability’ in both senses interchangeably. 
What, then, is the terminology that is now predominantly used? As 
was explained in chapter 2, a functioning is a state of one’s being (such 
as being healthy or ill), or something one is doing (such as going on 
a trip or raising children). The real opportunity to accomplish such a 
functioning, is the corresponding capability. Hence if my sister goes on 
a trip and invites me along, but I decide to stay at home because I want 
to do something else, then I have the capability to go on a trip, but I 
chose not to have the corresponding outcome — the functioning. Each 
functioning corresponds exactly to one capability. 
This plural use of capabilities is widespread in the contemporary 
literature on the capability approach — with the exception of those 
working in social choice theory, formal welfare economics and related 
fields. The terminology as used by the broader group of scholars 
working on the capability approach seems to be more straightforward 
and less technical, but when reading Sen’s (earlier) work it is important 
to know that the term ‘capability’ started with a different definition.1 
3.2.2 Nussbaum’s terminology
In Women and Human Development, her first book-length work on her 
capabilities theory, Martha Nussbaum used the following terminology, 
which she still uses in her recent book on the capability approach 
(Nussbaum 2011, 20–25). Human capabilities are “what people are 
1  For a seminal analysis of the differences between Nussbaum’s and Sen’s conceptual 
and terminological apparatus, see the twin papers by David A. Crocker (1992, 1995).
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actually able to do and to be” (Nussbaum 2000, 5). From those human 
capabilities, Nussbaum identifies a list of ten “central capabilities” which 
have the status of rights: they “may not be infringed upon to pursue 
other types of social advantage” (Nussbaum 2000, 14). According to 
Nussbaum’s minimal account of social justice, these central capabilities 
have to be protected up to a certain threshold level. 
Nussbaum helpfully distinguishes between three further notions to 
unpack the concept of ‘human capabilities’: basic capabilities, internal 
capabilities, and combined capabilities (Nussbaum 2000, 84–85). The 
term basic capabilities refers to “the innate equipment of individuals that 
is necessary for developing the more advanced capabilities”, such as 
the capability of speech and language, which is present in a new-born 
but needs to be fostered before it can develop into a true capability. 
Internal capabilities are “the matured conditions of readiness” — the 
internal aspect of the capability. If I have the skill and meet the physical 
preconditions of walking, then I may or may not be able to go for a 
walk — depending, for example, on whether as a woman I am legally 
allowed to leave the house without a male relative, or whether there 
is not currently a hurricane posing a real danger if I were to leave my 
house. If those suitable external conditions are in place, we can speak of 
combined capabilities. 
Finally, a functioning is an “active realisation of one or more 
capabilities. […] Functionings are beings and doings that are the 
outgrowths or realizations of capabilities” (Nussbaum 2011, 25). Hence, 
in Nussbaum’s terminology, a functioning stands in relation to a 
capability as an outcome stands in relation to an opportunity.
While the substantive distinctions to which Nussbaum’s terminology 
refers are very helpful, the specific words chosen may be not ideal. 
There are two problems. First, for many capability scholars, the 
reference to the term ‘capability’ refers to the real opportunity to do 
something or be the person one wants to be; ‘internal capabilities’ do 
not fit that category. They are, starting from that perspective, simply 
not a capability, but rather necessary elements of a capability, or a 
precondition for a capability. It would have been better to call ‘internal 
capabilities’ simply ‘internal characteristics’ or else ‘skills, talents, 
character traits and abilities’. Such terminology would also make the 
link with various other behavioural and social disciplines much easier. 
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What Nussbaum calls ‘combined capabilities’ could then simply be 
called ‘human capabilities’, which consist of the presence of those skills, 
talents, character traits and abilities, together with suitable external 
conditions and circumstances. Second, Nussbaum uses the term ‘basic 
capability’ after it had already been used in two other different ways, 
as the next section will show. Why not simply call these ‘innate human 
characteristics’? 
3.2.3 What are ‘basic capabilities’?
The way readers from different disciplines use terminology in particular 
ways is clearly exemplified by the various interpretations of the term 
‘basic capabilities’. 
One interpretation is Nussbaum’s. As was mentioned before, 
Nussbaum (2000, 84) uses the term ‘basic capabilities’ to refer to “the 
innate equipment of individuals that is necessary for developing the 
more advanced capabilities”, such as the capability of speech and 
language, which is present in a new-born but needs to be fostered. Yet 
of the four ways in which the term ‘basic capabilities’ is used in the 
literature, this one may be the least prevalent. 
Sen (1980) mentioned the term ‘basic capability’ as his first rough 
attempt to answer the ‘equality of what?’ question, but changed his 
terminology in subsequent work (what he called ‘basic capability’ 
would later become ‘capability’).2 In his later writings, Sen reserved 
the term ‘basic capabilities’ to refer to a threshold level for the relevant 
capabilities. A basic capability is “the ability to satisfy certain elementary 
and crucially important functionings up to certain levels” (Sen 1992a, 45 
fn 19). Basic capabilities refer to the freedom to do some basic things 
considered necessary for survival and to avoid or escape poverty or 
other serious deprivations. The relevance of basic capabilities is “not so 
much in ranking living standards, but in deciding on a cut-off point for 
the purpose of assessing poverty and deprivation” (Sen 1987, 109). 
2  The ‘equality of what?’ debate was prompted by Sen’s Tanner lecture with the same 
title (Sen 1980a), in which he argued that almost any theory of distributive justice is 
egalitarian, in the sense that they all advocate equality of something. The question 
to pose to a theory of distributive justice is therefore not whether it is egalitarian or 
not, but what is its answer to the ‘equality of what?’ question.
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A third way in which the term ‘basic capabilities’ can be used is, 
as in analytical political philosophy, to refer to essential (moral and/
or political) entitlements that signify a higher level of moral urgency, 
according to the philosopher’s own normative commitments. For 
example, Rutger Claassen, who has been developing an agency-based 
capability theory of justice, has been using the term ‘basic’ in that sense 
(Claassen 2016). 
A fourth way to use the term ‘basic capability’ has been proposed 
by Bernard Williams. Yet this has, to the best of my knowledge, not 
been taken up by anyone. Williams has argued that it is important to 
distinguish between the capability to choose yet another new brand 
of washing powder from, say, Adam Smith’s often-cited capability to 
appear in public without shame. Williams rightly notes that “what you 
need, in order to appear without shame in public, differs depending on 
where you are, but there is an invariant capability here, namely that of 
appearing in public without shame. This underlying capability is more 
basic” (Williams 1987, 101). I agree with the need for the distinction that 
Williams makes, but I would rather call these underlying capabilities 
the general capabilities, so as to avoid confusion with Sen’s use of basic 
capabilities. I will turn to the discussion of general versus specific 
capabilities in section 3.2.4, but first I want to ask the question: how 
should we interpret the term ‘basic capability’?
My reading is that, within the capability literature, the most 
widespread (and hence dominant) use of ‘basic capabilities’ is Sen’s 
use, referring to poverty or deprivation. Hence, while the notion 
of capabilities refers to a very broad range of opportunities, ‘basic 
capabilities’ refers to the real opportunity to avoid poverty or to meet 
or exceed a threshold of wellbeing. By focusing on ‘basic’ capabilities, 
we are limiting the set of all capabilities in two ways: first, by having a 
selection of capabilities (i.e. those that are key to capturing wellbeing, 
and those that are centrally important), and second, by imposing a 
threshold at which those capabilities will be evaluated (i.e. at a low or 
poverty-like level). 
Basic capabilities are thus crucial for poverty analysis and in general 
for studying the wellbeing of large sections of the population in poor 
countries, or for theories of justice that endorse sufficiency as their 
distributive rule. In affluent countries, by contrast, wellbeing analysis 
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often focuses on capabilities that are less necessary both for survival 
and the avoidance of poverty. It is important to acknowledge that 
the capability approach is not restricted to poverty and deprivation 
analysis but can also serve as a framework for, say, project or policy 
evaluations or inequality measurement in non-poor communities. Sen’s 
and Nussbaum’s extensive writings on the capability approach in the 
context of poverty alleviation and development questions have misled 
some of their readers into thinking that the capability approach is about 
poverty and development issues only. Yet as has been absolutely clear 
from the description and account of the capability approach presented 
in chapters 1 and 2, there is conceptually or normatively no reason to 
restrict its scope in this way. The term ‘basic capabilities’ is helpful since 
it can signal to the reader when the capability approach is specifically 
used in this context. 
3.2.4 Conceptual and terminological refinements
Over the years, several proposals have been made to refine the notions 
of ‘functioning’ and ‘capability’, or to add additional qualifications 
which may be helpful in capability analyses. 
The first refinement — which is straightforward but still very 
helpful — is the distinction between general and specific functionings and 
capabilities (Alkire 2002, 31). Suppose we are concerned with questions 
about what is needed for people not to be socially excluded. Sen has 
repeatedly referred to Adam Smith’s example that, in order to be able to 
appear in public without shame, one needed (in the time and place Smith 
lived) a linen shirt. Yet in other countries one would need a sari, or a suit, 
or something else. We all know that in every specific time and place, 
there are certain types of clothes one shouldn’t wear if one doesn’t want 
to be frowned upon or be seen as inappropriately dressed. We could 
say that, for women in place A, being able to wear a sari is important, 
and for men in another place, being able to wear a suit is important, in 
order not to be excluded. ‘Being able to wear a sari’ and ‘being able to 
wear a suit’ are specific capabilities; ‘being able to wear the clothes that 
are considered appropriate’ is the more general capability. Thus, if we 
formulate the relevant capabilities at a higher level of generality, it will 
be easier to reach agreement on what those are, than if we focus on more 
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specific capabilities (Sen 1992a, 108–09). General capabilities are thus 
the more generic and more abstract capabilities. The idea of general 
versus more specific functionings and capabilities is also entailed by 
Nussbaum’s idea of the multiple realisability of capabilities that are under 
scrutiny: the selected capabilities “can be more concretely specified in 
accordance with local beliefs and circumstances” (Nussbaum 2000, 77).
A second conceptual refinement to consider is the concept of ‘refined 
functioning’. Sen (1987, 36–37) has proposed the concept of ‘refined 
functioning’ to designate functioning that takes note of the available 
alternatives. Sen (1992a, 52) notes: “‘fasting’ as a functioning is not just 
starving; it is choosing to starve when one does have other options”. The aim 
of this proposal is to try to bridge the choice between functionings and 
capabilities by a conceptual move. That is, one could focus on achieved 
functionings levels but — where appropriate — include the exercise of 
choice as one of the relevant functionings (Fleurbaey 2002). This allows 
us to stay within the realm of (observable) achievements, but because 
the act of choosing is included, one can derive from that functioning 
relevant information about whether one had options or not. 
A third conceptual refinement — this time a qualification or property 
that we can attribute to a functioning or a capability — has been proposed 
by Avner De-Shalit and Jonathan Wolff. They have argued that what is 
relevant for the most disadvantaged persons is not so much whether 
they have any functionings, but rather whether those functionings are 
secure (Wolff and De-Shalit 2007, 2013). The idea here is that we are 
not only interested in the functionings that people can achieve, but also 
in the prospects that a person has to sustain that level — that is, the 
risk and vulnerability of losing that functionings achievement should 
be taken into account, even if the risk never materialises. The objective 
fact of risk and vulnerability itself should be seen as having an influence 
on how we normatively judge a functionings achievement (Wolff and 
De-Shalit 2007, 63–73). 
Another qualification that we could add to capabilities is their 
robustness — referring to the probability of a capability being realisable. 
The standard definition of a capability is that it is a genuine option: if we 
have the capability and we choose this opportunity, then we should also 
enjoy the outcome — the functioning. But this presents us with a very 
dichotomous view of our options: either we have an option with a 100% 
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probability, or else, if the probability is significantly less, it is implied 
that we do not have the capability. That is, arguably, a rather unhelpful 
way of thinking about real life processes. For example, the problem 
with women’s opportunities in advanced economies is definitely not 
that women have no capabilities to achieve professional success; rather, 
the problem is that, given a variety of mechanisms that are biased 
against female professionals, the robustness of the capabilities they are 
given is weaker. If an equally talented man and woman both want to 
succeed professionally, they may, in a liberal society, both have that 
capability — but the probability that the man will be able to succeed will 
be higher than the woman’s. She does have some opportunity, but that 
opportunity is less robust. Probabilities of success if one were to want 
to exercise that capability would be a way to express this. In the above 
gender case, the source of the different probabilities lies in the social and 
environmental conversion factors. But the source of the difference in 
robustness could also lie in internal factors. For example, a person with 
a psychiatric condition may have some opportunities for finding a job, 
but those opportunities may be much more precarious then they would 
be if she didn’t have those psychiatric challenges. 
3.3 Are capabilities freedoms,  
and if so, which ones?
Amartya Sen (1990c, 460) has described capabilities as 
the freedom[s] to achieve valuable human functionings, which can vary 
from such elementary things as being well-nourished and avoiding 
escapable morbidity and mortality, to such complex achievements 
as having self-respect, being well-integrated in society, and so on. 
Capabilities thus reflect the actual freedoms that people respectively 
enjoy in being able to lead the kind of lives they have reason to value. 
But several philosophers and social scientists have questioned the 
understanding (or, for philosophers: ‘conceptualisation’) of capabilities 
in terms of freedoms, asking whether capabilities could plausibly be 
understood as freedoms, whether Sen was not overextending the use 
of freedom, whether freedom is all there is to the capability approach, 
and whether it is wise to use the terminology of freedom for the goals 
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of the capability approach (e.g. Cohen 1993; Gasper and Van Staveren 
2003; Hill 2003; Okin 2003, 291–92). Let us therefore clarify and analyse 
the conceptualisation of capabilities as freedom by answering three 
questions. First, capabilities have been described as positive freedoms, 
but how should we understand that notion, and is that the best way to 
describe what kind of freedoms capabilities are? (Section 3.3.1) Secondly, 
is there a better conceptualisation of freedom that captures what 
capabilities are? (Section 3.3.2) Thirdly, if it is the case that capabilities 
can coherently be conceptualised as freedoms, are capabilities then 
best understood as freedoms, or is it better to avoid that terminology? 
(Section 3.3.3).
3.3.1 Capabilities as positive freedoms? 
Sen has often used the distinction between positive and negative 
freedoms, thereby describing capabilities as positive freedoms. For 
example, Sen (1984b, 315) has stated that he is trying “to outline a 
characterization of positive freedoms in the form of capabilities of 
persons”.3 In some discourses, especially in the social sciences, the term 
‘positive freedoms’ is used to refer to access to certain valuable goods, 
such as the freedom to affordable high quality health care or education. 
Positive freedoms are contrasted with negative freedoms, which refer 
to the absence of interference by others, such as the freedom to own a 
gun.4 Yet these are by no means standard understandings of positive 
and negative freedom. 
In making the claim that capabilities are positive freedoms, Sen 
often approvingly refers to Isaiah Berlin’s canonical distinction between 
positive and negative freedom, but unfortunately doesn’t explain in 
detail how we should read Berlin. This is potentially confusing, since 
Berlin’s use of the term ‘positive freedom’ is far from crystal clear. 
3  Other statements equating capabilities with positive freedoms can be found in 
Sen (1982, 6, 38–39; 1984c, 78, 86; 1985c, 201; 2008, 18 among other places). In his 
1979 Tanner lecture in which Sen coined the term ‘capability’, he did not refer to 
freedoms, but did use other terms such as ‘ability’ and ‘power’. 
4  According to Sen (2009c, 282) this is the understanding of positive and negative 
freedom in welfare economics. 
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Let us start from the clearest concept in Berlin — his notion of 
negative freedom — which Berlin (1969, 122) defines as follows: “I am 
normally said to be free to the degree to which no man or body of men 
interferes with my activity”. The opposite of having negative freedom is 
being coerced — the deliberate interference of other persons in an area 
of my life in which I could, without the interference, act freely. Negative 
freedom thus corresponds to freedom as non-interference, and Berlin 
speaks approvingly of this kind of freedom: “[…] non-interference, 
which is the opposite of coercion, is good as such, although it is not 
the only good. This is the ‘negative’ conception of liberty in its classical 
form” (1969, 128).
On positive freedom, there is much less clarity in Berlin’s work. 
Berlin first introduces positive freedom as the freedom to be one’s own 
master: 
I wish to be the instrument of my own, not of other men’s, acts of will. I 
wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious 
purposes, which are my own, not by causes which affect me, as it were, 
from outside. I wish to be a somebody, not nobody, a doer — deciding, 
not being decided for; self-directed and not acted upon by external nature 
or by other men as if I were a thing, or an animal, or a slave incapable of 
playing a human role, that is, conceiving goals and policies of my own 
and realizing them. (Berlin 1969, 131)
Berlin argues that the metaphor of self-mastery historically developed 
into the idea that a person has two selves, a dominant self which is 
identified with reason and a ‘higher nature’, and a ‘heteronomous self’ 
which follows desires and passions and needs to be disciplined. Berlin 
continues that the first self, the ‘real self’, may become seen as wider 
than the individual, 
as a social whole of which the individual is an element or aspect: a tribe, a 
race, a church, a state, the great society of the living and the dead and the 
yet unborn. This entity is then identified as being the ‘true’ self which, 
by imposing its collective, or ‘organic’ single will upon its recalcitrant 
‘members’ achieves its own, and therefore their ‘higher freedom’. (Berlin 
1969, 132) 
Put differently, men are “coerced in the name of some goal (let us 
say, justice or public health) which they would if they were more 
enlightened, themselves pursue, but do not, because they are blind or 
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ignorant or corrupt” (132–133). Berlin acknowledges that one could, in 
principle, develop the same justification of tyranny starting from the 
definition of negative freedom, but continues to argue that this is easier 
with the positive conception of freedom. The reason is that the idea of 
positive freedom as self-mastery entails a distinction between my ‘true’ 
self and an ‘untrue self’. It is therefore possible that someone else other 
than you knows better what your true self is, which opens up a space 
for another person to coerce you in the name of your ‘true self’. Berlin 
believes that this has historically been the case with tyrannical regimes 
that propagated an ideology entailing a notion of positive freedom as 
self-mastery, whereby everything can be justified in the name of some 
true or higher self that needs to master other impulses and desires. 
It is not difficult to see that positive freedom in Berlin’s sense is not 
the kind of freedom that capabilities represent, especially not when 
understood against the historically tyrannical shape that this ideal 
(according to Berlin) took. Capabilities are not about people’s internal 
attitudes towards what they should do with their lives. At the political 
level, the capability approach would advocate that we should organise 
our political life in such a way as to expand people’s capabilities, 
whereby the capability approach will judge that two persons had the 
same initial equal freedom if both of them had the same initial set of 
valuable options from which to choose. The capability approach, 
therefore, is not strongly perfectionist and teleological, as is the positive 
freedom doctrine in Berlin’s sense. In sum, capabilities are very different 
from Berlin’s notion of positive freedom, and Berlin’s understanding of 
positive freedom is not the best way to capture the kinds of freedom that 
capabilities are. 
In later work, Sen acknowledged the potential for confusion that 
his equation of capabilities with positive freedom and his references to 
Berlin’s work had made, and provided a clearer description of his own 
understanding of positive freedom. In his Arrow lectures, Sen (2002a, 
586) wrote: 
positive freedom has also been variously defined, varying on one side 
from the general freedom to achieve in general, to the particular aspect, 
on the other side, of freedom to achieve insofar as it relates to influences 
working within oneself (a use that is close to Berlin’s conceptualization of 
positive freedom). In my own attempts in this field, I have found it more 
useful to see ‘positive freedom’ as the person’s ability to do the things 
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in question taking everything into account (including external restraints as 
well as internal limitations). In this interpretation, a violation of negative 
freedom must also be — unless compensated by some other factor — a 
violation of positive freedom, but not vice versa. This way of seeing 
positive freedom is not the one preferred by Isaiah Berlin.
This quote also draws attention to another drawback of defining 
capabilities in terms of positive freedom. Violations of negative freedoms 
will, according to Sen, always lead to violations of positive freedoms; yet 
for Berlin this need not be the case. In a totalitarian state which espouses 
a doctrine of positive freedom, in which the state will help the citizens 
to ‘liberate their true selves’, a violation of a range of negative freedoms, 
such as the freedom of expression or of the freedom to hold property, 
will not violate positive freedom; on the contrary, within the parameters 
of that doctrine, violations of such negative freedoms may even enhance 
the state-aspired positive freedom. 
So where does all this terminological exegesis lead us? It has often 
been remarked that there are many available definitions of negative 
and positive freedom. Berlin’s conceptualisations are canonical, but his 
definition of positive freedom is very different from Sen’s. Moreover, as 
Charles Taylor (1979, 175) rightly pointed out, the debate on negative and 
positive freedoms has been prone to polemical attacks that caricature 
the views of both sides. One therefore wonders what is to be gained by 
describing capabilities in terms of positive freedoms — at least, if one 
is aware of the philosophical background to this term. Perhaps it may 
be wiser to look further for an alternative conceptualisation that is less 
prone to creating misunderstandings? 
3.3.2 Capabilities as opportunity or option freedoms?
Luckily, in other parts of Amartya Sen’s writings we can find the 
answer to the question of what kind of freedoms capabilities are (if any 
at all). Although Sen’s first descriptions of capabilities were couched 
exclusively in terms of positive freedoms, he soon offered an alternative 
description in terms of opportunities.5 In his 1984 Dewey Lectures, Sen 
5  In fact, even this is not entirely correct, since in his earlier work and especially in 
his work written for economists, Sen did not speak of ‘capabilities’, but rather of 
‘capability sets’ and thus also of ‘opportunity sets’ (see section 3.2.1).
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(1985c, 201) defended a conceptualisation of wellbeing freedom in terms 
of capabilities, and defined wellbeing freedom as: 
whether one person did have the opportunity of achieving the functioning 
vector that another actually achieved. This involves comparisons of 
actual opportunities that different persons have. 
Similarly, in Inequality Reexamined, Sen (1992a, 31) writes: 
A person’s position in a social arrangement can be judged in two different 
perspectives, viz. (1) the actual achievement, and (2) the freedom to 
achieve. Achievement is concerned with what we manage to accomplish, 
and freedom with the real opportunity that we have to accomplish what 
we value.
Given Sen’s descriptions of the freedoms that the capability approach is 
concerned with in terms of opportunities, it seems a natural suggestion 
to investigate whether the concept of ‘opportunity freedom’ better 
captures the nature of capabilities. 
Charles Taylor, in his discussion of Berlin’s distinction between 
negative and positive freedom, has argued that beneath the distinction 
between positive and negative freedom lies another set of distinctions, 
namely between an exercise concept of freedom and an opportunity 
concept of freedom. The exercise concept of freedom refers to an agent 
being free “only to the extent that one has effectively determined 
oneself and the shape of one’s life”, whereas according to the opportunity 
concept of freedom “being free is a matter of what we can do, of what 
is open to us to do, whether or not we do anything to exercise these 
options” (Taylor 1979, 177). According to Taylor, theories of negative 
freedom can be grounded on either an exercise or an opportunity 
concept, but theories of positive freedom can never be grounded 
merely on an opportunity concept. Taylor’s goal is arguing in favour 
of the exercise concept of freedom, and shows that the crude view of 
negative freedom (which, he argues, Berlin is defending) is untenable. 
Taylor (1979, 177) describes the opportunity concept of freedom thus: 
“being free is a matter of what we can do, of what it is open to us to do, 
whether or not we do anything to exercise these options. […] Freedom 
consists just in there being no obstacle. It is a sufficient condition of 
one’s being free that nothing stand in the way”. 
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Is Taylor’s opportunity concept of freedom the kind of freedom we 
are searching for in our attempt to understand the nature of capabilities? 
His concept comes close, but it is narrower than the conception of 
freedom contained in the idea of capabilities. For Taylor, only external 
obstacles count in the definition of negative freedom (Taylor 1979, 
176, 193; Kukathas 2007, 688). He holds that the acknowledgement of 
internal obstacles to action, including the action to choose between 
different opportunities, merges an element of the exercise concept of 
freedom into the opportunity concept. The notion of opportunity in 
Taylor’s concept of opportunity freedom thus resembles a formal notion 
of opportunity more closely than a substantive notion. 
Here’s an example to illustrate the difference between Taylor’s 
opportunity concept of freedom and the notion of ‘capabilities’. If, in 
a patriarchal community, men have all the power, and in a verbally 
aggressive manner they teach girls and remind women that their place 
is inside the house, then surely these women do not have the same 
opportunity freedom to find employment in the nearest city where 
women from more liberal communities are holding jobs. In formal 
terms, the women from both communities may be able to work outside 
the home since there are jobs available to women in the city, they are 
able-bodied and are able to commute to the city. Yet the women from the 
patriarchal community would face much bigger costs and would need 
to gather much more courage, and resist the subtle working of social 
norms, before they could effectively access this formal opportunity. Put 
in capability terms, we would say that the first group of women has 
a much smaller capability to work outside the home than the women 
living in less patriarchal communities. If the costs and burdens borne 
by the women from strongly patriarchal communities are excessive, we 
could even conclude that the capability to work in the city is virtually 
nonexistent.
Luckily, more recent debates in political philosophy have further 
developed this discussion, in a way that is helpful in answering the 
question of how capabilities should be understood. Philip Pettit (2003) 
has argued that the philosophical debate on social freedom could 
benefit from being clear on the distinction between option-freedom 
and agency-freedom. While option-freedom is a property of options, 
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agency-freedom is a property of agents. Agency-freedom relates to the 
long tradition in philosophy of seeing the slave as the prime example of 
someone who is not free: he is subjugated to the will of others. Agency-
freedom focusses on the question of how a person relates to their fellows, 
and is a matter of social standing or status, not of the options that they 
enjoy (Pettit 2003, 394–95). 
Options are the alternatives that an agent is in a position to realize. 
Pettit argues that option freedom is a function of two aspects: the 
character of access to options, and the character of options themselves. 
First, option freedom is a function of the character of the agent’s access to 
the options. Some philosophers would hold that the physical possibility 
of carrying out an option is sufficient for access, and thus would conclude 
that the agent has option freedom. Alternatively, one could defend the 
position that access to an option does not only depend on the physical 
possibility of carrying out the option, but that non-physical barriers 
are relevant too. Pettit distinguishes two possibilities: either an agent is 
objectively more burdened than another agent when trying to access an 
option, whether by difficulty or by penalty, or an agent is subjectively 
burdened in the sense that he believes that access to an option is not 
possible. The second aspect of option freedom is the character of the 
options. Here a wide range of views exist, such as the number of options 
that are accessible, their diversity, and whether they are objectively 
significant or subjectively significant (Pettit 2003, 389–92).
Capabilities are precisely this kind of option freedom. What counts 
in the capability approach is indeed the access that a person has to a 
wide range of valuable alternative options. In sum, capabilities can be 
understood as opportunity or option freedoms, but are broader than 
Taylor’s rather narrow opportunity concept of freedom. We can therefore 
conclude that it is conceptually sound to understand capabilities as 
freedoms of this sort.6 
6  It doesn’t follow, of course, that capability theories would not be able to pay attention 
to agency freedom. They do — for example by including relational capabilities in 
the selection of relevant dimensions, or by having some ideal of agency freedom as 
an additional moral principle included in module C4. 
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3.3.3 Are capabilities best understood as freedoms?
The detailed analysis in the previous section doesn’t settle all questions, 
though. It may well be the case that it is coherent to see capabilities as 
freedoms, but that there is another notion, such as human rights, basic 
needs, or something similar, that much better captures what capabilities 
are. 
The answer to that question has to be contextual in the following 
sense. The capability approach is a deeply interdisciplinary approach, 
yet scholars from different disciplines will have different associations 
with certain terms. Philosophers may well have very different 
associations with the word ‘freedom’ than, say, anthropologists or 
development sociologists. Similar remarks can be made when the 
capability approach is being applied for policy and political purposes, 
since the term ‘freedom’ has in some countries a particular historical 
connotation, or is being claimed by extreme right or extreme left political 
parties, in the sense that if they were to come to power, they would 
use that power to drastically curtail the capabilities of (some sections 
of) the population. However, one should also not forget that the word 
‘capabilities’ is non-existent in many languages, and may itself also lead 
to mistaken connotations, for example with skills or capacities in its 
French translation (capacité). 
When developing a particular capability theory or capability 
application, should we frame the capability approach in terms of 
freedoms? My suggestion would be to answer this question in a 
pragmatic fashion. If the context in which the capability approach is 
applied makes it likely that the use of the term freedom will lead to the 
application being misunderstood, then I would suggest that one defines, 
describes and illustrates the word ‘capabilities’ and introduces that 
term. Yet for moral philosophers and political theorists who are eager to 
further develop the capability approach into a coherent political theory, 
a clear understanding of capabilities as option freedoms may pave the 
way for work that lies ahead. Pettit’s analysis of option freedoms, and 
the established literature to which he is referring in his analysis, give 
the capability scholar a neat overview of the choices that need to be 
made if one wants to turn the underspecified capability approach into 
a well-specified moral or political capability theory. For the political 
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philosopher, there is therefore less reason to be worried about being 
misunderstood when referring to capabilities as option freedoms, or as 
opportunity freedoms. 
3.4 Functionings or capabilities? 
We now move to examine the issue that is central to module B6: should 
we, when developing a capability analysis or capability theory, focus on 
functionings, capabilities, or a mixture of both? After all, this question 
is not settled. It is one of the core features of the capability approach 
that it uses ‘functionings’ and ‘capabilities’ as core notions (property 
A1, as discussed in 2.6.1) and that every capability analysis endorses 
the claim that functionings and/or capabilities form the evaluative space 
(property A5, as discussed in 2.6.5). But this still leaves the question 
unanswered whether we should focus on functionings, or on capabilities 
or on a combination of functionings and capabilities. Perhaps we have 
good reasons sometimes to focus on functionings, and sometimes 
on capabilities, for example for different types of applications, or for 
different groups of people? 
Luckily, this question is not new to the capability literature, and 
there is by now a lively debate with many different types of arguments 
about whether the appropriate wellbeing metric should be capabilities 
or functionings, hence opportunities or achievements. What reasons or 
considerations have been argued to be relevant for this choice?7 
The first consideration concerns anti-paternalism. It is a normative 
consideration: by focusing on capabilities rather than functionings, we 
do not force people into a particular account of good lives but instead 
aim at a range of possible ways of life from which each person can 
choose. Thus, it is the liberal nature of the capability approach, or an 
anti-paternalist commitment, that motivates a principled choice of 
capabilities rather than functionings. Obviously, the strength of this 
argument depends on how bad one takes paternalism to be. There may 
be good reasons to believe that some paternalism is unavoidable, or 
even desired (Nussbaum 2000, 51–56; Robeyns 2016b). Moreover, some 
7  General discussions surveying different reasons to choose for functionings, 
capabilities or both, can also be found in Robeyns and Van der Veen (2007, 45–99, 
76–78), Hick and Burchardt (2016, 79–82) and Robeyns (2016b).
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scholars have argued that some element of paternalism in the capability 
approach may well be unavoidable. One reason is that the protection 
of the capacity to choose from one’s capability set requires certain 
functionings, such as mental health and education, to be promoted as 
achievements, rather than merely as freedoms (Gandjour 2008). Another 
reason is that the protection of certain specific capabilities requires 
either previously certain functionings-levels, or else requires certain 
levels of achievement of other capabilities, or requires that enough other 
people have functionings achievements within those capabilities (e.g. 
Robeyns and Van der Veen 2007; Claassen 2014; Robeyns 2016b). Rutger 
Claassen has identified five different types of mechanisms in which 
capability protection leads to the promotion of functionings, and has 
concluded that “any capability theory will have to confront the issue of 
paternalism” (Claassen 2014, 72).
As this literature shows, there are many reasons why one can 
reasonably decide sometimes to promote functionings, rather than 
capabilities. Here, I will only give one example, namely limits to our 
capacities to make informed choices in a voluntary, autonomous 
way. Let us start with an uncontested case: infants and the severely 
cognitively disabled. The concept of functioning has particular relevance 
for our relations to those human beings who are not yet able to choose 
(infants), who will never be able to make complex choices (severely 
mentally disabled individuals), or who have lost this ability through 
advanced dementia or serious brain damage. Whether or not these 
persons can decide to be well nourished and healthy, it is generally 
held that we (through families, governments, or other institutions) 
have the moral obligation to promote or protect their nutritional and 
healthy functioning. All capability theorists agree that in these cases, 
we should focus on functionings rather than capabilities. The implicit 
underlying assumption in the claim that capabilities have normative 
priority over functionings is that we assume the presence of a sufficient 
level of agency in the individuals who will be given the power to make 
their own choices from their capability sets. If we have strong reason 
to believe that such agency cannot be attributed to a person, we should 
not let the person herself decide on which options to choose; however, 
we should find ways of compensating for that lack of agency — either 
by having a steward make the choices for her or by guiding her in the 
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choice-making process. Thus, we will shift our normative concern from 
capabilities to functionings for those who are incapable of deciding for 
themselves. In empirical research, this implies, for example, that it is 
fine to study the quality of life of small children by focussing on a range 
of functionings (e.g. Phipps 2002). 
But the paternalism claim is not limited to the case of infants and the 
severely cognitively disabled: one could also apply this argument — at 
least to some extent and in some areas — to all adults. Adults, too, often 
make systematically irrational or mistaken choices. We are often not 
able to choose what is best for us simply because of our psychological 
makeup; many of our choices are the result of the impulsive, unreflective, 
habit-driven part of our brain rather than the deliberative and reflective 
part. There is mounting empirical evidence of our systematic failures in 
choice-making, that we are influenced by a large number of arbitrary 
factors in making choices and that we often harm our own interests in 
non-deliberate and non-intentional ways (e.g. Ariely 2010; Kahneman 
2011). It is entirely consistent for a capability theory to argue that we 
have strong reasons to protect people against their own systematic 
irrationalities, just as it is consistent for the capability approach to argue 
that there are stronger reasons why we should allow people to make 
the errors that follow from their own systematic irrationalities: both 
positions follow from choices made in the B-modules. 
Summing up, we have here a first normative consideration that can 
help us to decide whether some (limited or fuller) focus on functionings 
rather than capabilities is acceptable, namely the question of whether 
there are mechanisms that justify paternalism. 
A second normative consideration in the choice between capabilities 
and functionings stems from the importance given to personal 
responsibility in contemporary political philosophy. If one believes that 
the moral aim should be to establish equality of opportunity, then it 
follows that one should, at least as an ideal, favour equality of capability 
over equality of functionings. If equality of capability becomes the ideal, 
then each person should have the same real opportunity (capability), 
but once that is in place, each individual should be held responsible 
for his or her own choices. It is important to stress, however, that 
philosophers and social scientists working on issues of social justice 
do not at all agree on whether equality of opportunity (capabilities) 
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should be the goal, rather than equality of outcome (functionings). On 
the one hand, the responsibility-sensitivity principle is widely endorsed 
not only in political philosophy but also in the mathematical models 
being developed in normative welfare economics. If one wants to 
endorse and implement this principle of responsibility-sensitivity, then 
specifications and applications of the capability approach should focus 
on capabilities, rather than functionings. On the other hand, scholars 
have objected to the weight given to personal responsibility, both within 
the highly abstract theorising about ideals and when considering more 
applied and practical issues. At a highly abstract theoretical level, 
philosophers disagree on whether we should endorse responsibility-
sensitivity in developing the capability approach (Fleurbaey 2002; 
Vallentyne 2005; Wolff and De-Shalit 2007). Moreover, for applied 
work, serious epistemological hurdles may ultimately lead us to drop 
the responsibility-sensitivity principle for practical reasoning about 
the actual world: in practice, it is often impossible to know what the 
causal factors were that led someone to make decisions that lowered 
her achieved wellbeing, and hence it is difficult or even impossible to 
know whether the causal factors are those for which one could be held 
morally responsible or not. 
Thirdly, there may be institutional considerations that have an influence 
on whether we choose functionings, capabilities, or a mixture (Robeyns 
2016b). Take the example of a government that has, with the broad 
support of the population, set up a welfare state arrangement, which 
includes certain welfare rights. Then this government may demand 
from citizens who want to be part of this societal arrangement that they 
proactively aim to master, secure, or maintain certain functionings, 
such as being able to read and write, or to speak a language that does 
not exclude one from holding a job. A welfare state arrangement that 
offers citizens relatively generous welfare rights can legitimately induce 
or perhaps even force citizens and legal residents to choose certain 
functionings that are needed in order to justly participate in that welfare 
state arrangement. But here, again, one has to pay attention to detail and 
be careful, since we would want to distinguish between those who didn’t 
exercise a functioning but had the capability versus those who didn’t 
exercise a functioning but due to inability didn’t have the capability in 
the first place. For example, if the political community believes that it is 
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a fair requirement in order to enjoy the benefits of the welfare state that 
one learns the major dominant local language, then we have to make a 
distinction between those who do, those who don’t but could, and those 
who don’t but are unable. In practice, that distinction may sometimes 
be very hard to make. Nevertheless, the general point to take home is 
that an outcome-oriented theory of justice needs to be bolstered with an 
account of what justice requires from the institutional design for a state 
or coalition of states. Reasons of reciprocity, feasibility, and stability 
may justify a focus on functionings rather than merely on capabilities.
Fourthly, there are pervasive cases of interdependence between 
people’s capabilities that may prompt us to look beyond the capability of 
a single person. One important type of case is that in which a capability 
is available to a person but only if other people do not also want to realize 
that capability (Basu 1987, 74). For example, two spouses may each have 
the capability of holding demanding jobs which are each incompatible 
with large caring responsibilities. However, if these spouses also have 
infants or relatives with extensive care needs, then at best only one of 
them may effectively realize that capability. Another type of case is that 
in which the capability of one person is only possible if enough other 
people have chosen to realise the corresponding functioning (Claassen 
2014, 67–68). Take the example of being protected against dangerous 
infectious diseases such as polio or measles by way of a vaccine. In order 
genuinely to have that capability, one does not only need access to a 
vaccination, but enough other people need to choose to be vaccinated, 
since protection requires that a certain minimal number of people are 
vaccinated. In other words, my child’s capability to be protected from 
the debilitating effects of polio or the measles depends on your choice to 
exercise that capability and opt for the functioning — that is, to vaccinate 
your children. 
Since capability sets may thus include freedoms that are conditional 
(because they depend on the choices of other people), it might be better 
to focus both on the individual’s capability set and also on what people 
have been able to realize from their own capability sets, that is, their 
functionings or wellbeing achievements. The question of who decides 
or should decide this sort of question highlights the importance of 
agency and procedural fairness, which are often additional normative 
commitments included in the capability theory that is developed. 
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Finally, note that in many empirical applications, an analysis of 
functionings is used as a proxy for an analysis of the capability set. In the 
case of comparison of inequalities between groups, it has been argued 
that group-inequalities in functionings should be taken to reflect group-
inequalities in capabilities, except if a plausible reason can be offered 
for why the members of those groups would systematically choose 
differently (Robeyns 2003; Kuklys and Robeyns 2005). Tania Burchardt 
and Rod Hicks have stressed that if inferences about capabilities based 
on information about functionings are made, one should be explicit 
about the underlying assumptions, and that three different situations 
could occur, namely: 
(1) situations in which all difference in outcomes might reasonably 
be attributed to differences in capabilities (such as where a person is 
assaulted); (2) situations where differences in preferences may result in 
differences in outcomes, but where for the purposes of public policy it 
may be possible to assume that any differences are a result of differing 
levels of capabilities; and (3) situations in which additional evidence 
may be needed in order to determine whether differences in outcomes 
are genuinely a result of differences in capability. (Hick and Burchardt 
2016, 80)
What is the upshot of all these considerations? In my view, there are 
sound reasons why one would limit oneself to capabilities, there are 
sound reasons why one would rather focus only on functionings, and 
there are sound reasons why one would prefer a mixture. The choice 
depends on the purpose of the capability theory, but also on the 
additional ontological choices one endorses (e.g. one’s idea of human 
nature — are we fully rational or not, and what, if anything, should be 
the consequences for policy making and institutional design), on the 
normative principles one adds to the core of the capability approach 
when developing a capability theory (e.g. endorsement of neutrality or 
not), and on practical constraints one is facing. We cannot say in general 
that the capability approach should focus exclusively on capabilities, 
or exclusively on functionings. It all depends on additional theoretical 
choices and normative commitments, which can be made in modules B 
and C, when developing a capability analysis.8 
8  I therefore think that Nussbaum’s (2011c) claim that it is a core property of the 
capability approach that it focusses on capabilities rather than functionings is 
mistaken (Robeyns 2011, 2016b; see also Claassen 2014).
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3.5 Human diversity in the capability approach
In the previous chapter, it was already highlighted that diversity among 
human beings is a key motivation as well as a conceptual characteristic 
of the capability approach (module B3). Given how central human 
diversity is to the approach, it is worth saying a few more words on this 
topic. There are two important points to make: first, the mechanisms that 
the capability approach has at its disposal to account for diversity, and 
second, the attention given to diversity within the existing capability 
literature. 
The capability approach takes account of human diversity in at 
least two ways. First, by its focus on the plurality of functionings and 
capabilities as important evaluative spaces. By including a wide range 
of dimensions in the conceptualization of wellbeing and wellbeing 
outcomes, the approach broadens the so-called ‘informational basis’ 
of assessments, and thereby includes some dimensions that may 
be particularly important for some groups but less so for others. For 
example, in standard outcome assessments, women as a group virtually 
always end up being worse off than men. But if the selection of outcome 
dimensions is shifted to also include the quality and quantity of social 
relations and support, and being able to engage in hands-on care, then 
the normative assessment of gender inequality becomes less univocal 
and requires much further argument and normative analysis, including 
being explicit about how to aggregate different dimensions (Robeyns 
2003, 2006a).
Secondly, human diversity is stressed in the capability approach by 
the explicit focus on personal and socio-environmental conversion factors 
that make possible the conversion of commodities and other resources 
into functionings, and on the social, institutional, and environmental 
contexts that affect the conversion factors and the capability set directly. 
Each individual has a unique profile of conversion factors, some of 
which are body-related, while others are shared with all people from her 
community, and still others are shared with people with the same social 
characteristics (e.g. same gender, class, caste, age, or race characteristics). 
In the account of the capability approach presented in chapter 2, this 
is made very explicit by having module A3 focus on the conversion 
factors, which is an important source of interpersonal variations (the 
other source is how structural constraints affect people differently). As 
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Sen (1992a, xi) has argued, interpersonal variations should be of central 
importance to inequality analysis: 
Investigations of equality — theoretical as well as practical — that 
proceed with the assumption of antecedent uniformity (including the 
presumption that ‘all men are created equal’) thus miss out on a major 
aspect of the problem. Human diversity is no secondary complication (to 
be ignored, or to be introduced ‘later on’); it is a fundamental aspect of 
our interest in equality.
Indeed, if human beings were not diverse, then inequality in one space, 
say income, would more or less be identical with inequality in another 
space, like capabilities. The entire question of what the appropriate 
evaluative space should be would become obsolete if there weren’t 
any interpersonal difference in the mapping of outcomes in one space 
onto another. If people were all the same and had the same needs and 
abilities, then the capability approach would lose much of its force 
and significance, since resources would be excellent proxies for our 
wellbeing and wellbeing freedom. But as it happens, human beings are 
very diverse. 
However, we also need to acknowledge that there is significant 
scholarly dispute about the question of which dimensions and 
parameters of human diversity are salient, and which are not. Scholars 
embrace very different accounts of human diversity, which is why 
we have module B3 in the capability approach. One’s account of 
human diversity can often be traced back to the ontological accounts 
one accepts of diversity-related factors, as well as the role of groups 
in explanatory accounts. An example of the former is the account of 
gender and race that one embraces. If one holds a theory of gender and 
race that regards these as rather superficial phenomena that do not 
have an important impact on people’s behaviour and opportunities in 
life, then the attention given to diversity in a capability application or 
capability theory will be rather minimal. This is logically consistent with 
the structure of capability theories (as laid out in chapter 2), but it is also 
a view that has not been widely embraced in the capability literature. 
Instead, the capability approach attracts scholars who endorse accounts 
of dimensions of gender, race, and other dimensions of human diversity 
that are much richer. Presumably, these scholars recognise the ways in 
which the capability approach can account for human diversity, hence 
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this may explain why most capability scholars endorse rich accounts of 
such diversity. 
A strong acknowledgement of human diversity has therefore become 
a hallmark of the capability approach as that literature has developed. 
Its criticism of other normative approaches is often fuelled by, and based 
on, the claim that human diversity is insufficiently acknowledged in 
many normative frameworks and theories. This also explains why the 
capability approach is often favourably regarded by feminist scholars, 
and by academics concerned with global justice, race or class relations, or 
care and disability issues. One of the main complaints of these scholars 
about mainstream philosophy and economics has been precisely this 
issue: the relative invisibility of the fate of those people whose lives do 
not correspond to that of an able-bodied, non-dependent, caregiving-
free individual who belongs to the dominant ethnic, racial and religious 
groups. 
3.6 Collective capabilities 
Several scholars have proposed the introduction of a category of 
‘collective capabilities’ or ‘community capabilities’ (Evans 2002; Ibrahim 
2006, 2009, 2017; Schlosberg and Carruthers 2010; Murphy 2014). The 
idea of ‘collective capabilities’ is used in different ways in the literature, 
and not always spelled out very carefully. I will try to reconstruct what 
‘collective capabilities’ could mean, and then discuss to what extent 
these are different from human capabilities tout court. 
It is instructive, first, to see in which contexts different authors 
introduce the idea of ‘collective capability’. Here are a few typical 
examples from the literature. Solava Ibrahim (2006, 2009, 2017) argues 
for the importance of collective capabilities from the perspective of the 
work done by self-help groups of poor people fighting to overcome 
their poverty, which is an issue also discussed by Stewart (2005).9 David 
Schlosberg and David Carruthers (2010) argue for the importance of the 
idea of collective capabilities to understand the struggles of indigenous 
peoples for ecological justice. And Michael Murphy (2014) argues 
9  Self-help groups are “any informal income-generating or social activity initiated 
by a poor community to achieve permanent improvements in their individual and 
communal wellbeings” (Ibrahim 2006, 398–399).
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that political self-determination (of an indigenous group) should be 
considered to be a collective capability which should be a central aim 
for development. 
What is shared in those cases, and what makes the idea of ‘collective 
capability’ plausible, is that a group or collective is needed to engage in 
collective action in order to reach the capability that the members of that 
group find valuable. 
Sen (2002b) points out that we should be careful not to confuse 
this with a capability that he calls “socially dependent individual 
capability” — a person’s capability, which that person enjoys, but 
for which the person is dependent on others to have that capability 
realised. Perhaps we should not use the term ‘individual capability’ 
but rather ‘personal capability’, since for many defenders of ‘collective 
capabilities’ the word ‘individual’ evokes pejorative images of persons 
living by themselves on an island. There are no such human creatures; 
we all live interdependently, and none of us could grow up without 
prolonged care from others, or, as adults, have a decent chance of 
surviving and living a minimally adequate life. Human beings are, just 
as other mammals, animals who live in groups. Although philosophers 
are used to working with terms outside their everyday use, and most 
philosophers (especially those with an analytical background) will not 
have these pejorative connotations when they hear the term ‘individual 
capabilities’, I will proceed with the term ‘personal capabilities’ in order 
to facilitate the discussion in this section. 
Now, if we are very strict in our terminological distinctions, then 
collective capabilities are also personal capabilities, since it is individual 
persons who enjoy the capabilities that are thus secured. Still, there are 
two justifications to proceed with the term ‘collective capability’ — one 
fundamental one, and one additional one which is especially weighty 
from a practical point of view. 
The fundamental reason to keep and use the term ‘collective 
capability’ is that we may want to make a distinction between capabilities 
that are only realisable with the help of others, versus capabilities that 
require a group or collective to act in order to secure a capability for the 
members of that group. An example of the former would be learning a 
foreign language. It is impossible to do that without the help of others; 
one needs a teacher, or at the very least books and audio-tapes or 
internet lessons that help one with self-study. Still, that doesn’t suffice 
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to say that learning a language is a collective capability. There is no 
group involved, and no collective action of that group is necessary in 
order to achieve the functioning. A different case is acquiring the 
capability to vote in elections for groups that are not yet given suffrage. 
Fighting for that capability is not possible on one’s own. One needs 
collective action — e.g. the first wave women’s movement, or the civil 
rights movement in the US, or the anti-apartheid movement in South 
Africa — to act collectively so that the group is granted the capability, 
and all persons who belong to that group can enjoy the newly won 
freedom. 
The second reason to accept the notion of ‘collective capability’ is 
because it is already present in the practice of certain justice movements, 
whose demands fit very well with the capability approach, for example 
because they embody claims of diversity or because they fight for a 
notion of the good life or of justice that goes beyond a narrow materialist 
or economistic view of what is valuable. Examples include the disability 
movement, the women’s movement and indigenous struggles. 
So the idea of a collective capability can be understood and can be 
justified. Nevertheless, two warnings are in order, which may be needed 
to avoid conceptual confusion as well as an overuse or inflation of the 
notion. The first comment is that all that has been said so far does not 
permit one to conclude that one has personal (individual) capabilities 
and collective capabilities as two mutually exclusive categories. Rather, 
collective capabilities are a subset of personal capabilities, namely 
those personal capabilities that require for their realisation action by a 
group or a collectivity. Secondly, we should be very careful to be clear 
to keep our concepts distinct and correct when developing a capability 
theory. The modular account of the capability approach has ample 
conceptual and theoretical space to account for collective processes, 
the social embedding of persons, the influence of social structures on 
our choices and opportunities, a proper acknowledgement of social 
processes of preference formation as well as the crucial role of social 
institutions and norms in shaping a person’s capability set. But if we 
want to account for a social process, we shouldn’t just jump to the claim 
that we have now found a collective capability. Rather, we should use 
the quite complex and multi-layered framework that was presented in 
figure 2.1, and be clear when something is a social structure that is shaping 
our capabilities, rather than a capability itself. Means to ends (capabilities) 
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and the ‘capability determinants’ (the social structures, social norms, 
institutions, etc.) can all be part of our evaluation — we just need to 
keep in mind which parts of what we evaluate are the means, which 
are the ends and why we evaluate a certain dimension. In the case of 
the evaluation of the means, one important reason could be to see how 
those means have changed over time, as well as whether there is any 
scope to improve the contribution that those particular means can make 
to the increase of capability sets. 
3.7 Which notion of wellbeing is used in the 
capability approach?
The capability approach is closely related to notions of wellbeing and 
the quality of life. Sometimes it is assumed that the capability approach 
is a theory of wellbeing, which cannot be quite right since the capability 
approach can be used for many purposes, such as the construction of 
a theory of justice, poverty measurement or policy evaluation. Yet on 
the other hand, with its proposition that interpersonal comparisons 
be made in terms of functionings and/or capabilities, the capability 
approach is clearly also involved in offering us an account of wellbeing 
(Sen 1984c, 1985c, 2009a; Alkire 2016; Qizilbash 2013). But what, exactly, 
is the nature of the account of wellbeing in the capability approach? 
I will argue in this chapter that the more precise formulation is that 
the capability approach entails several slightly different accounts 
of wellbeing, which can be used for different purposes. Different 
capability theories have different purposes (module B1) and different 
meta-theoretical commitments (module B7), and the choices made in 
those modules will require different accounts of wellbeing for such 
capability theories. 
When one looks at the accounts of wellbeing in the various disciplines 
in which the notion of ‘wellbeing’ plays a central role, one quickly 
notices that there are a range of quite different accounts proposed 
in different paradigms or disciplines, and that there is very limited 
discussion between those fields (Gasper 2010). In particular, there is 
surprisingly little interaction between the very large philosophical 
literature on wellbeing (Crisp 2013; Fletcher 2015) and the (theoretical 
and empirical) literature in psychology and economics, or the uses of 
the term wellbeing in particular fields, such as development studies 
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or medical care. There are a few scholars who have tried to grasp this 
discrepancy, as well as explain why the philosophical and theoretical 
literatures, as well as the debates in different disciplines, are so little 
connected (e.g. Alexandrova 2013; Rodogno 2015b, 2015a). This is the 
background against which we must try to understand the place of the 
capability approach in thinking about wellbeing, and try to understand 
the accounts of wellbeing used in capability theories. I therefore believe 
that it is helpful first to try to grasp that scholarly context in somewhat 
more detail (section 3.7.1). Then we will briefly look at the standard 
typology of wellbeing theories (section 3.7.2), before analysing the 
question of which account (or rather, accounts) of wellbeing are entailed 
in the capability approach (section 3.7.3).
Before we start, one further clarification may be helpful. Recall 
that the capability approach includes a notion of achieved wellbeing 
(focussing on functionings) as well as a notion of wellbeing freedom, 
represented by one’s capability set (Sen 1985c, 1993a). The distinction 
between achieved wellbeing and wellbeing freedom is virtually absent 
from the wellbeing literature. In contemporary philosophy, most 
philosophical accounts focus on how well life is going for a person, 
hence on achieved wellbeing. But clearly, for policy purposes, we will 
often focus on wellbeing freedom, since other values, such as respect 
for personal autonomy or even human dignity, may prevent us from 
having a specific wellbeing outcome as a legitimate policy goal. When 
in the capability approach the term ‘wellbeing freedom’ is used, it 
refers to what philosophers elsewhere would call ‘opportunities for 
wellbeing’. This notion is especially relevant in moral theories where 
we try to balance a concern for wellbeing with a concern for individual 
freedom to choose: the term ‘wellbeing freedom’ tries to bring together 
and integrate those two values.
3.7.1 The aim and context of accounts of wellbeing
Philosophical discussions of wellbeing typically start out from a rather 
general definition of wellbeing, stating that wellbeing is about how well 
the life of a person is going for that person. The addition ‘for that person’ 
is important, since it means that in the philosophical literature wellbeing 
is generally conceived as what we could call a personal value, or a first-
person value, rather than an institutional value — a value that we have to 
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consider when we think about how to organise our collective life. While 
this demarcates ‘wellbeing’ from other public values such as ‘justice’ or 
‘efficiency’, this is still a very general notion that can be elaborated in 
many different ways. Moreover, as was already mentioned, if we look 
at the debates in contemporary philosophy of wellbeing, we notice that 
they hardly relate at all to the empirical discussions in policy studies 
and the social sciences (with the exception of the relatively recent boom 
in subjective wellbeing analysis, which will be discussed in section 3.8). 
Anna Alexandrova (2013) argues that the diversity in scholarship on 
wellbeing can be explained by the fact that the meaning of the use of the 
term ‘wellbeing’ differs depending on the context in which it is used. If 
the word ‘wellbeing’ is used by a medical doctor, or a policy maker, or a 
sociologist, or an adolescent reflecting on her options for her future life, 
they all use the term ‘wellbeing’ for different purposes and in a different 
context. I would like to add that, in particular, the aim or the purpose of 
our use of the term ‘wellbeing’ is crucial. That is, the term ‘wellbeing’ 
is never used in a vacuum; each use of that term plays a role in either 
explanatory or else normative projects. Normative projects always have 
a purpose, that is, something to judge, evaluate or recommend, which is 
precisely the choice that has to be made in module B1 in the account of 
the capability approach presented in chapter 2. Depending on whether 
we use the term ‘wellbeing’ for policy making, or for purely descriptive 
work, or for deciding what we owe to each other as fellow citizens, the 
term wellbeing will play a different function. 
Most work on wellbeing in contemporary analytical philosophy is 
concerned with answering the question “What would be the best for 
someone, or would be most in this person’s interests, or would make 
this person’s life go, for him, as well as possible?” (Parfit 1984, 493). This 
is especially the case for the literature since the publication of Derek 
Parfit’s typology of theories of wellbeing. While Parfit’s typology is 
arguably crude, it has been very influential, and still serves an important 
function as an influential attempt that a philosopher has made to classify 
accounts of wellbeing.
In the next section, we will consider how (if at all) the capability 
approach fits into Parfit’s typology. But it is important to note that 
this highly abstract, very detailed and analytical strand in philosophy 
is only to a very limited degree concerned with (a) empirical 
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applicability and measurement or (b) practical consequences, in the 
sense of action-guidance such as the establishment of normatively 
sound policy making or the question of which social arrangements we 
should want. The dominant contemporary philosophical literature on 
wellbeing is concerned with philosophical investigation in the sense 
of finding truths, and typically focussed on the entire lives of people 
from their own, first-person, perspective. That literature is much less 
concerned with wellbeing as an institutional value, with asking which 
account of wellbeing would be best when deciding what institutions 
we should implement — a question that can only be answered after 
taking feasibility considerations into account, or considering what 
would be best from the point of view of ethically sound policy making. 
However, as Alexandrova (2013, 311) rightly points out, “the context 
of an all-things-considered evaluation of life as a whole privileged by 
philosophers is just that: one of the many contexts in which wellbeing is 
in question”. Since most uses of the term ‘wellbeing’ in other debates, 
e.g. in applied philosophy or other disciplines, are concerned with 
overall evaluations of states of affairs and/or policy making, it shouldn’t 
surprise us that there is very little cross-fertilisation between those 
philosophical debates and the policy oriented and empirical literatures 
in other disciplines. This will have an influence on how we will, in the 
next section, answer the question how the capability approach fits into 
the standard typology of theories of wellbeing used in philosophy.
3.7.2 The standard taxonomy of  
philosophical wellbeing accounts
In Appendix I of his influential book Reasons and Persons, Parfit (1984, 
493) suggests that we should make a distinction between three types of 
philosophical wellbeing theories. 
On Hedonistic Theories, what would be best for someone is what would 
make his life happiest. On Desire-Fulfilment Theories, what would be best 
for someone is what, throughout this life, would best fulfil his desires. 
On Objective List Theories, certain things are good or bad for us, whether 
or not we want to have the good things, or to avoid the bad things.
In interdisciplinary conversations, hedonistic theories are today 
better known under the label ‘happiness theories’. Interpreted from 
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the perspective of the capability approach, hedonistic theories (or the 
happiness approach) entail that the only functioning that matters is 
happiness. The capability approach stresses what people can do and be 
(module A1) and ‘happiness’ or one’s hedonic state at best refers to one 
aspect of one’s being, not the various aspects of what we can do. The 
capability approach and the happiness approach do share some common 
characteristics, such as the fact that both focus on what they take to be of 
ultimate value. Yet the two approaches have very different ideas of what 
that ‘ultimate value’ should be, with the happiness approach defending 
an exclusive choice for a mental state versus the capability approach 
defending the focus on a plurality of aspects of our lives. It is therefore 
not plausible to see the happiness approach, or hedonism, as a specific 
case of the capability approach. However, more can be said about the 
precise relation between the capability approach and hedonistic or 
happiness approaches, which will be done in section 3.8. 
How about the desire-fulfilment theories, or the objective list 
theories? Can the notion of wellbeing embedded in the capability 
approach plausibly be understood as either of those? Let us first 
very briefly describe the two types of theories, and then ask how the 
capability approach fits in. 
Desire-fulfilment theories of wellbeing claim, essentially, that wellbeing 
is the extent to which our desires are satisfied. These desires could 
be our current, unquestioned desires. In philosophy, that is a view 
that cannot count on many defenders, since it is very easy to think of 
examples of current desires that will harm us in the near future, or else 
desires for something that is, arguably, not good for us, such as a desire 
for excessive amounts of food or alcohol. Philosophers have therefore 
proposed more sophisticated views of desires, called ‘informed desires’ 
(e.g. Sumner 1996). Those are desires that meet additional conditions, 
and different proposals have been made for what those conditions 
should be. Examples of such additional constraints include not 
being ignorant of facts, but also not being deceived, or not suffering 
from mental adaptation — which ranges from having adapted one’s 
aspirations to one’s dire circumstances, to having adapted one’s desires 
to one’s extremely affluent circumstances, to a more general ‘preference 
adaptation’ which applies to all of us in societies with social norms and 
the widespread use of advertisements. 
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For a philosophical theory of wellbeing, which merely asks the 
metaphysical question what is wellbeing for the person who is living that life, 
and which has no consequences for the choice of social arrangements 
or policy making, the informed desire theory has a very important 
attraction: it gives the authority to decide what would make life better 
to the person whose wellbeing we are investigating. We also see this 
account of wellbeing being helpfully put to work in various other 
contexts. For example, if the daughter of a family-owned business 
has no interest at all in continuing that business, and argues that her 
strongest desire in life is to become a medical doctor, then her parents 
may, regretfully, decide that it is indeed better for her to study medicine, 
since that is what she really wants. They may perhaps urge her to talk 
to a friend who is a medical doctor to get a better understanding of 
what that profession entails (that is, to ‘test’ whether her preferences are 
properly informed). Yet in such a context, the desire-fulfilment theory of 
wellbeing seems apt and appropriate. 
The problems with the informed desire-fulfilment theory of 
wellbeing are especially relevant in other contexts where an account 
of wellbeing is needed for policy making or social change. The most 
significant is that our desires are moulded, not fully informed, and 
subject to social norms and other forms of societal pressures and 
expectations. For example, critics of capitalism argue that advertisement 
by profit-seeking companies form our preferences, and make us want 
things we would be better off without. There are many subtle forms of 
manipulation possible. Students of marketing learn that the products 
put at eye-height are more often taken by customers shopping in a 
supermarket. At the macro-level, the culture of late-modern capitalism 
tells us to find happiness in material success and in trying to achieve 
higher status in the dominant social order. We are socialised into these 
patterns, often not even aware of their existence. But why would those 
desires give us the highest level of wellbeing? Another interesting case 
is the standards of beauty that women are expected to meet, which will 
make them more attractive and ultimately happier. Dominant norms of 
beauty put a huge pressure on women (and increasingly also on men), 
leading to anxieties, low self-esteem, and even unhealthy conditions 
and illnesses such as anorexia (Lavaque-Manty 2001). What if we could 
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‘reset’ our cultural and social norms, which would lead to less pressure, 
stress and fewer anxieties? Some alternative views of living, such as 
those advanced by deep ecology thinkers (e.g. Naess 1973, 1984), are 
based on the view that with a different set of desires, and a different 
appreciation of certain experiences and values, we would be able to 
live not only in an ecologically sustainable way, but also have higher 
levels of wellbeing. In sum, the desire-fulfilment theory is interesting 
and arguably plausible at the individual level, and also at the general 
level as a theoretical approach to wellbeing, which can make ample use 
of counterfactual and hypothetical thinking and conditions. But it is 
much trickier to think about wellbeing from a macro or third-person 
perspective in the world as it is, in which we don’t have information on 
how each person’s preferences have been formed and influenced. 
How does the objective list theory fare? Objective list theories 
are accounts of wellbeing that list items that make our lives better, 
independent of our own view on this. The claim of objective list theories 
is that there is an irreducible plurality of issues that make up wellbeing; 
wellbeing is plural and cannot be reduced to a single thing. Secondly, 
those items are objectively good for us, whether or not we attach any value 
to (or desire) those items. Hence items such as being healthy, or having 
friends, or feeling well, are all good for us, whether we personally value 
them or not. 
What are some of the main strengths and weaknesses of the objective 
list theories? Objective list theories are generally criticised for not 
respecting people’s views about their own lives, and hence taking away 
the authority to decide the quality of those lives from the agents leading 
them: in other words, for being paternalistic. Who is to decide that, 
say, social relationships are good for us? Now, this seems a very valid 
critique if we use an objective list theory for purely descriptive and first-
person truth-seeking purposes, as the vast literature in philosophy does. 
But if one uses accounts of wellbeing for policy or political purposes, 
the public nature of the dimensions of wellbeing is rather important. 
This relates to what political philosophers have called ‘the publicity 
criterion’: if wellbeing is used for purposes of institutional design or 
policy making, those principles used need to be capable of being known 
by all to be satisfied in society (Rawls 2009; Anderson 2010, 85). 
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Indeed, this directly relates to an advantage of objective list theories: 
many of the items that have been proposed by such theories have been 
translated into specific indicators such as health or social policy, or 
else overall assessments have been made that can be used for an entire 
population. The long-standing literature on social indicators can be 
situated in this tradition (Boelhouwer and Stoop 1999; Boelhouwer 
2002; Hagerty et al. 2001).
3.7.3 The accounts of wellbeing  
in the capability approach
So how does the capability approach fit in this standard taxonomy? 
The capability approach is often categorised as being an objective list 
theory, since functionings and capabilities are plural and the selection 
of dimensions gives us a list of items which are judged to be valuable for 
persons. However, in my view there is not merely one wellbeing account 
in the capability approach, but several wellbeing accounts. 
So why is there not one, but several accounts of wellbeing in the 
capability literature? As was mentioned in the introduction to this 
section, the reason is that there are a variety of capability theories in the 
general capability literature, and those theories need different accounts 
of wellbeing. If a capability theory is used for a first-person perspective, 
for example by an adolescent contemplating what to do with her life, she 
may ask herself what she really wants: to study hard and work hard and 
become a medical doctor? Or does she have a stronger desire to build a 
family and search for a job that makes it possible to spend enough time 
with her children? Does she want to devote her life to fighting for a 
good cause? In this personal deliberation, the account of wellbeing she 
then uses can be seen as a desire-fulfilment account in which the desires 
all refer to functionings.
In the design of institutions, there is also often implicitly a desire-
fulfilment account, by trying to create valuable options (capabilities) for 
citizens, but by not forcing them into those outcomes (functionings). But 
policy making can’t be done by trying to enlarge a non-specific general 
account of freedom to realise one’s desires: what would that look like? 
In policy making, we often assume that what we owe to each other 
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are specific freedoms, not a general vague notion of overall freedom 
(Anderson 2000b). Therefore, at the policy level we can often see that the 
implicit account of wellbeing is desire-fulfilment, whereby it is assumed 
that the desires refer to particular functionings (such as being able to 
enjoy higher education or leisure activities in green spaces in cities), or, 
alternatively, policies provide the resources (money, and sometimes 
time) that are inputs for a wide range of desires that people may have. 
If a capability theory is made for macro-level poverty analysis, then 
the researchers will select a number of functionings that they have 
reason to believe are good for people, such as their health, educational 
outcomes, and the kind of shelter in which they can live. The notion of 
achieved wellbeing entailed in this normative exercise is an objectively 
good account, although one could also argue that one has reason 
to assume that these are dimensions of the quality of life that people 
would want for themselves (hence their desires) and that, given that one 
is working with very large numbers, it is a safe assumption to proceed 
this way. 
There are at least two interesting things to notice. First, for policy 
making we often have to choose either an approach that uses resources 
as a proxy for wellbeing (although this cannot account for differences 
in conversion factors between people) or else policy makers will try 
to provide a range of options to us, where ideally the policy maker 
assumes that these options are things that many people want. Second, 
the often-heard view that the account of wellbeing given by the 
capability approach is an objective list theory doesn’t seem to be true. 
Rather, depending on the kind of capability theory one is pursuing (in 
particular, the choice in B1) it is more accurate to see this as a desire-
fulfilment or an objective list account. 
3.8 Happiness and the capability approach
In section 3.7.2, we encountered hedonist theories of wellbeing as 
an important subgroup of theories of wellbeing. The debates about 
hedonism and the happiness approach are closely related. Hedonism 
is the philosophical view that wellbeing can be captured by the balance 
of pleasures over pains. The core aspect is the exclusive focus on 
mental states, and on a person’s subjective assessments of their own 
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mental state. In recent decades, this approach has been revitalised in 
‘the happiness approach’, although empirical scholars prefer the term 
‘subjective wellbeing’ (SWB). The happiness and SWB literatures have 
in recent years gone through a revival. 
On the empirical front, significant progress has been made in the 
last few decades by an international network of economists and 
psychologists, such as Andrew Clark, Ed Diener, Ada Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 
Bruno Frey, Richard Layard, Andrew Oswald, David Schkade, Bernard 
van Praag and Ruut Veenhoven.10 Many of these scholars have 
concluded that sufficient scientific progress has been made for public 
policies to focus on subjective wellbeing. The measures of subjective 
wellbeing have been tested and refined, and much is supposedly known 
about the determinants of happiness that the government can influence. 
The happiness and SWB approaches are strongly focussed on empirical 
analysis and policy design, and this is also, therefore, the main lens that 
will be used in the comparison with the capability approach, although 
we will very briefly discuss the comparison between the theoretical 
happiness approach and the capability approach. 
From the perspective of the capability approach, the happiness 
approach raises three questions: First, what is the happiness approach, 
exactly? Second, what are its strengths and weaknesses? Third, what 
role can happiness play in the capability approach?11 
3.8.1 What is the happiness approach? 
The happiness approach is based on the assumption that wellbeing (or 
quality of life) is constituted by the subjective experiences of a person, 
expressed in terms of utility, happiness, or satisfaction. Satisfaction 
can be expressed in terms of overall satisfaction with life, or satisfaction 
within particular domains, such as income, health, family relationships, 
labour, and so forth. 
10  See, for example, Veenhoven (1996); Kahneman et al. (2006); Schkade and 
Kahneman (1998); Diener and Seligman (2004); Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell 
(2004); Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005); Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Gowdy (2007); Frey and 
Stutzer (2002).
11  This section draws on, yet also modifies and expands, the analysis presented in 
Robeyns and Van der Veen (2007, 33–42).
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In the happiness approach, life satisfaction is understood as a concept 
that combines two components: how we normally feel in everyday 
life — the affective or ‘hedonistic’ component — and how we judge 
the degree to which our preferences and aspirations in life have been 
realised — the cognitive component. In order to find out how ‘happy’ 
a person is, respondents are asked, for example, to rate how satisfied 
they are with their life on a scale from 1 to 10 (to measure the cognitive 
component) and to report their mood at particular moments of the day, 
sometimes even with the aid of a buzzer set to go off at random times (to 
measure the affective component). In another method, the respondents 
are asked to imagine the worst possible life and to give that life a value 
of 0, to imagine the best possible life and give that a value of 10, and then 
to rate their own life on a scale from 0 to 10. 
The view in the happiness literature is that overall life satisfaction 
should be adopted as the official ‘policy guide’, and the task of the 
government is to aim for the highest possible average level of life 
satisfaction (Hagerty et al. 2001; Layard 2011). For comparisons in the 
long term, Ruut Veenhoven also proposes to measure the quality of 
life based on ‘happy life expectancy’. This is an index obtained from 
multiplying life expectancy in a country with average overall life 
satisfaction (Veenhoven 1996).
Is the happiness approach, or the SWB approach, the best basis for 
thinking about wellbeing and the quality of life, especially against the 
background of policy design? The happiness approach certainly has a 
number of attractive features. Firstly, it puts the human being centre stage, 
rather than focusing on the means that human beings use to improve 
their quality of life. Hence the approach satisfies the core criterion from 
module A that means and ends should not be conceptually confused. 
Secondly, in considering the means to happiness, the subjective approach 
is not limited to material means, which is the major shortcoming of the 
dominant economic empirical methods. Income has only a limited (but 
not unimportant) role to play in generating happiness. 
In conclusion, the happiness approach does have some significant 
strengths, but it also gives rise to some concerns. We will briefly discuss 
the main theoretical problem, and then look in more detail at the worries 
raised for empirical research and policy making. 
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3.8.2 The ontological objection
The theoretical worry is an ontological worry, that is, it asks what 
wellbeing is, and questions whether this can be captured by mental states 
only. This objection was forcefully made by Robert Nozick (1974, 42–45) 
when he introduced the ‘experience machine’ thought experiment. 
Nozick ask us to imagine that we are invited to be plugged into a 
machine, which would stimulate our brain and make us feel as if we 
were having a range of experiences that we could choose beforehand; all 
the time, we would be floating in a tank with electrodes attached to our 
brain. Would we choose such a life? Nozick claims we would not, and 
interestingly enough the arguments he gives to justify this claim refer 
to our functionings and capabilities.12 According to Nozick, three things 
matter to us in addition to our experiences. First, we do not only want 
to have the experience of doing certain things (which we could have by 
sitting and taking drugs) but we also want to do certain things. Second, 
“we want to be a certain way, to be a certain sort of person” (Nozick 
1974, 43). Third, we don’t want to limit our experiences to a man-made 
reality (the experience machine) but also to have the opportunity to be 
in contact with deeper significance. The insight from Nozick’s thought 
experiment is thus that a good life cannot be reduced to mental states, but 
must also contain some genuine activities and states of being. According 
to Nozick (1974, 43), “someone floating in a tank is an indeterminate 
blob”, not a human being to whom we can describe human wellbeing. 
There is thus more to human wellbeing then merely feeling happy. If 
decent labour, knowledge, appreciating art and culture, and intimate 
relationships are to be valued only, or even primarily, because of their 
contribution to overall or specific life satisfaction, then we could say this 
is a misrecognition of the contribution they make to how well our lives 
progress. Phenomenologically speaking, this is an implausible account 
of wellbeing.
12  Obviously, Nozick didn’t use the terminology of the capability approach, but his 
account of what is valuable in life could nevertheless be seen as capabilitarian. 
130 Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice
3.8.3 Mental adaptation and social comparisons
How about the worries related to empirical research and policy 
making? The first worry at this level is raised by processes of mental 
adaptation and social comparisons. Our satisfaction is to some extent 
influenced by mental adaptation issues that emerge from comparisons 
with the situations of others. This can have problematic implications for 
public policies aiming at the highest happiness for the greatest number. 
Take the mental adaptation processes first. How do these emerge? First 
of all, there can be shocks in our lives that have a major effect on our 
wellbeing, such as immobility after an accident. People confronted with 
a major setback in health and mobility through such an impairment 
will first experience a strong deterioration of their subjective wellbeing, 
but after a while this effect will weaken. Obviously, this adaptation to 
circumstances is good, since a disabled person will not remain deeply 
unhappy for the rest of her life due to her limited abilities to move around 
without pain. However, the question is what this implies for policy. A 
utilitarian will say that the government has to limit itself to creating 
provisions such that a disabled person can return to an acceptable 
level of life satisfaction, taking into account the corresponding welfare 
costs for others.13 A utilitarian would even say that there is no reason 
to invest in prevention if this is more expensive than rehabilitation. But 
one could also argue that a cost-sensitive policy has to try to reach an 
acceptable level of functioning for a disabled person, even if this makes 
little difference to her subjective judgement about her wellbeing after 
adapting to the accident. Subjective indicators focus automatically on 
the first goal, but this may imply that the quality aspects that relate to 
the things a person still can do after the accident remain out of sight. 
Secondly, people can adapt to an objective disadvantage that is not 
caused by an external shock, but that shows a more stable pattern. This is 
the problem of ‘adaptive preferences’, which is particularly relevant for 
13  A more fine-grained analysis than that presented in this section would need to 
make the distinction between act-utilitarianism and rule-utilitarianism, and ask 
whether both are vulnerable to these critiques to the same extent. I am assuming 
here that the critiques apply to both types of utilitarianism to such a degree that it 
leads to worrying consequences. 
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the happiness approach.14 Amartya Sen has pointed out repeatedly that 
people living at the very bottom of the social ladder (such as ‘exploited 
labourers’ or ‘oppressed housewives’) adapt to their situation and come 
to suffer less intensely. Another example is the effect of racism. If a 
society becomes gradually less tolerant towards cultural minorities and 
increasingly accepts racist practices, then cultural minorities might get 
used to a racist social climate. Perhaps they will change their behaviour, 
in order to avoid contact with openly racist people. By changing their 
behaviour and mentally preparing for racist practices, it is possible 
that after a while the negative wellbeing effect of racism on minority 
groups will be partially wiped out. However, a policy that anticipates 
such adaptation processes is morally and politically problematic: racism 
should not be tolerated in society, even if it were not to have a significant 
impact on the subjective wellbeing of its victims. In order to judge that 
racism is not morally permissible and hence that policies should try 
to minimize racism, we don’t first need to investigate whether racism 
makes its victims less happy: that’s simply beside the point. Even if 
the victims of racism acted stoically and didn’t let racism affect their 
happiness levels, that wouldn’t make racism any less undesirable. 
Another form of mental adaptation which is relevant for the 
government is the adjustment response to income changes. Subjective 
wellbeing judgements about income have been shown to adapt 
asymmetrically to income changes. Income increases go together with 
higher aspirations for the future, with only one third of the increase 
being reflected by improvements of subjective wellbeing (Frey and 
Stutzer 2002). Panel-analysis over a period of ten years shows that we 
adapt strongly to an increase in income, but much less so to a drop 
in income (Burchardt 2005). Thus, if people change positions in an 
income distribution which itself remains unchanged, then aggregate 
satisfaction of the population will decrease. The people who move up 
the ladder will be more satisfied for a short time, but quickly adapt to 
the new situation, whereas people who move downwards experience a 
larger drop in satisfaction — and this effect lasts longer as well. Tania 
Burchardt (2006) argues that due to similar phenomena of adaptation, 
people’s positions in the distribution of income, health and marital 
14  Yet the phenomenon of ‘adaptive preferences’ can also potentially create problems 
for some capability theories, as we will analyse in section 3.9.
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status should preferably remain immobile, according to utilitarianism. 
Clearly this is a policy conclusion that goes against the principle that 
people should receive equal opportunities, even if the effect of one 
person’s upward social mobility is not compensated by the effect of 
another person’s downward social mobility.
How serious are these problems of mental adaptation for the 
subjective approach? In part, the response to this question depends on 
our normative judgements about the counter-intuitive and sometimes 
perverse implications of a policy that single-mindedly aims to promote 
maximal average utility. It also depends, however, on the empirical 
question of how strong these mental adaptation processes are in reality. 
According to Veenhoven, overall life satisfaction is primarily determined 
by the affective component, and therefore it is much less vulnerable to 
the effects of mental adaptation than satisfaction in particular domains, 
which he judges to be much more vulnerable to adaptation. However, 
the work of Kahneman and Krueger (2006, 17–18) shows that mental 
adaptation processes are clearly present even when predominantly 
affective measures of overall happiness experiences are adopted.
There are additional concerns related to the subjective wellbeing 
findings in particular domains, such as income or education. Recall 
the literature reporting on the findings that subjective wellbeing is 
also strongly influenced by social comparisons with reference groups. 
In particular, the wellbeing effect of income, but also of education, is 
affected by the levels reached by members of the reference groups to 
which individuals compare their own situation. As a consequence, 
increases in income, or additional educational credentials, contribute 
less to satisfaction in these domains, the more income or educational 
progress is achieved within the reference groups. Apparently, these 
resources have a stronger positional component than other resources 
do, in particular leisure time, where the comparison effect appears to 
have a much weaker impact on wellbeing obtained from an additional 
unit of free time.
In conclusion, there seems to be little consensus in the subjective 
wellbeing literature on the question of whether, and to what extent, 
phenomena of mental adaptation and reference groups cause problems 
for the measurement of overall life satisfaction. However, all researchers 
do acknowledge that satisfaction in some domains is susceptible to 
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these phenomena, and this may result in the counter-intuitive policy 
implications we mentioned earlier.
3.8.4 Comparing groups
The second worry about the happiness or SWB approach concerns 
the effect of group differences, which will be a problem if we need an 
account of wellbeing to compare wellbeing levels between groups. The 
subjective wellbeing approach focuses on the affective and cognitive 
responses of people to their lives overall, or in particular domains. If 
groups differ on average in their responses to a situation, then this 
may cause problems for policies, if those differences correlate with the 
objective circumstances that one would intuitively judge as important. 
There are two symmetric possibilities: (1) groups who are in the same 
objective situation have different levels of life satisfaction, or (2) groups 
with the same level of life satisfaction are in different situations, whereby 
it is clear that one situation is worse than the other independently of 
subjective wellbeing.
Research has indeed shown that the average level of life satisfaction 
between demographic groups differs systematically. In other words, if 
we control for the relevant factors, then some groups are significantly 
less satisfied with their lives than others. For example, recent Australian 
research (Cummins et al. 2003) shows that women report a higher 
level of overall life satisfaction than men, after taking a number of 
control-variables into account.15 The researchers cannot pinpoint the 
exact causes of this finding, but they do not exclude the possibility that 
women are ‘constitutionally’ more satisfied than men. This may have a 
biological explanation, but it may also be the consequence of processes 
of adaptation that men and women experience differently over their 
lifetimes.
If the aim of the account of wellbeing is to inform public policy, then 
the question is how government should deal with these findings. From 
a utilitarian perspective, it would be efficient to develop a policy that 
is advantageous to men. For example, if due to unemployment men 
experience a larger drop in happiness than women, as reported by Frey 
15  A similar strong and significant gender effect has been found by Eriksson, Rice and 
Goodin (2007).
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and Stutzer (2002, 419), then a policy that gives men priority on the 
labour market will minimise the average wellbeing damage in terms of 
happiness. But the fact that one demographic group (women, the worst 
off, the elderly, and so forth) are made less unhappy due to a certain 
event than other groups can cause perverse policy implications if life 
satisfaction is declared to be the guideline for policies. Fundamental 
political principles such as non-discrimination and equality of 
opportunities for all citizens are thereby put into jeopardy. This would 
also be true in the symmetric case where the average level of life 
satisfaction of discriminated or marginalised groups does not differ 
significantly from the average level of a group that is not faced with 
these disadvantages. I do not want to claim here that the subjective 
wellbeing approach will always lead to such injustices. But I do think 
that a central focus on subjective wellbeing will make policies less 
sensitive to signalling and combating these injustices. Hence Burchardt 
(2005, 94) is right in pointing out that “satisfaction — the best proxy 
we have for the concept of utility — is unsuitable for assessing current 
wellbeing, justice or equality”.
3.8.5 Macro analysis
A third worry concerns the applicability of the subjective wellbeing 
approach at the national or regional levels of policy making. One may 
agree that the happiness approach can be very helpful when it can offer 
persons with low affect (negative moods and feelings) concrete strategies 
to change that, such as engaging in mindfulness training and practice. 
Yet what about policy making? Are the happiness indicators sufficiently 
refined and sensitive for policy at lower levels of aggregation than the 
level of a country? In their discussion of the criteria that an index of the 
quality of life should meet, Hagerty and his co-authors (2001, 2) include 
the criterion that the index must help policy makers to develop and 
evaluate policies at all levels of aggregation. Thus, the index should not 
only be useful for the national government, but also for governments in 
cities, communities, and regions. As Robert van der Veen and I argued 
in earlier work, overall life satisfaction does not satisfactorily meet this 
criterion (Robeyns and Van der Veen 2007); it is too crude for these 
purposes. It is even less suitable for the evaluation of specific policy 
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interventions (Cummins et al. 2003). The effect of one policy measure 
such as improved child care facilities will be reflected hardly or not at all 
in reported overall life satisfaction, even if such policies have significant 
effects on the real opportunities of parents to organise their lives as they 
think best — hence on their capabilities. Overall ‘happy life expectancy’ 
is, by contrast, well-suited for comparing the effects of fundamental 
political and economic institutions on subjective wellbeing. This 
emerges clearly from the work of Veenhoven (1996), which concentrates 
on studies whereby the unit of analysis is the country. In other words, 
Veenhoven mainly uses happy life expectancy as an indicator for macro-
analysis. The variables that emerge as the determinants of happy life 
expectancy are therefore typically system variables such as the degree 
of political freedom, or the presence of rule of law. But the quality 
of life in a micro-situation (say, living in a particular community or 
neighbourhood) is also influenced by many other variables.
3.8.6 The place of happiness in the capability approach 
The previous sections argued that happiness can’t be taken to represent 
a person’s wellbeing for many purposes, including policy purposes. Yet 
it would also be deeply counter-intuitive to say that happiness doesn’t 
matter at all. It may be the right concept of wellbeing for other aims. 
How, then, can happiness be given a proper place within the capability 
approach? 
The first possibility is to see happiness, or some more specific 
capabilities that are closely related to the affective component of 
subjective wellbeing, as one important dimension to be selected. In fact, 
Amartya Sen has for many years argued that we could take ‘feeling 
happy’ as one of the functionings to be selected. For example, Sen (2008, 
26) wrote: 
happiness, however, is extremely important, since being happy is a 
momentous achievement in itself. Happiness cannot be the only thing 
that we have reason to value, nor the only metric for measuring other 
things that we value, but on its own, happiness is an important human 
functioning. The capability to be happy is, similarly, a major aspect of 
the freedom that we have good reason to treasure. The perspective of 
happiness illuminates one critically important element of human living.
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Indicators of happiness are already included, for example, by 
incorporating dimensions of mental health into capability applications. 
Certain specific functionings, which make up an overall ‘mental health’ 
functioning, already contain such affective items: whether, over the 
last week, the respondent has felt down or worthless, for example, or 
whether one is free from worry. 
Second, we can try to capture the cognitive aspect of happiness, 
that is, a person’s satisfaction with her capability set, or with particular 
options from that set. We can then compare that person’s level of 
satisfaction with her capabilities, which should allow us to compare the 
objective situation with a person’s satisfaction with that situation. For 
example, the absence of criminality is a valuable functioning.16 But there 
is a long-standing finding in criminology that there are discrepancies 
between the objective incidence of being safe versus the subjective 
feeling of being in danger of becoming a victim of crime. For example, 
even if the incidence and impact of criminality goes down, it can still be 
the case that the population is more worried about crime than before 
and feels less safe. The discrepancy between objective outcomes and 
subjective perception is instructive here; it may imply, for example, that 
the government should communicate more effectively about its success 
in reducing crime, so as to make the subjective perception more in line 
with the objective reality, or it should work directly on factors that 
impact on the subjective experience of safety feelings. 
Third, capability scholars would, of course, hope that an enlarging of 
people’s functionings and capabilities would, as a further effect, increase 
their feelings of happiness and satisfaction, and serve as a (sometimes 
rough) indicator of people’s satisfaction with their functionings and 
capabilities (Sen 2008, 26–27). Not all functionings will lead to people 
becoming happier, yet their lives may still be better: more flourishing, or 
more meaningful, or with a higher quality of life, or with a greater degree 
of freedom that could be realised. An interesting example is the case of 
writing a PhD dissertation. Very few PhD students would say that this 
is what makes them happy in the sense outlined above. So why, then, 
do so many graduates want to earn a doctoral degree, and give some of 
the best years of their lives to what often becomes a stressful time? It is 
hard to understand this, if one doesn’t take into account the meaning it 
16  Perhaps criminals would disagree. 
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brings to their lives. The capability approach can capture this — taking 
on a difficult and challenging project such as writing a PhD dissertation 
can plausibly be conceptualised as a general functioning (consisting of 
a set of more specific functionings) that we may want to include in our 
capability analyses, including in our capabilitarian theories of wellbeing 
for public policies. 
I would thus defend the position that various roles for happiness are 
potentially possible within capability theories, and that it depends on 
the exact purpose and scope of the capability theory or application, as 
well as the aim that wellbeing plays in that capability theory, what the 
best role (if any) for both the affective and cognitive aspects of happiness 
would be.
3.9 The capability approach and adaptive 
preferences
As we saw in the previous section, a widely-voiced reason offered 
for rejecting the happiness approach as an account of wellbeing is the 
phenomenon of adaptive preferences, which has been widely discussed 
in the literature (e.g. Elster 1983; Sen 1985c, 3, 1992a; Nussbaum 2000; 
Teschl and Comim 2005; Burchardt 2009; Khader 2009, 2011, 2012, 2013; 
Conradie and Robeyns 2013). Phenomena of mental adaption are a 
problem if we take happiness or desire-satisfaction to be our account 
of wellbeing. Yet we also concluded in section 3.7.3 that the capability 
approach sometimes boils down to a desire-fulfilment account of 
wellbeing. Hence we need to ask: how do processes of adaptation affect 
the desire-fulfilment view of wellbeing, and what are the implications 
for the capability approach? 
In the most general terms, preferences formation or adaptation is 
the phenomenon whereby the subjective assessment of one’s wellbeing 
is out of line with the objective situation. Two persons who find 
themselves in the same objective situation will have a very different 
subjective assessment, because one is happy with small amounts of 
‘objective goods’, whereas the other is much more demanding. In the 
capability literature, the general concern is with deprived persons 
who, over time, adapt to their objectively poor circumstances, and 
report a level of subjective wellbeing which is higher than the objective 
circumstances warrant. 
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The idea of adaptation can take different forms. Jon Elster (1983) 
referred to one particular type of adaptation, in which being unable 
to fulfil a preference or realise an aspiration leads one to reject that 
preference or aspiration. This phenomenon is known as ‘sour grapes’: 
the fox who cannot pick the grapes, because they are hanging too 
high for him, starts telling himself that they are sour anyway, and no 
longer desires to eat them. On Elster’s account, adaptation occurs at 
a non-conscious level, as a reaction to the painful process of cognitive 
dissonance that a person who can’t fulfil her unreachable desires or 
aspirations feels. Elster’s notion of adaptive preferences only refers to 
a process, and makes no reference to an objective notion of wellbeing. 
These psychological aspects of adaptation are echoed in Sen’s reference 
to this phenomenon, when he writes that “considerations of ‘feasibility’ 
and of ‘practical possibility’ enter into what we dare to desire and what 
we are pained not to get” (Sen 1985a, 15). Adaptive preferences are 
a reason for Sen to reject a focus on mental metrics, such as utility or 
happiness, as the metric of wellbeing. After all, someone who is in an 
objectively dire situation may have adapted to that situation and learnt 
to be pleased with little. As Sen (1985c, 21) puts it, “A person who is 
ill-fed, undernourished, unsheltered and ill can still be high up in the 
scale of happiness or desire-fulfilment if he or she has learned to have 
‘realistic’ desires and to take pleasure in small mercies”. 
Serene Khader (2011) has argued that not all cases that we tend to 
consider as cases of adaptive preferences fit Elster’s conceptualisation. 
Khader believes that an account of adaptive preferences must make 
reference to an objective notion of flourishing, even if that notion 
remains vague and only focusses on basic flourishing (since there is 
more intercultural agreement on what basic flourishing entails). She 
develops the following definition: 
An adaptive preference is a preference that (1) is inconsistent with a 
person’s basic flourishing, (2) was formed under conditions nonconducive 
to her basic flourishing, and (3) that we do not think a person would 
have formed under conditions conductive to basic flourishing. (Khader 
2011, 51)
A similarly perfectionist, but much less systematically developed 
account of adaptive preferences can be found in Martha Nussbaum’s 
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work. She understands adaptive preferences as the preferences of 
people who do not want to have items of her list of capabilities, whereby 
these preferences are deformed due to injustices, oppression, ignorance 
and unreflective habit (Nussbaum 2000, 114). 
What questions do adaptive preferences raise for the capability 
approach? At the very minimum, they raise the following questions: 
first, why would adaptive preferences pose a problem for capability 
theories? Second, do we have any evidence about the prevalence of 
adaptive preferences? And third, how can capability scholars deal with 
adaptive preferences in their capability theories and applications? 
Let us start with the first of these questions: why would adaptive 
preferences pose a problem for capability theories? There are at least 
two reasons. The first lies in module B2, the selection of dimensions. If 
that selection is done in a participatory or democratic way, then it may 
be vulnerable to adaptive preferences. A group that is systematically 
socialised to have low aspirations and ambitions will perhaps not put 
certain capabilities on its list, thereby telling themselves that they are 
unachievable, whereas objectively speaking they are achievable, albeit 
perhaps only after some social changes have taken place. The second 
reason is that a person with adaptive preferences may objectively have 
access to a certain capability, but may believe that either this capability 
is not available to her, or else that she should not choose it, and hence 
she may pick from her capabilities set a suboptimal combination of 
functionings. If we then assume that this person (or group) has non-
adaptive preferences, then we will wrongly interpret the choice not 
to exercise certain capabilities as a matter of personal agency, which a 
capability theory that focusses on capabilities rather than functionings, 
should respect. The capability approach by default regards adults as 
agents rather than patients, but this may be problematic in the case of 
adaptive preferences. 
So we can conclude that adaptive preferences can pose a problem for 
capability theories in which the choice of dimensions is made democratic, 
or in which we focus on capabilities rather than functionings. But a critic 
may raise the question: do we have any evidence about the prevalence 
of adaptive preferences? Is this not a theoretical problem invented by 
philosophers who like complex puzzles, or by western scholars who 
pity the lives of poor people in the Global South? 
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There are at least two answers to be given to this question. The 
first is that there are indeed good reasons to be very careful with the 
conclusions we draw when studying adaptive preferences, especially 
in a context with which one is not familiar. Serene Khader (2011, 
55–60) provides a nuanced and convincing discussion of the various 
mistakes that can be made when we try to identify whether a person 
or group of persons living under unjust conditions expresses adaptive 
preferences. There are at least three ‘occupational hazards’ that those 
trying to identify adaptive preferences may make: we run the risk of 
psychologizing structural constraints, of misidentifying possible trade-
offs between various dimensions of wellbeing that a person makes, or 
we may be unable to recognise forms of flourishing in very different 
culture or class settings. All this shows that thinking about adaptive 
preferences needs to be done with great attention to contextual details 
and in a very careful manner; it is not an analysis that can easily be 
done by applying a rigid formula. Scholars should therefore be very 
cautious before concluding that someone or a group shows adaptive 
preferences, and carefully investigate alternative interpretations of 
what they observe, since otherwise they run the risk of seeing adaptive 
preferences where there are none. 
Having said this, it is clear from the literature that adaptive preferences 
are a genuine phenomenon. For example, Serene Khader (2011) 
discusses real cases of groups of women who had adaptive preferences. 
Tania Burchardt analysed the 1970 British Cohort Study and found that 
“among those able to formulate agency goals, the aspirations expressed 
are conditioned by their socio-economic background and experience” 
(Burchardt 2009, 13). She also found evidence that adaptation may play 
a role in the selection of functionings from one’s capability set, since 
among the sixteen-year-olds who have the capability to continue full-
time education, the choice whether or not to do so is highly influenced 
by past deprivation and experiences of inequality. Burchardt rightly 
concludes that if the influence on people’s choices is so systematically 
related to previous experiences of disadvantage, that this is a case of 
injustice. Hence the need, for capability theorists and not just for those 
endorsing the happiness approach or the desire-fulfilment theory 
of wellbeing, to take processes of adapted preferences and adapted 
aspirations seriously. On the other hand, as David Clark (2009, 32) 
argued in the context of development studies, adaptive preferences may 
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not be as widespread as some capability theorists make it out to be: “the 
available evidence only provides limited support for the adaptation 
argument and is not always easy to interpret”. Given the “occupational 
hazards” that those trying to identify adaptive preferences face (Khader 
2011, 55–60), it is important not to ‘see’ adaptive preferences where 
there are none. In conclusion, the capability scholar will have to balance 
the tricky tasks of neither ignoring processes of adaption, nor making 
the adaptation problem bigger than it really is. 
This brings us to the last question: can the capability approach deal 
with these issues? Given that capability theories and applications can 
be very diverse, we will need different methods to handle the issue of 
adaptive preferences for different capability theories and applications. 
In the context of action-research, small-scale projects and grassroots 
strategies, what is required above all is deliberation and interaction with 
people of whom one may be worried that their preferences may show 
signs of adaption, as exemplified by Ina Conradie in her project with 
women in a South African township (Conradie 2013; Conradie and 
Robeyns 2013). Khader (2011) has developed ‘a deliberative perfectionist 
approach to adaptive preference intervention’, in which a practitioner 
who suspects that a group of people has adaptive preferences will first 
attempt to understand how the suspected preferences affect their basic 
flourishing. This must be done via deliberative processes — a strategy 
that we also see in Conradie’s research. If the practitioner has good 
reasons to suspect that some of the preferences are adapted, she can 
involve those with the alleged adaptive preference in a discussion and 
together search for a strategy for change. Note that there is an interesting 
parallel here with the grassroots-based development model that has 
been proposed by Solava Ibrahim (2017), in which ‘a conscientization 
process’ is an integral part of the development process. In this process, 
a person reflects critically on her life, develops aspirations for better 
living conditions, and makes a plan of action to bring about the 
desired change (Ibrahim 2017, 206). While, as Ibrahim rightly notes, 
adaptive preferences and aspirations may provide a challenge for this 
conscientization process, they are also very likely to be challenged and 
hence changed via such a process. 
What about capability applications that involve the empirical analysis 
of large-scale datasets? How can adaptation be dealt with in those 
applications? Here, the capability approach needs to use insights from 
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the disciplines that have built most expertise in large-scale adaptation 
processes, such as sociology and social policy studies. Based on the 
insights from those disciplines, we know the likely candidates to be 
dimensions of adaptation — such as social class, caste or gender. We can 
then use indicators of those dimensions to study whether preferences 
and aspirations systematically differ, as in the earlier mentioned study 
by Tania Burchardt (2009). But it is clear that this can only help us to 
identify adapted preferences or adapted aspirations; it will not always 
tell us whether for each application it is possible to ‘launder’ the data so 
as to clean them from processes of unjust adaptations. 
3.10 Can the capability approach be an 
explanatory theory?
In almost all capability applications and theories, the capability 
approach is developed for conceptual and normative purposes, rather 
than for explanations. If it is used for conceptual work, then capability 
theories do not explain poverty, inequality, or wellbeing, but rather 
help us to conceptualize these notions. If capability analyses are used 
for normative work, then they help to evaluate states of affairs and 
prescribe recommendations for intervention and change.
Nevertheless, the notions of functionings and capabilities in 
themselves can be employed as elements in explanations of social 
phenomena, or one can use these notions in descriptions of poverty, 
inequality, quality of life and social change. In those cases, the 
properties A1 to A4 from module A would still hold, but characteristics 
A5 (functionings and capabilities as the evaluative space), A6 (other 
dimensions of intrinsic values can be important for normative analyses) 
and A7 (normative individualism) are not applicable. 
To the best of my knowledge, few scholars use the capability 
approach in this way. Probably this should not be surprising, since the 
capability approach may not make a significant difference to this type of 
work. Still, there are parallels with existing studies. For example, there 
is a large literature on the social determinants of health (e.g. Marmot 
2005; Wilkinson and Marmot 2003; Marmot et al. 2008). The goal here 
is to establish a set of functionings related to the general functioning 
of being healthy, and the determinants are investigated so that social 
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interventions are possible. The same is done for other functionings — not 
surprisingly, since explaining the determinants of valuable social states 
is one of the main aims of social scientists. 
This raises the question of whether the capability approach should 
aspire to do this kind of explanatory capabilitarian analysis. The answer 
depends on a further question: whether the capability approach would 
have any added value in conducting explanatory capability analyses. If 
not, then it is unclear why this should be part of the capability approach, 
since there seems to be very little value in doing what others are already 
doing successfully.
But this pessimistic dismissal of the potential of explanatory 
capability analyses may be too quick. Perhaps the capability approach 
has a role to play in synthesising and connecting these field-specific 
lines of explanatory research; since it is a strongly interdisciplinary 
approach, it may perhaps also have a role to play in bringing different 
disciplines within the social and behavioural sciences together. Another 
very important task of the capability approach is to reach out to those 
disciplines in order to make bridges between the normative and 
the explanatory analyses — one valuable element of the truly post-
disciplinary agenda to which the capability approach aims to contribute. 
3.11 A suitable theory for all normative questions?
The capability approach is primarily a normative theory, but are there 
also restrictions on which normative questions it can help to address? 
Or is it suitable for all normative questions? 
In order to answer this, it is helpful to remind us of the key distinction 
in philosophical ethics between the right and the good. Questions about 
the good focus on what makes life valuable and include discussions 
about wellbeing, autonomy, freedom, and love. Questions about the 
right focus on how we should act in order for that action to be morally 
sound, as well as discussions about how institutions and policies should 
be designed so as not to violate universal moral rules. Here, the central 
issues concern fairness, respect and the avoidance of harm. Different 
moral theories give different answers to the question of how the good 
and the right relate to each other. 
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In philosophical ethics, if we say that an issue is a moral issue, this 
implies that we have duties to comply with the moral norm, no matter 
how we feel about it. These are very stringent and universal duties. 
An example is: do not kill an innocent person; or: respect the human 
dignity of all persons. Normative questions are much broader, and can 
also entail other values, such as prudential value (wellbeing). Questions 
about the right are questions about morality, whereas for most ethical 
frameworks questions about the good are questions about other areas of 
normativity, but not morality straight.17 
The modular view that has been presented in chapter 2 has in the 
core module A only normative properties related to the good. Properties 
A1 and A2 define functionings and capabilities, and property A5 claims 
that a person’s advantage should focus on functionings and capabilities: 
this gives the capability approach the core of its theory of the good. The 
complete theory of the good may be extended by additional choices 
made in module C4.
What does the core of the capability approach (module A) have to 
say about the right? The only property related to the right is normative 
individualism. There are no additional claims related to the right 
included in module A. Hence, the only conclusion we can draw is that 
the capability approach would claim that, if and whenever rightness 
involves a notion of the good, one should use the theory of the good as 
entailed by the core characteristics of the capability approach. Hence, 
if we believe that the right thing to do is to prioritise the lives of the 
worst-off, then a capabilitarian version of this claim would say that we 
should prioritise the functionings and/or capabilities of the worst-off 
rather than their happiness or their command over resources. 
Yet many claims concerning the right make no reference to an 
account of the good. The core of the capabilities approach is, thus, 
orthogonal to other aspects of the theory of the right, except for ethical 
individualism, which is only a very small part of a theory of the right. 
The fact that the capability approach has, at its very core, more to offer 
in terms of the theory of the good than in terms of the theory of the 
right has an important implication, namely that the capability approach is 
17  An influential exception are utilitarians and other consequentialists, who define the 
morally right as that which maximizes the (non-moral) good (Driver 2014; Sinnott-
Armstrong 2015). 
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not very suitable for ethical issues that only concern questions about the right. 
For example, the capability approach is not a very helpful theory when 
analysing the morality of abortion since so much of that ethical debate 
is about issues of the right rather than about issues of the good. That is, 
most of the philosophical debates on the ethics of abortion concern the 
moral status of the foetus, notions of personhood, or questions about 
the autonomy and self-ownership of the pregnant woman — issues 
on which the capability approach remains mute.18 It is therefore not 
surprising that the capability approach is more useful and more widely 
used as a theory analysing socio-economic policies where there is a 
consensus on those aspects that are questions about the right or where 
the questions about the right are much less weighty than those about the 
good. Examples include debates about poverty alleviation, distributive 
justice, environmental ethics and disability ethics. In sum, the capability 
approach is not a very helpful (or the most illuminating) framework for 
normative analyses in which elements regarding deontological duties 
and rights, which are not conceptually closely related to notions of 
wellbeing, play the most important role — that is, where aspects of the 
right are crucial in addressing the normative questions. 
3.12 The role of resources  
in the capability approach
In section 2.6.4 we discussed property A4, which stresses the importance 
of the difference between means and ends in the capabilities approach. 
In section 2.6.5, we discussed property A5, which claims that in the 
capability approach functionings and capabilities form the evaluative 
space. From these two core properties from module A, some may draw 
the conclusion that resources are no longer important in the capability 
approach. This is a mistake. Resources are important, although in an 
instrumental manner. 
Firstly, a focus on functionings and capabilities does not necessarily 
imply that a capability analysis would not pay any attention to resources, 
18  Philosophical arguments on the moral permissibility of abortion come to widely 
divergent conclusions (e.g. Thomson 1971; Tooley 1972; English 1975; Marquis 
1989).
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or to the evaluation of social institutions, economic growth, technical 
advancement, and so forth. While functionings and capabilities are of 
ultimate concern, other dimensions can be important as well, but in 
an instrumental way, or as indicators for what ultimately matters. For 
example, in their evaluation of development in India, Drèze and Sen 
have stressed that working within the capability approach in no way 
excludes the integration of an analysis of resources: 
It should be clear that we have tended to judge development by the 
expansion of substantive human freedoms — not just by economic 
growth (for example, of the gross national product), or technical progress, 
or social modernization. This is not to deny, in any way, that advances in 
the latter fields can be very important, depending on circumstances, as 
‘instruments’ for the enhancement of human freedom. But they have to 
be appraised precisely in that light — in terms of their actual effectiveness 
in enriching the lives and liberties of people — rather than taking them 
to be valuable in themselves. (Drèze and Sen 2002, 3)
Second, once we have decided which capabilities are relevant, we need 
to investigate the determinants of those capabilities — the factors which 
affect their emergence, size and robustness. As figure 2.1 illustrates, 
these determinants include resources, a person’s set of conversion 
factors and structural constraints. Hence if we want to expand the 
capabilities of a person or a group, these are the levels at which we 
could intervene. Resources are not the only things that matter, and for 
some capabilities that we try to expand or try to equalise, resources 
may not be the most effective factor of intervention. At the same time, 
it is also clear that resources are very important for most capabilities 
and there are hardly any capabilities where resources play no role at 
all. Being able to buy presents enhances the capability of affiliation and 
social interaction; being able to get the best medical care enhances the 
capability of health; and being able to afford time off and time to travel 
enhances the capability to enjoy nature. Hence even those capabilities 
that could be seen as non-material dimensions of advantage are 
nevertheless also aided by the availability of resources, albeit probably 
not in a linear way, and perhaps only up to a certain threshold level. If 
a capability analysis is aimed at making an intervention, then the exact 
relationship between resources and functionings needs to be studied 
for each capability analysis, rather than being assumed to have a 
certain shape.
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Third, in empirical research there are often data constraints that force 
scholars to work with resources as proxies for valuable functionings. 
There is nothing inconsistent in taking that path, as long as one is 
careful in the conclusions that one draws from an analysis of resources. 
Moreover, if one uses multiple resources, such as a combination of 
income, time, and human and social capital (e.g. Burchardt 2010), then 
the informational riches of the analysis increases, compared to a one-
dimensional monetary analysis. 
3.13 The capability approach  
and theories of justice
Discussions about inequality and justice are very important within 
the capability literature. In fact, they are so important that many 
philosophers studying the capability approach have made the mistake 
of believing that it is a theory of equality, or a theory of justice. But as 
the descriptions of the capability approach in chapter 2 have shown, 
that is not the case. Here, too, we need to make use of the distinction 
between the general capability approach and more specific capability 
theories: theorizing justice is only one among many different purposes 
that capability theories can have, that is, one of the possible choices we 
can make in module B1.19 Still, given that the capability approach offers 
a distinct view on interpersonal comparisons of advantage, it should 
not surprise us that the capability approach has been widely used in 
thinking about inequality and justice. 
The literature that develops the relevance of the capability approach 
in theories of justice falls primarily within the domain of normative 
political philosophy, but there is some overlap with the work done by 
welfare economists and other scholars. In order to get a grip on what 
the capability approach does in the literature on distributive justice, or, 
vice versa, what thinking goes on about theories of distributive justice 
within the capability literature, let us start with a brief primer on the 
theoretical literature on justice in the next section. Then, in section 
3.13.2, I pose the question of what is required for the construction of a 
complete capability theory of justice. The final section, 3.13.3, explores 
the implications of a capability-based approach to justice in practice. 
19  In particular, see the overview of different types of capability study in section 2.4.
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3.13.1 A brief description of the literature  
on theories of justice 
Justice is an essentially contested concept: there is no generally accepted 
definition of justice, and thus no consensus on what the appropriate 
subject matter of theories of justice is or should be. Of course, it does not 
follow that nothing at all can be said about the notion of justice. David 
Miller’s description of social justice is a good starting point. He claims 
that when arguing about justice, we are discussing:
how the good and bad things in life should be distributed among the 
members of a human society. When, more concretely, we attack some 
policy or some state of affairs as socially unjust, we are claiming that a 
person, or more usually a category of persons, enjoys fewer advantages 
than that person or group of persons ought to enjoy (or bears more of 
the burdens than they ought to bear), given how other members of the 
society in question are faring. (Miller 1999, 1)
Theories of justice do not cover the entire spectrum of moral issues. 
Social justice theorists generally agree that parts of morality fall outside 
the scope of justice. Charity is such a case: you may not have a duty 
of justice to help a frail, elderly neighbour, but you may nevertheless 
decide to help that person as an act of charity and compassion. Another 
example is morally laudable behaviour, such as being a volunteer for 
social activities in your neighbourhood. Such behaviour may be morally 
praiseworthy, but it may at the same time not be required as a matter of 
justice. Hence, justice is not all that matters, if we consider how to make 
the world morally better. 
Can we describe justice, and theories of justice, by their properties, as 
philosophers often do? First, justice is a property that has been ascribed 
to both individuals and institutions: justice is a virtue of individuals 
in their interactions with others, and justice is also a virtue of social 
institutions (Barry and Matravers 2011). Thus, we can say that a certain 
society is more or less just, or we can say that the behaviour of some 
persons is just or unjust. Theorists of justice tend primarily to discuss 
the justice of social arrangements, that is, of social institutions broadly 
defined; justice as an individual virtue is sometimes regarded as a 
matter of ethics rather than of political philosophy (although not every 
political philosopher would agree with this way of demarcating justice 
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from ethics). Moreover, an increasing number of theorists define social 
institutions more broadly so as to include societal structures related to 
class or caste, as well as social norms; under such broad definitions, 
conceptualising justice as a virtue of institutions touches upon many of 
the same aspects we would discuss if we were to see justice as a virtue of 
persons. For example, if a society has widely shared racist social norms, 
such as the disapproval of interracial love relationships, then a person 
who shows her disapproval of an interracial love relationship is acting 
upon an unjust social norm, but also showing non-virtuous behaviour. 
Second, while sometimes the terms ‘social justice’ and ‘distributive 
justice’ are used as synonyms, it makes sense to understand ‘social 
justice’ as somewhat broader than ‘distributive justice’. Distributive 
justice always deals with an analysis of who gets what, whereas social 
justice may also relate to questions of respect or recognition, or the 
attitudes that a certain institution expresses. The capability approach 
is mainly discussed in theories of distributive justice, although it is to 
some extent able to integrate the concerns of theorists of recognition 
about what they conceive to be the narrow or mistaken focus of theories 
of distributive justice.20 
A third point to note about the literature on justice is that there 
are several different schools within social justice theories. According 
to Brian Barry and Matt Matravers, it is helpful to classify theories 
of social justice according to four types: conventionalism, teleology, 
justice as mutual advantage and egalitarian justice. Conventionalism is 
the view that issues of justice can be resolved by examining how local 
conventions, institutions, traditions and systems of law determine the 
divisions of burdens and benefits. Barry and Matravers rightly point out 
that this approach, which has been defended by Michael Walzer (1983), 
can lead to the acceptance of grossly unjust practices because they are 
generally endorsed by certain communities, even if they may be seen as 
unjust if judged on the basis of values and ideas not currently present (or 
dominant) in that society. Teleology is the view that social arrangements 
should be justified by referring to some good they are aiming for. Some 
examples are utilitarianism, natural law theory or Aquinas’ Christian 
20  It doesn’t follow that all concerns of theorists of recognition are best expressed by 
using the capability approach. I doubt that this is the case, but will not pursue this 
issue here further. 
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philosophy. For teleological theories, what justice is follows from an 
account of the good, and thus the account of justice depends on the 
account of the social good itself. A criticism of teleological theories is that 
they necessarily rely on an external source (to specify what ‘the good’ is), 
such as utility, the natural law or God’s authority. Teleological accounts 
of justice therefore necessarily depend on notions of the ultimate good. 
However, in pluralistic societies characterised by a variety of religious 
and non-religious worldviews, it is hard to see how justice can be 
derived from notions of the good that are not endorsed by all. Many 
contemporary political philosophers therefore argue that teleological 
theories cannot be defended since people have competing ideas of the 
good, and we cannot call upon a generally-accepted external source that 
will tell us which idea of the good should be imposed on all.
The third and fourth schools of social justice, in comparison, share a 
commitment to some form of liberalism that recognizes the diversity of 
views of the good life, which a just society should respect. These schools 
experienced a major revival after the publication of John Rawls’s A 
Theory of Justice in 1971, which is generally regarded as the single most 
important work on social justice written in the last century.21 Rawls 
turned to the social contract tradition, in which justice is understood as 
the fair distribution of benefits of social cooperation. The core idea is 
that rules of justice are ultimately more beneficial to everyone than if 
each were to pursue their own advantage by themselves. Some of these 
theories (though not Rawls’s!) take the relative power or bargaining 
strength of every individual in society as given, and one may therefore 
question whether in situations of unequal bargaining power, justice 
will be done (Nussbaum 2006b). The other liberal school of justice is 
egalitarian justice, which is premised on the idea that people should be 
treated with equal respect and concern (Dworkin 2000). The most basic 
claim of those theories is that people are morally equal: each person 
should be treated as a being of equal moral worth. However, that 
21  There is a large literature on the differences and complementarities between the 
capability approach to justice (that is, capabilitarian theories of justice) and Rawls’s 
theory of justice (see e.g. Sen 1980, 195–200; Rawls 1988; Sen 1992a, 82–83; Pogge 
2002; Nussbaum 2006b; Robeyns 2008b, 2009; and the contributions to Brighouse 
and Robeyns 2010).
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general and abstract claim can be further developed in many different 
ways, and it is in specifying these further details that philosophers 
disagree. Distributive justice requires equality of something, but not 
necessarily equality of outcome in material terms (in fact, plain equality 
of resources is a claim very few theorists of justice would be willing 
to defend, since people have different needs, are confronted with 
different circumstances and, if given the same opportunities, are likely 
to make different use of them). Hence, Rawls’s theory of justice can be 
seen as an egalitarian theory of justice, but so are theories that come to 
very different substantive conclusions, such as Robert Nozick’s (1974) 
entitlement theory. Other major contemporary theorists of justice who 
can be labelled ‘liberal egalitarian’ are Brian Barry (1995), Philippe Van 
Parijs (1995), and Ronald Dworkin (2000), among many others. 
Of those four schools, it is primarily liberal egalitarian theories that are 
discussed in relation to the capability approach. While there is internal 
diversity within this group of liberal egalitarian theories, these theories 
share the commitment to the principle that there should be considerable 
(although by no means absolute) scope for individuals to determine 
their own life plan and notion of the good, as well as a commitment 
to a notion of equal moral consideration, which is another way to put 
the principle of each person as an end, or normative individualism (see 
section 2.6.8). 
Of the four schools of social justice, only the last two regard justice 
and equality as being closely related values. Under conventionalism, 
justice is guided by existing traditions, conventions and institutions, 
even if those existing practices do not treat people as equals in a 
plausible sense. Teleological theories also do not understand justice 
as entailing some notion of equality; instead, the idea of the good is 
more important, even if it implies that people are not treated as moral 
equals. In some theories of conventionalism and teleology, social justice 
could be consistent with a notion of equality, but this is not necessarily 
the case for all these theories. The social contract tradition and liberal 
egalitarianism, in contrast, derive their principles of social justice from 
a fundamental idea of people as moral equals. However, the notion of 
equal moral worth does not necessarily lead to the notion of equality of 
resources or another type of equality of outcome, as will be explained 
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in what follows. Social justice and equality are related in these theories, 
but not always at the level of material inequality, but rather at a more 
fundamental level of treating people as moral equals or with equal 
respect and concern. 
For a proper understanding of mainstream philosophical literature 
on theories of justice, it is helpful to know that the literature itself is 
highly abstract, and often rather detached from questions about policy 
design or political feasibility. Sen (2006, 2009c) has recently criticised 
such theories, and in particular Rawls’s work, for being overly 
“transcendental”. Such ideal theories give an account of the perfectly 
just society, but do not tell us what needs to be done to get closer to 
that very ideal, how we can make the world less unjust and which of 
two situations might be more unjust than the other. Another critique of 
contemporary theories of justice is that they are often based on so-called 
idealisations or strong assumptions, which may introduce significant 
biases or exclude certain groups of people from the theory. For example, 
Dworkin (2000) sets his egalitarian theory against a set of background 
assumptions that rule out racist and sexist attitudes and behaviours, 
as well as the adaptation of preferences to unfair circumstances (Pierik 
and Robeyns 2007). Certain assumptions and meta-theoretical as well 
as methodological choices also put philosophical theories of justice at 
risk of being too far removed from practical applicability. When we 
try to apply contemporary theories of justice to the actual reality of 
our chaotic and often messy world, there are all sorts of complications 
that need to be taken into account, such as trade-offs between different 
values, power imbalances between different social groups, unintended 
consequences of justice-enhancing interventions and policies, or interests 
of individuals and groups that may conflict with concerns for justice 
(e.g. a desire for re-election on the part of government administrations). 
Debates about the practical relevance of contemporary philosophical 
theories of justice have gained momentum in the last decade. It remains 
unclear whether the outcome will change the way theories of justice are 
constructed in the future. It may well be that we will see a turn towards 
more non-ideal, empirically-informed, ‘directly useful’ theories that are 
easier to translate into practice. In any case, it is fair to say that most 
capability theorists working on justice are among those who strongly 
advocate this turn to make theories of justice more relevant to practice. 
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3.13.2 What do we need for a capability theory of justice?
In the previous section I gave a very brief account of the philosophical 
literature on theories of justice. What contribution can the capability 
approach make to this field? The first thing to note is that Martha 
Nussbaum has written at great length developing a capabilities theory 
of justice (e.g. Nussbaum 1988, 1992, Nussbaum 2000, 2002a; Nussbaum 
2006b). Her capabilities theory is the most detailed capability theory of 
justice that has been developed up till now. Her theory is comprehensive, 
in the sense that it is not limited to an account of political justice, or to 
liberal democracies. Her account holds for all human beings on earth, 
independently of whether they are living in a liberal democratic regime, 
or of whether they are severely disabled. However, Nussbaum’s theory 
of social justice doesn’t amount to a full theory of social justice. The 
main demarcation of Nussbaum’s account is that it provides only “a 
partial and minimal account of social justice” (Nussbaum 2006b, 71) 
by specifying thresholds of a list of capabilities that governments in all 
nations should guarantee to their citizens. Nussbaum’s theory focuses 
on thresholds, but this does not imply that reaching these thresholds is 
all that matters for social justice; rather, her theory is partial and simply 
doesn’t discuss the question of what social justice requires once those 
thresholds are met. Not discussing certain things is not necessarily a 
flaw of a theory: this may be theoretical work that Nussbaum will do 
in the future, or it may be work that will be done by other scholars. 
Moreover, it is quite possible that Nussbaum’s account of partial justice 
is consistent with several accounts of what justice requires above the 
thresholds. 
Yet, while Nussbaum’s theory of justice has been worked out in 
great detail and has received a lot of attention, it would be a grave 
mistake to think that there can be only one capability theory of justice. 
On the contrary, the open nature of the capability framework allows 
for the development of a family of capability theories of justice. This 
then prompts the question: what is needed if we want to create such a 
capability theory of justice?22 
22  I have presented this overview of steps that need to be taken in earlier publications 
(e.g. Robeyns 2016d).
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First, a theory of justice needs to explain on what basis it justifies 
its principles or claims of justice. For example, Rawls uses the method 
of reflective equilibrium, including the thought experiment of the 
original position.23 Dworkin’s egalitarian justice theory starts from the 
meta-principle of equal respect and concern, which he then develops in 
the principles that the distribution of burdens and benefits should be 
sensitive to the ambitions that people have but should not reflect the 
unequal natural endowments with which individuals are born (Dworkin 
1981, 2000). One could also develop a capability theory of justice arguing 
that the ultimate driving force is a concern with agency (Claassen and 
Düwell 2013; Claassen 2016) or with human dignity (Nussbaum 2000; 
Nussbaum 2006b). If capability scholars want to develop a full theory 
of justice, they will also need to explain on what bases they justify their 
principles or claims. As mentioned earlier, Nussbaum starts from a 
notion of human dignity, whereas the Senian strand in the capability 
approach stresses the importance of what people have reason to value, 
hence an account of public reasoning. However, little work has been 
done so far to flesh out this embryonic idea of ‘having reason to value’, 
and it therefore remains unclear whether the capability approach has 
a solid unified rationale on the basis of which a full account of justice 
could be developed. 
Second, as indicated above, in developing a capability theory of 
justice we must decide whether we want it to be an outcome or an 
opportunity theory; that is, whether we think that we should assess 
injustices in terms of functionings, or rather in terms of capabilities, 
or a mixture. At the level of theory and principles, most theorists of 
justice endorse the view that justice is done if all have equal genuine 
opportunities, or if all reach a minimal threshold of capability levels. 
Translated to the capability language, this would imply that at the level 
of theory and principles, capabilities are the relevant metric of justice, 
and not functionings. However, among theorists of justice, not everyone 
subscribes to this view. Anne Phillips (2004) has been a prominent 
voice arguing for equality of outcome, rather than opportunities. In 
the capability literature, Marc Fleurbaey (2002) has argued against an 
approach that takes only capabilities into account and has defended a 
23  An accessible explanation of the method of reflective equilibrium can be found in 
Knight (2017).
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focus on ‘refined functionings’ (being the combination of functionings 
and capabilities). 
A third issue which needs to be solved if one hopes to develop a 
capability theory of justice is to decide and justify which capabilities 
matter the most. There are at least two ways of answering this question: 
either through procedural approaches, such as using criteria from 
which the relevant capabilities are derived, or by defending a specific 
list of capabilities. This selection of relevant capabilities for the purpose 
of justice can be done at the level of ideal theory (without taking issues 
of practical feasibility and implementation into account), at the level of 
abstract principles (Anderson 1999; Nussbaum 2006b; Claassen 2016) or 
at an applied theoretical level, which is useful for practical assessments 
of unjust inequalities (e.g. Robeyns 2003; Wolff and De-Shalit 2007).
Fourth, a capability theory of justice may need to engage in a 
comparison with other ‘metrics of justice’. In the literature on social 
justice there are several terms used to indicate what precisely we are 
assessing or measuring: the metric of advantage, the currency of justice, 
or the informational basis for the interpersonal comparisons for the 
purpose of justice. Within theories of justice, the main arguments are with 
Rawlsian resourcists24 and with defenders of Dworkinian resourcism.25 
Other possible metrics are basic needs or the many different types of 
subjective welfare or preference satisfaction. A full capability theory of 
justice would need to show why it serves better as a metric of justice 
than these other metrics. 
Fifth, a capability theory of justice needs to take a position on the 
“distributive rule” (Anderson 2010, 81) that it will endorse: will it argue 
for plain equality, or for sufficiency, or for prioritarianism, or for some 
other (mixed) distributive rule? Both Martha Nussbaum’s and Elizabeth 
Anderson’s theories are sufficiency accounts, but from this it does not 
follow, as one sometimes reads in the secondary literature, that the 
capability approach entails a sufficiency rule. Sen may have given the 
(wrong) impression of defending straight equality as a distributive rule, 
24  An analysis of this comparison between social primary goods and capabilities was 
made by the various contributions to the volume edited by Brighouse and Robeyns 
(2010).
25  For comparisons of the capability view with Dworkin’s egalitarian theory, see Sen 
(1984b, 321–23, 2009c, 264–68); Dworkin (2000, 299–303); Williams (2002); Browne 
and Stears (2005); Kaufman (2006); Pierik and Robeyns (2007). 
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by asking the question “Equality of what?” (Sen 1980), though a careful 
reading shows that he was merely asking the question “If we want to 
be defending equality of something, then what would that be?” In fact, 
Sen has remained uncommitted to one single distributive rule, which 
probably can be explained by the fact that he is averse to building a well-
defined theory of justice but rather prefers to investigate how real-life 
unjust situations can be turned into more just situations, even if perfect 
justice is unattainable (Sen 2006, 2009c). The capability approach clearly 
plays a role in Sen’s work on justice, since when assessing a situation, 
he will investigate inequalities in people’s capabilities and analyse the 
processes that led to those inequalities. Yet Sen has an eclectic approach 
to theorizing, and hence other notions and theories (such as human rights 
or more formal discussions on freedoms from social choice theory) also 
play a role in his work on justice. The presence and importance of the 
capability approach in Sen’s work is thus undeniable, but should not be 
seen as the only defining feature. 
Sixth, a capability theory of justice needs to specify where the line 
between individual and collective responsibility is drawn, or how this 
will be decided, and by whom. There is a remarkable absence of any 
discussion about issues of responsibility in the capability literature, in 
sharp contrast to political philosophy and welfare economics where 
this is one of the most important lines of debate, certainly since the 
publication of Dworkin’s (1981, 2000) work on justice and equality 
which led to what Anderson (1999) has called “luck-egalitarianism”. 
Nevertheless, whether one wants to discuss it explicitly or not, any 
concrete capability policy proposal can be analysed in terms of the 
division between personal and collective responsibility, but this 
terminology is largely absent from the capability literature. In part, this 
might be explained by the fact that much of the work on capabilities 
deals with global poverty, where issues of individual responsibility 
seem to be less relevant since it would seem outrageous to suggest that 
the world’s most destitute people are personally responsible for the 
situation they are in. That doesn’t mean that the responsibility question 
is not important: it is indeed of utmost importance to ask who is 
responsible for global poverty reduction or the fulfilling of international 
development targets, such as the Sustainable Development Goals on 
which political philosophers have written a great deal (Singer 2004, 
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2010; Pogge 2008). The point is rather that philosophical puzzles, such 
as the issue of expensive tastes (for expensive wine, caviar, fast cars, or 
you name it), are simply beyond the radar of the child labourer or the 
poor peasant. However, while this may perhaps justify the absence of 
any discussion about personal responsibility among capability scholars 
concerned with poverty, it does not absolve theorists of justice who deal 
with justice in affluent societies (or affluent sections of poor societies) 
from discussing the just division between personal and collective 
responsibility (Pierik and Robeyns 2007, 148–49). 
This brings us to a related issue: a theory of justice generally specifies 
rights, but also duties. However, capability theorists have remained 
largely silent on the question of whose duty it is to expand the selected 
capabilities. Nussbaum passionately advocates that all people all over 
the world should be entitled, as a matter of justice, to threshold levels 
of all the capabilities on her list, but apart from mentioning that it is the 
governments’ duty to guarantee these entitlements (Nussbaum 2006b, 
70), she remains silent on the question of who precisely should bear 
the burdens and responsibilities for realizing these capabilities. Yet as 
Onora O’Neill (1996, 122–53) has argued, questions of obligations and 
responsibilities should be central to any account of justice. 
This section makes clear that a capability theory of justice is 
theoretically much more demanding than the basic presupposition of 
the capability approach that ‘functionings’ and ‘capabilities’ are the 
best metric for most kinds of interpersonal evaluations. While much has 
been written on the capability approach in recent years by an increasing 
number of scholars, including philosophers, much of the philosophical 
work needed for turning the open-ended capability approach into a 
specific theory of justice remains to be done. 
Note, however, that not all capability theorists working on issues 
of justice believe that such a fully worked-out theory is required. Sen 
(2009c) himself has argued at length that we don’t need a theory that 
describes a utopian ideal, but rather we need theorising to help us with 
making comparisons of injustice, and to guide us towards a less unjust 
society. Similarly, Jay Drydyk (2012) has argued that the capability 
approach to justice should focus on reducing capability shortfalls, for 
which a utopian account of perfect justice is not needed. Some capability 
theorists may want to work out a full theory of justice by addressing the 
158 Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice
various specifications outlined above, while others may want to change 
the very nature of theorising about justice, moving it more to applied, 
non-ideal or grounded theories (Watene and Drydyk 2016). 
3.13.3 From theories of justice to  
just practices and policies
Before closing this section on capabilitarian theorizing about justice, 
let us briefly shift from theory to practice. Since theories of justice are 
mainly developed at a highly abstract level, often entailing ideals of 
perfect justice, we may wonder whether the capability approach to social 
justice and equality is of any use in telling us what justice-enhancing 
strategies and policies to develop. Indeed, this has sometimes been 
phrased as a serious concern, namely, that theories of justice are too 
abstract and do not help us with social justice struggles on the ground. 
One may well argue that we roughly know what is going wrong and 
we need political action rather than more and more detailed theorising. 
Moreover, some think that in the real world the subtleties of theories 
of justice are easily abused in order to justify gross inequalities, as 
may have been the case with philosophical discussions on individual 
responsibility. For example, Brian Barry’s (2005) later work exemplified 
this concern with the direct application of theories of justice to political 
change and the reform of the welfare state, rather than with further 
philosophical refinements of theories of justice. Related charges have 
been aimed at the capability approach as well. For instance, it has 
been argued that not enough attention has been paid to issues of social 
power in the capability writings on justice, and Feldman and Gellert 
(2006) have underscored the importance of recognising the struggles 
and negotiations by dominated and disadvantaged groups if social 
justice is ever to be realised. Such questions of power politics, effective 
social criticism, successful collective action, historical and cultural 
sensitivities, and the negotiation of competing interests are indeed 
largely absent from the philosophical literature on theories of justice. 
These ideal theories develop standards of a just society, but often do not 
tell us what institutions or policies are necessary if just societies are to be 
constructed, nor do they tell us what social and political processes will 
help advocates implement these social changes in concrete ways. 
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But the capability approach can be linked to more concrete justice-
enhancing policy proposals that have been developed. For one thing, 
the Millennium Development Goals could be understood as being a 
practical (albeit specific and also limited) translation of the capability 
approach in practice, and their successors, the Sustainable Development 
Goals, can also be seen as influenced by the capability approach.26 In 
fact, at the level of severe global poverty, any concrete poverty-reduction 
strategy which conceptualises poverty in a capability sense is, for most 
accounts of justice, a concrete justice-enhancing strategy, since these 
theories would include the absence of severe poverty as a principle of 
justice. 
If we move from the area of poverty-reduction strategies to the 
question of just social policies in countries or regions with higher levels 
of affluence, we observe that there are much fewer actual examples 
of justice-enhancing policies that have been explicitly grounded in, or 
associated with, the capability approach. Yet many concrete policies 
and interventions could be interpreted as such, or are consistent with 
the capability perspective itself. One example relates to a policy of 
providing, regulating and/or subsidising child-care facilities. This can 
arguably be justified as a prerequisite for gender justice in capabilities 
since, due to gender norms, women will in effect not be able to develop 
themselves professionally if they are not supported in their need for 
decent quality-regulated (and possibly subsidised) child-care facilities. 
Mothers at home may be materially well-off if their husbands earn a 
good income but, if they do not have the genuine opportunity to hold 
jobs, then their capability sets are severely constrained and gender justice 
in capabilities cannot be achieved. An income metric which assumes 
equal sharing in the household may not detect any moral problem, but 
a capability metric will claim that women have more limited freedoms 
than men, since the provisions are not there to ensure that both parents 
can hold jobs, and gender norms and other gendered social mechanisms 
make it highly unlikely that men will volunteer to stay at home with 
their children. At the same time, men are also losing out since they have 
a very limited capability to spend time with their newborn babies. 
26  See http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/
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A slightly different example concerns a justice-enhancing 
intervention that can be found in the form of adult volunteers who visit 
disadvantaged families to read to the children in order to enhance their 
language skills.27 It is well-known that many children of immigrants are 
disadvantaged at school since they are very likely to enter school with 
weaker knowledge of the language of instruction than non-immigrant 
children. For this reason, in several cities there are networks of volunteers 
to read books to small immigrant children in their own homes. In this 
way, they effectively reduce the gap in educational opportunity between 
immigrant children and non-immigrant children. This example also 
illustrates that justice-enhancing strategies are not confined to public 
policy, but can also be initiated by persons and groups at the grassroots. 
The government is not the only agent of justice; we can all do our part. 
3.14 Capabilities and human rights 
Several capability theories are closely related to accounts of human 
rights. Within the capability literature, some scholars have developed 
capability theories that they regard as a human rights theory. In the 
human rights literature, scholars have examined to what extent the 
capability approach can help to develop stronger theories of human 
rights. The same topics (e.g. provision of or right to basic health or basic 
education) are defended based on both approaches, or are defended 
appealing both to human rights and capabilities (e.g. Osmani 2000). 
Amartya Sen has in several of his publications analysed the relationship 
between human rights and capabilities (e.g. Sen 2004b, 2005). In 
addition, Martha Nussbaum has claimed that her capabilities theory is a 
version of human rights theory, which has drawn much attention to the 
question about the relationship between capabilities and human rights.
It should not be surprising that there are so many scholars and 
practitioners interested in both the human rights framework and the 
capability approach, since they share some important aspects. First, 
they are both widely endorsed ethical frameworks. Second, they seem 
to share an underlying motivation, namely to protect and enhance 
27  In the Netherlands, this volunteer organisation is called De Voorleesexpress (https://
voorleesexpress.nl) but similar initiatives must exist around the world. 
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people’s freedoms. Third, they are both used for global as well as 
domestic questions. Fourth, both frameworks want to build strong links 
between theory and practice: they are studied and used by scholars but 
also used by practitioners (political parties, activists, policy makers, 
etc.). Finally, both discourses are strongly interdisciplinary in nature. 
All this raises some questions. What is the relationship between 
human rights and capabilities? Can we say that capabilities are the 
objects of human rights? If so, do human rights theories and analyses 
have something to gain by developing capabilities-based human rights 
theories? Can the capability approach deliver all that is important in 
human rights theories? And what should we make of the alleged 
disadvantages of using the capability approach in thinking about 
human rights? 
3.14.1 What are human rights?
Human rights are rights each human being is entitled to in order to 
protect her from severe harms that could be inflicted by others — either 
by deliberate actions, or else by the failure to protect human rights 
caused by institutional design. They are norms aimed at protecting 
people from severe social, political and legal abuse (Nickel 2014, 1). 
Examples of human rights are the right to life, the right to food, the 
right to freedom of assembly, the right to freedom of religion, the right 
to a fair trial when charged with a crime, the right not to be tortured, 
and the right to privacy. 
Human rights are not all the rights that people have. As Sen 
(2004b, 329) writes, “there have to be some ‘threshold conditions’ of (i) 
importance and (ii) social influenceability for a freedom to figure within 
the interpersonal and interactive spectrum of human rights”. Take the 
‘importance threshold’ first. Here is an example of a right that is not 
a human right, because it does not meet the threshold condition of 
importance: the right to parental leave. In many European countries, 
parents who are employed have a right to paid parental leave upon 
the birth of their child or when they adopt a child. While many have 
argued that such a right would help meet our duties towards children 
and parents as well as advance gender justice (e.g. Gheaus and Robeyns 
2011), it is not at all plausible to argue that this should be seen as a 
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human right. It has a much weaker moral urgency than the right to a fair 
trial, let alone the right to life. Human rights thus correspond to a subset 
of the domain of justice, and focus on those questions that are of utter 
importance, the protection of which should have a greater urgency than 
the support of other normative claims. The second threshold — social 
influenceability — implies that even if something valuable is hugely 
important, as long as there is no or very limited social influenceability, 
its protection cannot be a human right. For example, it makes no sense 
to speak of a human right to be protected from volcano eruptions, or 
a human right to be protected from cancer. However, one can say that 
there is a human right to be warned about volcano eruptions if the 
government has the relevant information. To the extent that there is 
more social influenceability, the scope to speak coherently of human 
rights increases. 
Human rights have corresponding duties. But on whom do those 
duties fall and what kind of duties are they? A broad, inclusive account 
of duties is given by Pablo Gilabert (2009, 673) who writes: 
[Human rights impose] a duty of the highest priority for individuals 
and governments to identify ways to protect certain important interests 
through (a) specific rights and entitlements, but also, when these 
are insufficient or not presently feasible, through (b) urgent goals of 
institution-building.
Note that this definition does not limit the duty to protect human rights 
to governments only, and that it does include institution-building as an 
important path towards protecting human rights.28 
3.14.2 The interdisciplinary scholarship on human rights
The human rights literature is, just like the capability approach, deeply 
multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary. The philosophy of human rights 
“addresses questions about the existence, content, nature, universality, 
justification, and legal status of human rights” (Nickel 2014, 1). How 
can human rights exist in the first place? What should be the content of 
28  This relates to a complex discussion in legal and political philosophy on whether 
human rights can be protected by so-called ‘imperfect duties’ or ‘imperfect 
obligations’ which is beyond the scope of this book. See, amongst others, Polly 
Vizard (2006, 84–91) and Frances Kamm (2011) for further discussion. 
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human rights, that is, what kinds of harms or abuses should they protect 
us from? What kind of rights are human rights — are they moral claims, 
or legal claims, or political claims, or something else? The question 
of justification asks: on what grounds can we say that people have 
human rights? Is it because humans have rational capacities or agency? 
If so, does that mean that newborn babies do not have human rights? 
All these questions are studied in the vast philosophical literature on 
human rights. 
Note that while the relationship between normative political 
philosophy, justice and human rights is not entirely disputed, the 
dominant view in the contemporary literature is that the domain of 
human rights is a subset of the domain of justice, which in turn is a 
subset of the domain of morality. The reason is that “[n]ot everything 
that is desirable to be realized in politics is a matter of human rights, 
and not everything that is a matter of justice is a matter of human rights. 
Human rights constitute the most urgent demand of basic global justice” 
(Gilabert 2009, 676).
Legal scholars are interested in questions related to the treaties and 
constitutions in which human rights are codified. The idea of human 
rights gained momentum with the 1948 adoption of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which over time received a 
canonical status in legal and political debates. The UDHR subsequently 
served as a template for human rights instruments that are legally 
binding, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
the European Convention on Human Rights, the American Convention 
on Human Rights and the African Charter of Human and People’s 
Rights. One question this raises is to what extent national constitutions 
are consistent with those legally binding treaties, or with the UDHR. 
Another question frequently asked by legal scholars is to what extent 
national jurisprudence can be in tension with — and violate — a human 
right that is part of an international treaty to which that particular 
nation signed up. For example, in the famous ‘Lautsi case’, the question 
emerged whether the Italian state’s policy to have a compulsory crucifix 
in the classroom of public schools was in violation of the human right 
to the freedom of religion as codified in the European Convention on 
Human Rights (Weiler 2010; Pierik 2012; Pierik and van der Burg 2011). 
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In the social sciences and international relations, questions are asked 
about what role human rights play in politics. How do countries differ 
in the degree in which they protect human rights? What are the effective 
instruments that support human rights in countries in which they are 
not violated? Is it effective to condemn human rights violations in other 
countries, or is silent support for grassroots human rights activists a 
more effective strategy? 
Of course, human rights are hugely important for human right 
activists, who are working on actual human rights protections. Other 
activists, such as those focusing on the empowerment of disadvantaged 
groups, often take a more instrumental attitude towards human rights, 
and ask whether such rights are effective instruments to reach their 
goals of inclusion, development and combatting forms of injustice and 
oppression. 
3.14.3 Why a capability-based account of human rights? 
After this brief sketch of the huge literature on human rights, we can 
now explore the relation between human rights and capabilities. The 
first question that needs to be asked is: why would we be at all interested 
in a capabilities-based theory of human rights? What could be gained by 
theorizing human rights, or trying to protect human rights, by referring 
to capabilities? 
The first reason is philosophical, and concerns the justification 
of human rights. Human rights are norms or instruments to protect 
certain valuable things (which are called ‘the objects of human rights’). 
But every time we claim an object is so important its protection must 
be enshrined as a human right, we must argue why that object has this 
special importance. Part of the philosophical literature on capabilities 
does precisely that — to justify why we need to protect certain valuable 
personal states. Both Sen (2004b, 2005) and Nussbaum (1997, 2011a) 
have argued that human rights can be seen as entitlements to certain 
capabilities. However, Sen’s views are more qualified, since he has 
argued that the object of some but not necessarily all human rights 
can be viewed as capabilities. There are plausibly also other objects of 
human rights, such as process freedoms and liberties. 
The second reason builds on the first. If some human rights 
can be understood in terms of capabilities, and poverty can also be 
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conceptualized in terms of the denial of capabilities, then poverty can 
be conceptualized as a human rights violation (Osmani 2005). This is 
important for various reasons, including the strong rhetorical force that 
a human rights violation has in comparison with other claims, and also 
because socio-economic human rights have sometimes been regarded 
as more in need of conceptual foundations, in comparison with the civic 
and political human rights whose status as human rights has been less 
contested. 
This relates to the third reason why it can be helpful to conceptualise 
human rights in terms of capabilities, which is the often-stated worry 
that the protection of human rights, especially social and economic 
rights, is infeasible (Gilabert 2009). To counter that pessimism, we need 
greater clarity on the chain of steps that are involved in socio-economic 
human rights protection. Capabilities are the objects of our rights, and 
we know, from our understanding of how capabilities relate to resources 
and social structures, which parameters can influence the capabilities 
that people enjoy (see the figure in section 2.12). Hence, if we want to 
protect human rights, in particular socio-economic rights, which sceptics 
believe cannot effectively be protected, the capability approach helps 
us see that “promoting socioeconomic rights may require attention 
to specific parameters that affect the capabilities of people” (Gilabert 
2009, 666). In sum, the language of the capability approach helps us to 
respond and address the feasibility worry of socio-economic rights. 
Fourthly, we are unsure whether some things we want to protect 
meet the threshold condition of importance that human rights should 
meet. If one is unsure about whether a certain freedom should be a right, 
let alone a human right, one could already start to protect or enhance it if 
one sees it as a capability. One does not need to wait until the discussion 
about the threshold is settled before one starts to protect something that 
everyone agrees is in any case important. 
A final reason is more practical or political. In some countries, the 
terminology of ‘human rights’ is regarded with suspicion, as it is seen as 
stemming from a colonial era, and, as a consequence, is regarded as an 
instrument of western domination. This makes it hard for both local and 
global advocates of human rights to advance their cause. By using the 
terminology of capabilities, which is not linked to a particular colonial 
era or western power, instead of the language of human rights, these 
same valuable rights can be argued for. 
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3.14.4 Are capabilities sufficient to construct  
a theory of human rights? 
There is quite a lot of interest among capability scholars and those 
working in the human development paradigm to try to bring the best 
of the capability approach and the human rights approach together (e.g. 
Vizard 2006, 2007; Vizard, Fukuda-Parr and Elson 2011; Fukuda-Parr 
2011; Gilabert 2009, 2013). One important question, though, is how much 
the capability approach can offer if one is interested in constructing a 
powerful human rights theory. Is the notion of capabilities sufficient for 
such a theory?
The answer clearly must be negative. A theory of human rights needs 
other elements, such as a discussion of the scope of, and, importantly, 
the justification for, human rights. Yet, by making use of the distinction 
between the capability approach and capability theories that was 
introduced in section 2.3, we can see that it is not at all an embarrassment 
for the capability approach that, by itself, it cannot deliver a theory of 
human rights. Instead, that should be the task of a specific capability 
theory, for which, in the various modules, additional elements that are 
needed for a human rights theory can be added. 
This raises the next question: what would have to be added, then? 
One important thing that may need to be added (in A6  — other 
dimensions of ultimate value) are process freedoms. Sen (2004b) argues 
that we should make a distinction between freedoms as substantive 
opportunities and the process aspect of freedom (procedural aspects). 
Both are, in his view, relevant when thinking about human rights, but 
only the opportunity aspect of freedom is captured by the notion of 
‘capabilities’. Linda Barclay (2016) makes a similar point, by saying that 
rights that concern equitable processes are very important for human rights, 
and cannot be captured by the notion of capabilities. Clearly, procedural 
characteristics, for example those that guarantee a free trial, may not 
necessarily best be understood as capabilities, but perhaps rather more 
as elements of institutional design. Yet as proposition A6 emphasizes, 
not everything that is of crucial importance is a capability. Recall that 
proposition A6 allows us to include other elements of ultimate value, 
and this could incorporate what Sen calls process freedoms.29 In short, by 
29  The example that Barclay gives is the right not to be discriminated against. Barclay 
believes that “to be protected from discrimination” is a very important human 
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seeing a capability-based human rights theory as a capability theory, for 
which various theoretical additions and choices are possible, it becomes 
clear that more is needed than the mere reference to ‘capabilities’. 
Note also that we can, of course, ask the question the other way 
around — what is needed to make a capability theory? — and use the 
human rights framework as the theory of value that is used to make the 
selection of capabilities. This route has been developed by Polly Vizard, 
and has led to the “human rights based capability set” (Vizard 2006, 
2007). 
3.14.5 The disadvantages 
Finally, we need to ask whether there are any disadvantages in using the 
capability approach to further our thinking, policy making and activism 
on human rights, and — ultimately — in letting a capabilities-based 
human rights theory compete with the existing human rights accounts. 
The first thing to note is that there is a long-standing human rights 
discourse that is used by activists all over the world, and often very 
effectively so. Clearly there are costs involved for these activists to 
become familiarized with the capability language. If the human rights 
discourse delivers to them what they need, why would we change it? 
Second, there is a worry about legitimacy. The current human rights 
declarations and treaties have been the result of actual political processes, 
and the treaties were drafted by a large number of people, drawn from 
all over the world. For the capability approach, this is different. Given 
the prominence of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, and also the 
many publications that (wrongly) reduce the capability approach to 
the work by, primarily, Sen and Nussbaum,30 the capability approach 
is much more associated with specific individuals. A capability-based 
human rights theory that is the work of one thinker can never have the 
political leverage that the existing human rights framework has. For the 
right, but cannot plausibly be conceptualized as a capability, since one does not 
have a choice to be discriminated against or not. However, not being discriminated 
against is a functioning, and it is a mistake to think that the capability approach 
holds that we should only focus on capabilities and never on functionings, as was 
argued in section 3.4.
30  Unfortunately, Nussbaum’s (2011c) account of the capability approach only adds to 
that reductive and misleading portrayal of the capability literature (Robeyns 2011, 
2016b; Unterhalter 2013).
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various practices in which human rights are used (creating laws, making 
policy and activism) a capability-based human rights framework can 
therefore never replace the existing human rights framework. 
However, there is, of course, a more fruitful relationship possible, 
and that is to see the two frameworks as complementary rather than 
competitive (Nussbaum 2011a). Note, however, that any merging of 
the two frameworks has to be between a particular capability theory 
and human rights thinking, rather than between the general capability 
approach and human rights thinking.31 A good example of such 
practical work is the UK’s Equality and Human Rights Framework. 
Tania Burchardt and Polly Vizard (2011) used insights from both the 
capability approach and the existing work on human rights to create a 
framework that is used for the monitoring undertaken by the Equality 
and Human Rights Commission in order to meet its legal mandate.32
3.15 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter has been to deepen our understanding of the 
capability approach, by analysing some questions of clarification 
that are often posed, and by reconstructing and synthesizing some 
developments that have taken place in the capability literature over 
time. 
The next chapter will focus on a range of critiques that have been 
put to the capability approach. Of course, it is not always entirely clear 
whether a certain question or debate is purely a matter of clarification, 
or rather a matter of debate and dispute; put differently, there is no neat 
demarcation between the main focus of this chapter and that of the next. 
Still, in this chapter I have tried to be as neutral and even-handed as 
possible in describing the literature, whereas in the next chapter I will 
take a more active role in arguing for or against certain views or claims. 
31  Hence, when Nussbaum (2011a, 24) writes “the CA is a type of human rights 
approach”, we should read this as “Martha Nussbaum’s capability theory is a 
type of human rights approach”. Many other capability theories are, evidently, not 
human rights approaches, and hence the capability approach, as the overarching 
framework, cannot be either. 
32  See https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en
4. Critiques and Debates
4.1 Introduction
In chapter 2 I gave an account of the capability approach that gave us 
a better sense of its necessary core and its scope, as well as describing 
the structure of a capability theory or capability analysis. While that 
account has aimed to be precise and comprehensive, it nevertheless 
raises some further issues. 
Hence, this chapter is focussed on investigating those further 
questions and debates. We will look into the following issues. Section 
4.2 asks whether everything that has been called a capability in the 
literature is genuinely so. Section 4.3 addresses a dispute that has kept 
capability theorists busy for quite a while over the last two decades, 
namely whether a capability theorist should endorse a specific list 
of capabilities. For many years, this was debated under the banner 
‘the question of the list’ and was seen as the major criticism that 
Martha Nussbaum had of Amartya Sen’s work on the capability 
approach. Section 4.4 investigates the relationship between the basic 
needs approach and philosophical theories of needs, and argues that 
the capability scholars may be able to engage more fruitfully with 
theories of needs. Section 4.5 asks whether, as Nussbaum suggests, 
we should understand the capability approach as a theory that 
addresses the government; I will argue that we should reject that 
suggestion and also take other ‘agents of change’ into account. Section 
4.6 analyses a debate that has generated much controversy, namely 
whether the capability approach can be said to be too individualistic. 
The next section, 4.7, focuses on a closely related issue: the scope 
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for the inclusion of ‘power’ into the capability approach. Should the 
capability approach pay much more attention to political economy? 
Section 4.8 asks whether the capability approach is a liberal theory, 
and whether it can be anything other than a liberal theory. Section 4.9 
argues that, despite the many references to ‘the human development 
and capability approaches’, these are not the same thing. Finally, 
section 4.10 discusses the potential and problems of a capabilitarian 
welfare economics.
4.2 Is everything that’s called a capability 
genuinely a capability?
Since this chapter is the place to collect critiques and debates, let me 
start with a very basic point of criticism: not everything that is called 
‘a capability’ in the capability literature is, upon closer examination, 
genuinely a capability. The main criticism that I want to offer in this 
brief section is that we should be very careful in our choices of terms 
and concepts: not everything that is important is a capability, and it 
is conceptually confusing (and hence wrong) to call everything that is 
important a capability. As an interdisciplinary language used in many 
different disciplines, the capability approach already suffers from 
sloppy use of terms because of interdisciplinary differences in their 
usage, and we should avoid contributing to this conceptual confusion. 
Let me give one example to illustrate the critique. 
In her book Allocating the Earth as well as in earlier work, Breena 
Holland (2008, 2014) argues that the role of the environment in making 
capabilities possible is so important and central that we should 
conceptualize environmental ecological functioning (that is, the 
ecosystem services that the environment offers to human beings) as 
a meta-capability that underlies all other capabilities. As Holland puts 
it, “the environment’s ecological functioning is a meta-capability in 
the sense that it is a precondition of all the capabilities that Nussbaum 
defines as necessary for living a good human life” (2014, 112). By 
using this terminology, Holland wants to stress that protecting 
the ecosystem is not just one way among many equally good ways 
to contribute to human wellbeing — rather, it is a crucial and non-
substitutable precondition for living. Yet one could question whether 
conceptualizing it as a “meta-capability” is correct. As I have argued 
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elsewhere (Robeyns 2016a), the environment is not a capability, 
since capabilities are real opportunities for beings and doings. The 
environment and the services that its ecosystems give to human beings 
are absolutely necessary for human life to be possible in the first place, 
but that doesn’t warrant giving it the conceptual status of a ‘capability’. 
It would have been better, in my view, to introduce a term showing that 
there are substitutable and non-substitutable preconditions for each 
capability, and that there are absolutely necessary (or crucial) versus 
less central preconditions. An environment that is able to deliver a 
minimal level of ecosystem services to life on our planet is both a 
non-substitutable as well as an absolutely necessary precondition for 
human wellbeing understood in terms of capabilities. There are many 
other preconditions for human wellbeing, but a minimum level of 
sustainable ecosystem services is one of the very few — perhaps even 
the only one — that is both non-substitutable and absolutely necessary. 
That makes it hugely important — perhaps even more important than 
some capabilities (which could be accommodated by including it in 
proposition A6), but the absolute priority it should receive does not 
warrant us to call it a capability. 
4.3 Should we commit to a  
specific list of capabilities?
At an earlier stage of the development of the capability approach, a 
rather heated debate took place on whether or not it was necessary 
for Sen to list the capabilities he felt were relevant for the issue under 
consideration. This ‘question of the list’ debate wasn’t always very 
helpful, since participants were not making the distinction between 
capability theories and the capability approach, which, as I will show 
in this section, is crucial to answer this question. Several scholars have 
criticized Sen for not having specified which capabilities matter or for 
not giving us some guidelines on how the selection of capabilities could 
be conducted (e.g. Sugden 1993; Roemer 1996; Nussbaum 2003a). As is 
well known, Sen has explicitly refrained from committing himself to 
one particular list of capabilities. But should Sen (or anyone else) do so?
In order to answer that question, it is important to keep the distinction 
in mind between the general capability approach, and particular 
capability theories. As Mozaffar Qizilbash (2012) rightly points out, Sen 
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has written on the capability approach in general and he has developed 
particular capability applications, critiques, and theories. When asking 
whether Sen (or anyone else) should commit to a particular list of 
capabilities, we have to keep that distinction firmly in mind — since it 
is relevant to our answer. 
It is obvious that there cannot be one list that applies to all the different 
purposes for which the capability approach can be used — that is, one 
list that applies to more specific capability theories and applications. 
Hence insofar as it is argued that Sen (or any other capability scholar) 
should endorse a particular list of capabilities when discussing the 
capability approach, rather than more specific capability theories, this 
critique misfires. This is part of the answer that Sen has given to his 
critics. Each application or theory based on the capability approach will 
always require a selection of valuable functionings that fits the purpose 
of the theory or application. Hence the capability approach as such is 
deliberately too underspecified to endorse just one single list that could 
be used for all capability analyses (Sen 1993, 2004). It is quite likely that 
those who have criticised Sen, or the capability approach in general, 
for not entailing a specific list of capabilities, have not sufficiently 
appreciated the distinction between the capability approach in general 
and more specific capability theories. 
But what then about specific capability theories, applications and 
analyses? Should these always commit to a particular list of capabilities? 
It is possible to distinguish between two types of critique addressing 
capability theories, which I labelled the weak and strong critiques 
(Robeyns 2005a). The strong critique entails that there must be a clear 
list of capabilities that we can use for all capability theories and their 
application. 
The strong critique is most clearly voiced by Nussbaum, who has 
proposed a list of ten “central human capabilities” that specify the 
political principles that every person should be entitled to as a matter 
of justice.1 Nussbaum’s capabilities theory differs in a number of ways 
from Sen’s version. Nussbaum (1988, 2003) not only argues that these 
ten capabilities are the relevant ones, but in addition claims that if 
1  These ten capabilities are: Life; Bodily health; Bodily integrity; Senses, imagination 
and thought; Emotions; Practical reason; Affiliation; Other species; Play; and 
Control over one’s environment. For more details, see Nussbaum (2006b, 76–78).
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Sen wants his version of the capability approach to have any bite for 
addressing issues of social justice, he has to endorse one specific and 
well-defined list of capabilities. 
Sen does not accept the stronger critique as it applies to particular 
capability theories. The reason is the importance he attaches to agency, 
the process of choice, and the freedom to reason with respect to the 
selection of relevant capabilities. He argues that theory on its own is not 
capable of making such a final list of capabilities (Sen 2004). Instead, Sen 
argues that we must leave it to democratic processes and social choice 
procedures to define the distributive policies. In other words, when 
the capability approach is used for policy work, it is the people who 
will be affected by the policies who should decide on what will count 
as valuable capabilities for the policy in question. This immediately 
makes clear that in order to be operational for (small-scale) policy 
implementation, the capability approach needs to engage with theories 
of deliberative democracy and public deliberation and participation.
Sen’s response to the strong critique can be better understood by 
highlighting his meta-theoretical views on the construction of theories, 
and theories of justice in particular. One should not forget that Sen is 
predominantly a prominent scholar in social choice theory, which is 
the discipline that studies how individual preferences and interests 
can be combined to reach collective decisions, and how these processes 
affect the distribution and levels of welfare and freedom. Sen published 
ground-breaking work in social choice theory before he started working 
on the capability approach, and he has never ceased to be interested in 
and to contribute to social choice theory.2 Sen’s passion for social choice 
theory is also a very likely explanation for his critique of the dominant 
forms of contemporary theories of justice, which, he argues, focus on 
describing a utopian situation of perfect justice, rather than giving us 
tools to detect injustices and decide how to move forward to a less 
unjust society (Sen 2006, 2009c). 
According to my reading of Sen’s work on capability theories and 
applications, he is not against the selection of dimensions in general, but 
rather (a) against one list that would apply to all capability theories and 
2  Sen was also awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize for his contributions to social 
choice theory and welfare economics. For some of his work on social choice theory, 
see Sen (1970a, 1970b, 1976, 1977b, 1979, 1983, 1986, 1992c, 1999c, 2017).
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applications, and (b) as far as those capability theories and applications 
are concerned, in favour of seriously considering procedural methods 
to decide which capabilities matter. 
However, even if we all accept that view, it doesn’t settle all disputes. 
Even if we agree that a selection of capabilities for, say, a poverty 
evaluation should differ from the selection of capabilities for a theory 
of justice, this still allows for different views on how that selection 
should be made. Some scholars have argued that it should be based on 
normative grounds, in other words based on philosophical reasoning 
and argumentation (Nussbaum 2000; 2006b; Claassen 2016). Others 
have argued for a selection based on a procedural method (Byskov 
2017). For empirical applications, it has been argued that the selection 
of dimensions should be made in a way that minimises biases in the 
selection (Robeyns 2003). For policy-relevant applications, it has been 
argued that the freedoms listed in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights could provide a good starting point, and should plausibly be 
playing a larger role in the selection of capabilities (Vizard 2007; Burchardt 
and Vizard 2011). There are by now various overviews published on 
how to select functionings and capabilities but, interestingly, they 
almost always are limited to a certain type of capability theory, such 
as wellbeing for policy making (Hick and Burchardt 2016; Alkire 2016), 
multidimensional poverty measurement (Alkire 2016; Alkire et al. 
2015), human development projects and policies (Alkire 2002; Byskov 
forthcoming) and theories of justice (Robeyns 2016d). Thus, there are 
a range of arguments pointing out that the selection of capabilities for 
particular capability theories needs to be sensitive to the purpose of the 
theory in question, hence selection is a matter to be decided at the level 
of the individual capability theories, rather than at the more general and 
abstract level of the capability approach (see also Sen 2004a).
4.4 Why not use the notion of needs?
By introducing the concepts of ‘functionings’ and ‘capabilities’, the 
capability approach offers some specific notions of ‘advantage’ and 
provides an ethical framework to guide our actions and institutional 
design. It is also a theoretical framework with clear commitments 
to practice and policy making in the world as it is, not just in some 
hypothetical world or in a stylized model. However, the same can be 
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said of the (basic) needs approach, which was introduced and developed 
much earlier in the landscape of ethical approaches related to wellbeing 
and poverty. Hence, the obvious question to ask is: why not use the 
notion of needs for our theoretical work, and the basic needs approach 
for work on development? 
To answer that question, it makes sense to make a distinction 
between the basic needs approach as it has been used by development 
scholars and policy makers, and the philosophical theories of basic 
needs. Let us look at the basic needs approach first. This is a practice 
and policy oriented approach “that gives priority to meeting people’s 
basic needs — to ensuring that there are sufficiently, appropriately 
distributed basic need goods and services to sustain all human lives at 
a minimally decent level” (Stewart 2006, 14). The basic needs approach 
was a reaction to the development policies that many countries in the 
Global South pursued after independence from colonial rule, and that 
led to a dualistic pattern of development, with a small modern sector 
that allowed some people to flourish while at the same time leaving 
many other people in poverty and unemployment. The fundamental 
claim of the basic needs approach was that the poor not only need a 
monetary income but also some very basic goods and services such as 
clean water, enough food, health services, and education. Given the 
urgency of these needs, the hope was that the requirement to supply 
them would be more readily accepted by governments in both the 
Global South and North than theoretical arguments about inequality 
(Stewart 2006, 15).
In the 1980s, the basic needs approach lost support because 
development donors shifted their attention to the goals of stability 
and adjustment, but when they again started to pay attention to the 
poor, adopting the capability approach, and especially the more policy 
oriented human development paradigm, seemed more attractive. 
However, according to Frances Stewart (2006, 18), when applied to 
the concern of reducing poverty in the Global South, the capability 
approach and the basic needs approach are very similar in terms of the 
actions they recommend. 
Why, then, would anyone consider the capability approach over the 
basic needs approach? The first reason is that the capability approach 
seems to have a more elegant philosophical foundation (Stewart 2006, 
18). However, while its seeming elegance might have been perceived 
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by the basic needs practitioners as a reason for its adoption, the 
question is whether this is true, given that there have always been the 
philosophical theories of needs, to which we turn below. Perhaps the 
answer is pragmatic and points to an advantage of the interdisciplinary 
nature of the capability approach: Sen did not only lay out its theoretical 
foundations, but also, via his empirical work and his contributions to the 
Human Development Reports, translated those philosophical ideas into 
practice. Perhaps it is the case that a philosophical theory needs some 
charismatic thinker who translates it into practice, since otherwise it is 
not picked up by policy makers. In the case of the capability approach, 
Sen did both the philosophical work and the policy translation. 
Another reason mentioned by Stewart is that the capability 
approach focuses more on the situation of individuals than the basic 
needs approach (Stewart 2006, 18). The capability approach doesn’t 
recommend the delivery of the same basic goods to everyone, but rather 
that we take human diversity as much as possible into account. The basic 
needs approach was more broad-brush than the capability approach, 
which stresses the additional resources needed by some people, such 
as the disabled. A third reason is that the capability approach applies 
to all human beings, hence also to the rich, whereas the basic needs 
approach has generally been perceived as focused on poor people 
in poor countries (Streeten 1995, ix). The more inclusive scope of the 
capability approach, which applies to all human beings, resonates with 
an increasing acknowledgement that countries in the Global North 
also include people with low levels of wellbeing, and that ideas of 
development, social progress and prosperity apply to all countries. This 
is very well captured in the case of the Sustainable Development Goals, 
which are goals applicable to all countries. 
Many of the earlier key advocates of the basic need approach 
are pursuing their goals now under the umbrella of the human 
development paradigm. Hence the pragmatic and policy oriented basic 
needs approach has joined the human development paradigm, which 
has become much stronger politically. For policy making, the influence 
of frameworks at a particular point in time is one of the relevant 
considerations whether one should adopt one framework rather than 
another, and hence there is a good reason why, given their pragmatic 
goals, the basic needs advocates have contributed to a joint endeavour 
with capability scholars to set up the human development paradigm. 
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But what about the philosophical theories of basic needs? Are there 
reasons why we should favour them rather than the capability approach? 
The arguments that were given for the pragmatic basic needs approach 
apply also to some extent to the questions of the complementarities 
and differences between the theories. There are, theoretically, close 
similarities between theories of needs and capabilities, and Soran Reader 
(2006) has argued that many of the objections that capability scholars 
have to theories of needs are unwarranted and based on implausibly 
reductionist readings of theories of needs. According to Reader, theories 
of needs and capability theories have much more in common than 
capability scholars have been willing to see. 
Still, Sen has been notorious in arguing that the capability approach 
is superior to the basic needs approach, a critique he has reaffirmed 
in his latest book (Sen 2017, 25). In his paper ‘Goods and people’, 
Sen (1984a, 513–15) criticised the basic needs approach for being too 
focussed on commodities, and seeing human beings as passive and 
needy. Those criticisms were rebutted by Alkire (2002, 166–74), who 
believed they were based on misinterpretations. However, Alkire did 
argue that the other two claims by Sen were correct. First, that the basic 
needs approach confines our attention to the most desperate situations, 
and is therefore only useful to developing countries. Alkire, however, 
sees this as potentially a strength of the basic needs approach; one 
could argue that it helps us to focus our attention on the worst off. Sen’s 
final criticism was, according to Alkire, the one with most theoretical 
bite: that the basic needs approach does not have solid philosophical 
foundations. 
However, the question is whether that is true. A set of recent 
papers by basic needs scholars (Brock and Reader 2002; Reader and 
Brock 2004; Reader 2006) make clear that the philosophical theory of 
basic needs is sophisticated; moreover, several philosophically highly 
sophisticated theories of needs have been proposed in the past, both 
in the Aristotelian tradition but also more recently by contemporary 
philosophers (e.g. Doyal and Gough 1991; Wiggins 1998). Instead, a 
more plausible explanation for the basic needs approach losing ground 
in comparison to the capability approach seems to me that in the case of 
the basic needs approach, there was less interaction between empirical 
scholars and policy makers on the one hand, and philosophers on 
the other. It is hard to find evidence of a clear synergy between basic 
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needs philosophers and basic needs development scholars and policy 
advisors — an interaction that is very present in the capability literature. 
This may explain why the basic needs approach has been seen as lacking 
solid conceptual foundations. 
Yet despite these hypotheses, which may help us understand why 
the capability approach to a large extent replaced the focus on needs in 
the practical field and in empirical research, some genuine differences 
remain. The first difference requires the capability approach to adopt 
some basic distinctions that are fundamental to philosophical needs 
theory, and for which the capability approach in itself does not have 
the resources: the distinction between non-contingent needs on the one 
hand, and contingent needs, desires, wants, etc. on the other hand. Non-
contingent needs are cases in which “the needing being simply cannot 
go on unless its need is met” (Reader and Brock 2004, 252). This relates 
to a more common-sense distinction between ‘needs’ and ‘wants’, that 
has an important relevance to our everyday ethical life and to policy 
making, but that has no equivalent in the capability approach. For 
some applications of the capability approach, such as those related to 
prioritising in conditions of extreme scarcity of resources (whether these 
resources are money, food, water, the right to emit greenhouse gasses, 
etc.) theories of needs can provide tools to guide our moral priorities that 
are lacking in the capability approach. Right now, preferences dominate 
in public decision making, but the concept of preferences cannot make 
a distinction between a preference for minimal amounts of water, food, 
safety, and social interaction, versus a preference for wine and a jacuzzi. 
The preferences-based approach, which has become very dominant in 
ethical theory as well as policy analysis by economists, doesn’t have the 
theoretical resources to make such a distinction, whereas it is central to 
some of our intuitions of how to prioritise our actions in cases of scarcity 
(e.g. J. O’Neill 2011; Robeyns 2017a). 
The second difference follows from the first. The distinction 
in theories of needs between the morally required (meeting non-
contingent or basic needs) and the morally laudable but not required 
(the other needs, wants, desires, etc.) implies that the needs approach 
may have a smaller scope than the capability approach. The modular 
view of the capability approach presented in chapter 2 makes clear that 
the capability approach can be used for a wide variety of capabilitarian 
theories and applications. The basic needs approach is more focussed 
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on situations in which we need to prioritise — but the domain of ethical 
questions is broader than that. 
In conclusion, the basic needs approach in practice is, for pragmatic 
and political reasons, now part of the human development paradigm. 
At the theoretical level, though, capability scholars neglect to take the 
philosophy of needs seriously or to draw on the theoretical resources 
of those theories to strengthen particular capabilitarian theories and 
applications. 
4.5 Does the capability approach  
only address the government?
Some capability scholars believe that the capability approach is a theory 
about public policy or state action. For example, Nussbaum (2011, 19) 
writes that it is an essential element of the (general) capability approach 
that it ascribes an urgent task to government and public policy. In her 
own capabilities theory of justice, Nussbaum makes very clear that she 
sees the government as the actor of change. But is it right to see the 
government as the only agent of change or of justice in the capability 
approach? I think the literature offers ample evidence that this is not 
the case. 
The first thing to note is that, while the dominant view is that 
the capability approach is related to public policy and assumes the 
government as the main or only agent of change, and while Nussbaum 
highlights the government as the actor of change in her account of the 
capability approach in Creating Capabilities, not all capability scholars 
endorse this focus on the government. For example, as Frances Stewart 
(2005, 189) writes: 
Given that improvements in the position of the poor rarely happen solely 
through the benevolence of governments, and are more likely to occur 
because of political and economic pressures, organisation of groups 
among the poor is important — even essential — to achieve significant 
improvements.
The view that the capability approach is government-focussed may thus 
be reinforced by the fact that Nussbaum makes this claim, but other 
capability scholars are developing theories or applications that address 
other agents of change. A prominent example is the work of Solava 
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Ibrahim (2006, 2009) who has shown how self-help initiatives can play a 
crucial role in promoting the capabilities of the poor, by enhancing their 
ownership of development projects, and “overcoming their helplessness 
by changing their perceptions of their own capabilities” (Ibrahim 2009, 
236). Similar research has been conducted in more informal settings 
in Khayelitsha, a South African township, by Ina Conradie (2013). 
These are just two studies that have been published in widely read 
scholarly journals — but there is a broad range of capability theories 
and capability applications that do not, or do not primarily, address 
the government. In conclusion, the first observation is that some of the 
capability literature does not address the government. But can we in 
addition also find reasons for not restricting the agents of change in the 
capability approach to the government? 
The first reason relates to the distinction between the capability 
approach and capability theories and applications, which was introduced 
in section 2.3. As far as we are looking at the capability approach, rather 
than particular capability theories or applications, an exclusive focus on 
the government is clearly unwarranted. There is nothing in module A 
that forces us to see the government as the addressee of our capability 
theory, and module B1 (the purpose of the capability theory) gives us 
the choice between any addressee we would like to pick. One could also 
use the capability approach to analyse what neighbours, in a particular 
street or neighbourhood in a well-functioning democratic state, could 
do for each other and in their common interests, in order to improve 
the quality of life in their neighbourhood. The neighbours may prefer to 
keep the initiative for themselves, and not ask the government to solve 
their local problems. 
Another example of a capability application in which the government 
is not involved at all is the case of parents deciding to which school 
to send their child (assuming they have options to choose from, which 
globally is not the case for many parents). Suppose that parents have 
the choice between two schools. The first school focusses more on 
making pupils ready to excel in their future professional life, endorsing 
a human capital understanding of education. In the other school, there 
is more attention paid to creative expression, learning the virtues of 
cooperating, taking responsibility for oneself, for others and for the 
environment, and a concern with the flourishing of the child as he or 
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she is now, not just as a future adult. Clearly there is a different ideal of 
education in these two school. The parents may sit down and write two 
lists of the pros and cons of the different schools — and many items on 
that list will be functionings or capabilities. Parents choosing between 
these two schools will choose different future capability sets for their 
children. Although the terminology may not be used, capabilities are at 
work in this decision; yet very few people would argue that it is a task 
for the government to decide whether children should be sent to schools 
focussing on human capital training, or rather on human flourishing. 
The scholarship focussing on curriculum design using the capability 
approach, or on making us understand the difference between human 
capital and human capabilities is doing precisely all of this (Brighouse 
2006; Robeyns 2006c; Wigley and Akkoyunlu-Wigley 2006; Walker 2008, 
2010, 2012b). 
Of course, one could respond to these examples by saying that there 
may be capability applications or theories that belong to the private 
sphere and that therefore the government is not the (only) agent of 
change — yet that capabilitarian political theories, such as theories of 
justice, should address the government. 
But this response will not do either. As several political theorists 
have argued, the question of who should be the agents of justice is 
one that needs to be properly discussed and analysed, and it is not 
at all obvious that the primary or only agents of justice should be the 
government (O. O’Neill 2001; Weinberg 2009; Deveaux 2015). There are 
at least three reasons one could give for not giving the government the 
main role as agent of change, or indeed any role at all. The first reason 
is one’s general ideological commitment as regards political systems. 
Anarchism and (right-)libertarian political theories would either give 
the government no agency at all, or else only insofar as property rights 
need to be protected (Nozick 1974). There is nothing in the structure of 
anarchist or libertarian political theories that rules out their adoption 
of functionings and capabilities as (part of) the metric of quality of life 
that should guide the social and economic institutions that we choose 
for our societies. People have very different views on the question of 
what can realistically be expected from a government. Just as we need to 
take people as they are, we should not work with an unrealistic utopian 
account of government. It may be that the capabilitarian ideal society is 
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better reached by a coordinated commitment to individual action or by 
relying on market mechanisms. Adherents of public choice theory would 
stress that giving the government the power to deliver those goods 
will have many unintended but foreseeable negative consequences, 
which are much more important than the positive contributions the 
government could make.3 
A second reason why capabilitarian political theories may not 
see the government as the only, or primary, agent of justice, relates 
to the distinction between ideal theories of justice (which describe 
those normative principles that would be met in a just world, and the 
institutions that would meet those principles) versus non-ideal theory 
(which describes what is needed to reduce injustices in the world in 
which we live).4 In several areas of the world, governmental agents 
are involved in the creation of (severe) economic and social injustice, 
either internationally or against some of its own minorities, or — in 
highly repressive states — against the vast majority of the population 
(e.g. Hochschild 1999; Roy 2014). The government is then more part of 
the problem than part of the solution, and some would argue that it 
is very naive to construct capabilitarian political theories that simply 
assume that the government will be a force for the good (Menon 2002). 
Similarly, some political philosophers have argued that in cases of 
injustice in which the government doesn’t take sufficient action, as in 
the case of harms done by climate change, duties fall on others who are 
in a position to ‘take up the slack’ or make a difference (Karnein 2014; 
Caney 2016). 
The third reason why capabilitarian political theories may not see 
the government as the only, or primary, agent of justice, relates to the 
question of how we decide to allocate the responsibility for being the 
agent of change.5 As Monique Devaux points out, we can attribute 
moral and political agency derived from our responsibility in creating 
the injustice (a position advocated by Thomas Pogge (2008) in his work 
on global poverty) or because of the greater capacities and powers that 
3  For an introduction to the public choice literature, see Mueller (2003).
4  On the distinction between ideal and non-ideal theories of justice, see e.g. Swift 
(2008); Stemplowska (2008); Robeyns (2008a); Valentini (2012).
5  The second and third reasons may sometimes both be at work in an argument to 
attribute agency to a particular group or institutions. 
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agents have, as Onora O’Neill (2001) has advocated. Devaux (2015, 
127–28) argues that in the case of justice related to global poverty, 
the moral agency of the poor stems from their experience of living in 
poverty. This may not only make them more effective as political agents 
in some contexts, but it might also lead to the poor endorsing a different 
political agenda, often focussing on empowerment, rather than merely 
reducing poverty understood in material terms. This is in tune with the 
earlier-mentioned research by Ibrahim (2006, 2009) and Conradie (2013) 
on self-organisation by the poor. 
It has not been my aim in this section to defend a particular way to 
answer the question of who should be the agent(s) of justice. Rather, 
my goal has been much more limited — namely, to show that it is not 
at all self-evident that a capabilitarian political theory, let alone another 
type of capabilitarian theory or application, would always posit the 
government as the only agent of change, or the primary agent of change. 
Pace what Nussbaum (2011) claims on this issue, there is no reason 
why this should be the case, and there are many good reasons why we 
should regard our answer to this question as one that requires careful 
reasoning and consideration — and ultimately a choice that is made in 
module B and module C, rather than a fixed given in module A. 
4.6 Is the capability approach too individualistic?
At the beginning of this century, an often-heard critique at academic 
meetings on the capability approach was that “the capability approach 
is too individualistic”. This critique has been especially widespread 
among those who endorse communitarian philosophies, or social 
scientists who argue that neoclassical economics is too individualistic, 
and believe that the same applies to the capability approach (e.g. Gore 
1997; Evans 2002; Deneulin and Stewart 2002; Stewart 2005). The main 
claim would be that any theory should regard individuals as part of 
their social environment, and hence agents should be recognised 
as socially embedded and connected to others, and not as atomised 
individuals. Very few scholars have directly argued that the capability 
approach is too individualistic, but a few have stated it explicitly. 
Séverine Deneulin and Frances Stewart (2002, 66) write that “the 
[capability] approach is an example of methodological individualism” 
184 Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice
and also add “the individualism of the [capability] approach leads us 
[…] to a belief that there are autonomous individuals whose choices 
are somehow independent of the society in which they live”. But is this 
critique correct? What are we to make of the argument that the capability 
approach is “too individualistic”?6
4.6.1 Different forms of individualism
To scrutinise the allegedly individualistic character of the capability 
approach, we should distinguish between ethical or normative 
individualism on the one hand and methodological and ontological 
individualism on the other. As we already saw in section 2.6.8, ethical 
individualism, or normative individualism, makes a claim about who or 
what should count in our evaluative exercises and decisions. It postulates 
that individuals, and only individuals, are the units of ultimate moral 
concern. In other words, when evaluating different states of affairs, we 
are only interested in the (direct and indirect) effects of those states on 
individuals. Methodological and ontological individualism are somewhat 
more difficult to describe, as the debate on methodological individualism 
has suffered from confusion and much obscurity. Nevertheless, at 
its core is the claim that “all social phenomena are to be explained 
wholly and exclusively in terms of individuals and their properties” 
(Bhargava 1992, 19). It is a doctrine that includes semantic, ontological 
and explanatory individualism. The last is probably the most important 
of these doctrines, and this can also explain why many people reduce 
methodological individualism to explanatory individualism. Ontological 
individualism states that only individuals and their properties exist, and 
that all social entities and properties can be identified by reducing them 
to individuals and their properties. Ontological individualism hence 
makes a claim about the nature of human beings, about the way they 
6  Amartya Sen has responded to their critique by stating that “I fear I do not 
see at all the basis of their diagnosis” (Sen 2002b, 80). As my arguments in this 
section will show, I think Sen is right, because Deneulin’s and Stewart’s critique 
fails to distinguish properly between different types of individualism, including 
methodological individualism (which the capability approach is not) and normative 
individualism (which the capability approach meets, and, as I have argued in 
section 2.6.8, should meet).
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live their lives and about their relation to society. In this view, society is 
built up from individuals only, and hence is nothing more than the sum 
of individuals and their properties. Similarly, explanatory individualism 
is the doctrine that all social phenomena can in principle be explained 
in terms of individuals and their properties.
The crucial issue here is that a commitment to normative 
individualism is not incompatible with an ontology that recognises 
the connections between people, their social relations, and their social 
embedment. Similarly, a social policy focussing on and targeting certain 
groups or communities can be perfectly compatible with normative 
individualism.
As I argued in section 2.6.8, the capability approach embraces 
normative individualism — and this is, for reasons given there, a 
desirable property. However, it also follows from the discussion on the 
importance of structural constraints (section 2.7.5) that the capability 
approach does not rely on ontological individualism. 
Clearly, scholars have divergent (implicit) social theories, and 
hence some attach more importance to social structures than others do. 
Nevertheless, I fail to see how the capability approach can be understood 
to be methodologically or ontologically individualistic, especially since 
Sen himself has analysed some processes that are profoundly collective, 
such as his analysis of households as sites of cooperative conflict (1990a). 
In later work too, he acknowledged persons as socially embedded, as 
the following quote from his joint work illustrates:
The [capability] approach used in this study is much concerned with the 
opportunities that people have to improve the quality of their lives. It 
is essentially a ‘people-centered’ approach, which puts human agency 
(rather than organizations such as markets or governments) at the 
centre of the stage. The crucial role of social opportunities is to expand 
the realm of human agency and freedom, both as an end in itself and 
as a means of further expansion of freedom. The word ‘social’ in the 
expression ‘social opportunity’ […] is a useful reminder not to view 
individuals and their opportunities in isolated terms. The options that a 
person has depend greatly on relations with others and on what the state 
and other institutions do. We shall be particularly concerned with those 
opportunities that are strongly influenced by social circumstances and 
public policy […]. (Drèze and Sen 2002: 6)
186 Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice
Of course, the critique is not only (and also not primarily) about Sen’s 
work, but about the capability approach in general, or about capability 
theories. But the work done by other scholars similarly doesn’t meet 
the criteria for being plausibly considered to be methodologically or 
ontologically individualistic. In general, we can say that the capability 
approach acknowledges some non-individual structures, and for the 
various more specific capability theories, the degree to which they move 
away from methodological or ontological individualism depends on the 
choices made in modules B and C. But whatever those choices are, there 
are already some features in module A that prevent capability theories 
from being methodologically or ontologically individualistic.
4.6.2 Does the capability approach  
pay sufficient attention to groups? 
The critique that the capability approach should focus more on groups 
is often related to the critique that the focus of the capability approach 
is too individualistic, but it is nevertheless a distinct critique. A clear 
example can be found in the work of Frances Stewart (2005), who argues 
that in order to understand processes that affect the lives of people, such 
as violent conflict, one has to look at group capabilities — which she 
defines as the average of the individual capabilities of all the individuals 
in the selected group. The reason we need to focus on these ‘group 
capabilities’ is because they are a central source of group conflict. They 
are thus crucial to understand processes such as violent conflict. 
We will return to Stewart’s specific complaint below, but first 
unpack the general critique that the capability approach doesn’t pay 
enough attention to groups. To properly judge the critique that the 
capability approach does not pay sufficient attention to groups, we need 
to distinguish between a weaker and a stronger version of that claim. 
A stronger version of that claim would be that the capability approach 
cannot pay sufficient attention to groups — that there is something 
in the conceptual apparatus of the capability approach that makes it 
impossible for the capability approach to pay attention to groups. But 
that claim is obviously false, because there exists a large literature of 
research analysing the average capabilities of one group compared to 
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another, e.g. women and men (Kynch and Sen 1983; Nussbaum 2000; 
Robeyns 2003, 2006a) or the disabled versus those without disabilities 
(Kuklys 2005; Zaidi and Burchardt 2005). Capability theorists have 
also written on the importance of groups for people’s wellbeing, like 
Nussbaum’s discussion of women’s collectives in India. Several lists of 
capabilities that have been proposed in the literature include capabilities 
related to community membership: Nussbaum stresses affiliation as 
an architectonic capability, Alkire (2002) discusses relationships and 
participation, and in earlier work I have included social relationships 
(Robeyns 2003). The UNDP (1995, 2004) has produced Human 
Development Reports on both gender and culture, thus policy reports 
based on the capability approach focus on groups.
The weaker claim states that the present state of the literature on the 
capability approach does not pay sufficient attention to groups. I agree 
that contemporary mainstream economics is very badly equipped to 
account for group membership on people’s wellbeing. But is this also 
the case for the capability approach? While some capability theorists 
have a great faith in people’s abilities to be rational and to resist social 
and moral pressure stemming from groups (e.g. Sen 1999b, 2009b), 
other writers on the capability approach pay much more attention to 
the influence of social norms and other group-based processes on our 
choices and, ultimately, on our wellbeing (e.g. Alkire 2002; Nussbaum 
2000; Iversen 2003; Robeyns 2003a). There is thus no reason why the 
capability approach would not be able to take the normative and 
constitutive importance of groups fully into account. Admittedly, 
however, this is a theoretical choice that needs to be made when making 
scholarly decisions in modules B3, B5 and C1, hence we may not agree 
with the assumptions about groups in each and every capability theory. 
If we return to the reasons Stewart gave for a focus on group 
capabilities, we notice that the main reason stated is that analysis 
of group capabilities is needed to understand outcomes. Yet that is 
precisely what the just mentioned capability applications do (since 
they do not only measure group inequalities in capabilities but also try 
to understand them). Those applications also investigate how group 
identities constrain groups to different degrees, or which privileges 
they ensure for certain groups. In my reading of the literature, many 
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capability scholars do precisely this kind of work, and to the extent 
that they do not do so, one important reason is that they are engaging 
in documenting and measuring inequalities, rather than in explaining 
them. The complaint should then be that capability analysis should 
be less concerned with documenting and measuring inequalities, and 
should spend more time on understanding how inequalities emerge, 
are sustained, and can be decreased — but that is another complaint. 
Still, I do think that a consideration of the role of groups in the capability 
approach gives us a warning. To fully understand the importance of 
groups, capability theories should engage more intensively in a dialogue 
with disciplines such as sociology, anthropology, history, and gender 
and cultural studies. This will make the choices of the account of human 
diversity (module B3), the account of structural constraints (module B5), 
and of ontological and explanatory theories (module C1) more accurate. 
Disciplinary boundaries and structures make these kinds of dialogues 
difficult, but there is no inherent reason why this could not be done. 
4.6.3 Social structures, norms and institutions  
in the capability approach
The critique that the capability approach is too individualistic is 
sometimes also put in another way, namely that the capability approach 
should pay more attention to collective features, such as social structures, 
social norms, and institutions. How can the capability approach account 
for such collective aspects of human living?
At the theoretical level, the capability approach does account 
for social relations and the constraints and opportunities of societal 
structures and institutions on individuals in two ways. First, by 
recognising the social and environmental factors which influence the 
conversions of commodities into functionings. For example, suppose 
that Jaap and Joseph both have the same individual conversion factors 
and possess the same commodities. But Jaap is living in a town with 
cycle lanes and low criminality rates, whereas Joseph is living in a city 
with poor infrastructure for cyclists, and with high levels of criminality 
and theft. Whereas Jaap can use his bike to cycle anywhere he wants, at 
any moment of the day, Joseph will be faced with a much higher chance 
that his bike will be stolen. Hence, the same commodity (a bike) leads 
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to different levels of the functioning ‘to transport oneself safely’, due to 
characteristics of the society in which one lives (its public infrastructure, 
crime levels etc).
The second way in which the capability approach accounts for 
societal structures and constraints is by theoretically distinguishing 
functionings from capabilities. More precisely, moving from capabilities 
to achieved functionings requires an act of choice. Now, it is perfectly 
possible to take into account the influence of societal structures and 
constraints on those choices, by choosing a nuanced and rich account 
of agency (module B4  — account of agency) and of societal structures 
(module B5  — account of structural constraints). For example, suppose 
Sarah and Sigal both have the same intellectual capacities and human 
capital at the age of six, and live in a country where education is free 
and children from poorer families receive scholarships. Sarah was born 
in a class in which little attention was paid to intellectual achievement 
and studying, whereas Sigal’s parents are both graduates pursuing 
intellectual careers. The social environment in which Sarah and Sigal 
live will greatly influence and shape their preferences for studying. In 
other words, while initially Sarah and Sigal have the same capability 
set, the social structures and constraints that influence and shape 
their preferences will influence the choice they will make to pick one 
bundle of functionings. The capability approach allows us to take those 
structures and constraints on choices into account, but whether a 
particular capability theory will take that into account depends on the 
choices made in the various modules, especially modules B4 and B5. Yet 
it is clear that the choices made in modules B and C will have ultimately 
far reaching consequences for our capabilitarian evaluations. 
Summing up, one could, plausibly, complain that a certain capability 
theory doesn’t pay sufficient attention to social structures or collective 
features of human life. This may well be a very valid critique of a 
particular capability theory in which the additional theories of human 
diversity, social structures, and other social theories more generally, are 
very minimal (that is, the explanatory and ontological theories added 
in C1 do not properly account for many collective features of life). But I 
have argued that it is not a valid critique against the capability approach 
in general. 
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4.7 What about power and political economy?
In section 4.6, I analysed the critique that the capability approach 
is too individualistic, and argued that this charge is based on a 
misunderstanding of different distinct types of individualism, as well 
as a flawed (and unduly limited) understanding of the potential for 
capability theories to include social structures as factors that explain 
varying levels of advantage between different people. However, there 
are two closely related critiques that must be addressed briefly: first, that 
the capability approach downplays power and social structures, and 
second, that capability theories divert our attention from the political 
economy of poverty and inequality, which is much more important 
than the measurement and evaluation of poverty and inequality. Let us 
analyse these two critiques in turn. 
4.7.1 Which account of power and choice?
The first worry is that the capability approach is insufficiently critical of 
social constraints on people’s actions, and does not pay due attention to 
“global forces of power and local systems of oppression” (Koggel 2003). 
Put differently, the worry is that the capability approach does not pay 
sufficient attention to inequalities in power (Hill 2003). Similarly, there is 
also a worry that the capability approach could be used in combination 
with a stripped-down version of human choice. For example, despite 
Sen’s repeated criticism of choice as revealed preference, one could in 
principle make interpersonal comparisons of functionings that assume 
revealed preference theory: a person will choose from their option 
set what is best for them. But this ignores the fact that our choices are 
heavily influenced by patterns of expectations and social norms,7 as 
well as commitments we have to certain interests that do not necessarily 
affect our own advantage.8 Depending on the choice theory one adopts, 
the capability approach could lead to widely divergent normative 
conclusions (Robeyns 2000; 2001). Standard economics pays very little 
attention to the social and cultural constraints that impinge on people’s 
7  On the importance of social norms in explaining a person’s choice and behaviour, 
see e.g. Elster (1989); Anderson (2000a).
8  On commitment, see e.g. Sen (1977a, 1985b); Cudd (2014).
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choices, in contrast to sociology, gender studies and cultural studies, 
among other disciplines. In political philosophy, one sees a similar split 
between the core of Anglo-American political philosophy, in which the 
concept of the self that is endorsed is that of a rational, autonomous 
agent whose own plans take precedence over things he finds as ‘given’ 
in his life, versus other traditions in philosophy that pay more attention 
to relations and the social embedding of individuals, including unjust 
structures in which one finds oneself, as well as mechanisms that 
reproduce power differences. The consequence is that it is possible to 
use functionings and capabilities as the evaluative space in combination 
with many different normative accounts of choice, with a widely 
divergent critical content.
Take as an example the choices made by men versus women between 
paid (labour market) or unpaid (care and household) work. In all societies 
women do much more household and care work, whereas men do much 
more paid work. Both kinds of work can generate a number of different 
functionings so that the largest capability set might perhaps be reached 
only by giving everyone the opportunity to combine both types of work. 
However, I would argue that in the world today, in which hardly any 
society allows people to combine market work and non-market work 
without having to make significant compromises when it comes to the 
quality of at least one of them, the labour market enables more (and more 
important) functionings than care work. These include psychological 
functionings like increased self-esteem; social functionings like having a 
social network; material functionings like being financially independent 
and securing one’s financial needs for one’s old age or in the event of 
divorce.9 Many schools in political philosophy and normative welfare 
economics have typically seen the gender division of labour as ethically 
unproblematic, in the sense that this division is seen as the result of 
men’s and women’s voluntary choices, which reflect their preferences. 
However, this is an inadequate way of explaining and evaluating this 
division, because gender-related structures and constraints convert 
this choice from an individual choice under perfect information into a 
collective decision under socially constructed constraints with imperfect 
information and asymmetrical risks. Moreover, evaluating the gender 
9  As is also suggested by the empirical findings of Enrica Chiappero-Martinetti 
(2000) who measured achieved functioning levels for Italy.
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division of labour can only be done if we scrutinise the constraints on 
choice, and these may turn out to be very different for men and women.10 
What is crucial for the discussion here is that both positive theories 
of the gender division of labour (which are choices made in modules 
B3, B4, and B5) bear different normative implications. If a housewife 
is held fully responsible for the fact that she works at home then the 
logical consequence would be that she had the capability to work in the 
labour market. However, if we embrace a theory of choice that focuses 
on gender specific constraints, then we will not hold the housewife 
fully responsible for her choice but acknowledge that her capability set 
was smaller and did not contain the possibility for a genuine choice to 
work in the labour market. It seems, thus, that it is perfectly possible to 
apply the capability approach in combination with different accounts of 
gender-specific constraints on choices. 
By giving choice such a central position and making its place in 
wellbeing and social justice evaluations more explicit, the capability 
approach opens up a space for discussions of how certain choices are 
constrained by gender-related societal mechanisms and expectations. 
But again, the capability approach provides no guarantee for this: 
it depends on the choices made in modules B and C. For example, 
conservatives will want to integrate a conservative theory of gender 
relations within the capability approach, whereas for critical scholars it 
will be crucial to integrate a feminist account of gender relations, which 
includes an account of power. No doubt the two exercises will reach 
very different normative conclusions. In short, for scholars who defend 
a theory of human agency and social reality that challenges the status 
quo, one of the important tasks will be to negotiate which additional 
theories will be integrated in further specifications of the capability 
approach, especially the choices made in module C1. 
The conclusion is that the core characteristics of the capability 
approach (as listed in module A) do not necessarily have significant 
implications for the role of power in capability theories and applications, 
which can include widely divergent views on social realities and 
interpersonal relations. Indeed, the fact that the capability approach 
10  The seminal work in this area is Susan Okin’s book Justice, Gender and the Family 
(Okin 1989). On the gendered nature of the constraints on choice, see also Nancy 
Folbre (1994).
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interests both scholars who work in the libertarian tradition, as well as 
scholars who work in more critical traditions, illustrate this conclusion. 
My own personal conviction is that there is ample reason why we 
should not adopt a stripped-down view of the roles of social categories 
and social structures, and hence include a rich account of power that 
is supported by research in anthropology, sociology and other social 
sciences. But for everyone advancing a capability theory or application, 
it holds that they should defend their implicit social theories, and be 
willing to scrutinize them critically.
4.7.2 Should we prioritise analysing  
the political economy?
Capability scholars have been criticised for having the wrong priorities: 
by focusing so much on the metric of justice and on human diversity 
in the conversion of resources into capabilities, their approach 
draws attention away from huge inequalities in terms of resources 
(income, wealth) and therefore helps to preserve the (unjust) status 
quo. Thomas Pogge (2002) has specifically argued that the capability 
approach — Sen’s work in particular — overemphasises the role of 
national and local governments, thereby neglecting the huge injustices 
created by the global economic system and its institutional structures, 
such as global trade rules. Similarly, Alison Jaggar (2002, 2006) has 
argued that western philosophers, and Martha Nussbaum’s work on 
the capability approach in particular, should not prioritise the analysis 
of cultural factors constraining poor women’s lives, or listing what an 
ideal account of flourishing and justice would look like, but rather focus 
on the global economic order and other processes by which the rich 
countries are responsible for global poverty. 
Pogge and Jaggar may have a point in their charge that capability 
theorists have paid insufficient attention to these issues, which have 
been discussed at length in the philosophical literature on global justice. 
But one might also argue that this is orthogonal to the issues about which 
the capability approach to social justice is most concerned, namely, how 
to make interpersonal comparisons of advantage for the purposes of 
social justice. One could, quite plausibly, hold the view that, since most 
capability theorists are concerned with human wellbeing, they should 
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invest their energies in addressing the most urgent cases of injustice, 
investigate their underlying causal processes and mechanisms, and 
concentrate on the development of solutions. Using the modular view 
of the capability approach, this critique boils down to the view that 
we should concentrate on modules outside the core, namely those that 
explain certain unjust structures. 
This is not, however, a valid critique of the capability approach as a 
general framework, nor does it recognise the role that capability theories 
can play in substantive debates about global justice and inequality. 
Rather, the critique should be reformulated to say that the most urgent 
issues of justice do not require theories of justice, but rather a political 
and economic analysis of unjust structures. But then we are no longer 
facing a critique of the capability approach, but rather a critique of our 
research priorities, which goes beyond the scope of this book.11 It is clear 
that the capability approach will not solve all the world’s problems, 
and that we should regard it as a tool to help us in analysing cases that 
need our attention, rather than an intellectual project that has become 
an end in itself for academics. However, it doesn’t follow therefore that 
all scholars developing the capability approach should become political 
economists — or malaria researchers, for that matter. 
4.8 Is the capability approach a liberal theory?
Students of the capability approach often ask whether it is a liberal 
theory — something those who ask that question seem to think is a bad 
thing. Given the various audiences and disciplines that engage with 
the capability approach, there is a very high risk of misunderstandings 
of discipline-specific terms, such as ‘liberal’. Hence, let us answer the 
question: is the capability approach a liberal theory, and if so, in what 
sense?
In many capability theories and applications, including the work by 
Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, there is a great stress on capabilities 
rather than functionings, as well as on agency and the power of people to 
11  Serene Khader (2011, 24–30) faces similar critiques in her study of adaptive 
preferences (rather than the global economic order), and provides a sensible 
response to those worries. 
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shape their own destinies.12 What is ultimately important is that people 
have the freedoms (capabilities) to lead the kind of lives they want to 
lead, to do what they want to do and be the person they want to be. 
Once they have these freedoms, they can choose to act on them in line 
with their own ideas of the kind of life they want to live. For example, 
every person should have the opportunity to be part of a community 
and to practice a religion, but if someone prefers to be a hermit or an 
atheist, they should also have this option. Now, it is certainly true that 
individual freedoms and agency are a hallmark of liberalism. But is this 
enough to conclude that the capability approach, in contrast to specific 
capability theories, is a liberal framework?13 
First, given the interdisciplinary context in which the capability 
approach is operating, it is very important that the word ‘liberal’ is 
not confused with the word ‘liberal’ in daily life. In ordinary language, 
‘liberal’ has different political meanings in different countries, and 
can cover both the political right or left. In addition it is often used to 
refer to (neo)liberal economic policies that prioritise free markets and 
the privatization of public companies such as water suppliers or the 
railways. In contrast, philosophical liberalism is neither necessarily left 
or right, nor does it a priori advocate any social or economic policies. 
The first misunderstanding to get out the way is that capabilities as 
freedoms refer exclusively to the ‘free market’ and thus that the capability 
approach would always lead to an endorsement of (unfettered) markets 
as the institutions that are capabilities-enhancing. Sen does argue that 
people have reason to value the freedom or liberty to produce, buy, and 
sell in markets. This point, however, is part of his more general work on 
development, and it is very different to the highly disputed question in 
economics and politics regarding the benefits and limits of the market 
as a system of economic production and distribution. Functionings 
and capabilities are conceptualizations of wellbeing achievements and 
wellbeing freedoms, and the question of which economic institutions 
are the best institutional means to foster functionings and capabilities 
12  Sen’s work on identity testifies to the great faith he puts in people’s power to choose 
whether or not to adopt certain group memberships and identities. See e.g. Sen 
(2009b).
13  In earlier work, I argued that on those grounds we could conclude that the capability 
approach is a liberal theory. I now think this conclusion was premature. 
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is both analytically and politically a question that can only be settled 
after we first agree what economic outcomes we should be aiming for: a 
question to which the capability approach gives a (partial) answer. 
The question of what are the appropriate institutions to lead to 
capability expansions is a separate one, which cannot be answered by 
the capability approach in itself; it must be coupled with a political 
economy analysis. However, there is nothing in the (limited) literature 
that has undertaken this task so far to suggest that a capability analysis 
would recommend unfettered markets — quite the contrary, as the 
work by Rutger Claassen (2009, 2015) shows: capabilities theories give 
reasons for regulating markets, and for constraining property rights. 
In sum, if the word ‘liberal’ is used to refer to ‘neoliberalism’ or to 
‘economic liberalization policies’, then neither the capability approach 
in general, nor Sen and Nussbaum’s more specific theories, are liberal 
in that sense. 
Yet I believe it is correct to say that Sen and Nussbaum’s writings 
on the capability approach are liberal in the philosophical sense, which 
refers to a philosophical tradition that values individual autonomy 
and freedom.14 However, even philosophical liberalism is a very broad 
church, and Sen and Nussbaum’s theories arguably participate in a 
critical strand within it, since the explanatory theories that they use in 
their capability theories (that is, the choices they make in module C1), 
are in various ways aware of social structures. 
Third, while the particular capability theories advocated by Sen 
and Nussbaum aspire to be liberal, it is possible to construct capability 
theories that are much less so. Take a capability theory that opts in 
module C1 for (1) a highly structuralist account of social conditions, 
and (2) theories of bounded rationality, that place great emphasis on 
people’s structural irrationalities in decision-making. In module C4, the 
theory accepts some degree of paternalism due to the acknowledgement 
of bounded rationality in decision-making. Similarly, one could have a 
capability theory of social justice that argues that the guiding principle 
in institutional design should be the protection of the vulnerable, rather 
14  Nussbaum (2011b, 2014) has written explicitly on the type of liberalism that her 
capabilities approach endorses: political liberalism. For arguments that Nussbaum’s 
capability approach is, upon closer scrutiny, not politically liberal but rather 
perfectionist liberal, see Barclay (2003), and Nussbaum (2003b) for a response. 
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than the maximal accommodation of the development of people’s 
agency. Such theories would already be much less liberal. 
Is it possible for capability theories to be non-liberal? This would 
probably depend on where exactly one draws the line between a liberal 
and a non-liberal theory, or, formulated differently, which properties 
we take to be necessary properties of a theory in order for that theory 
to qualify as ‘liberal’. The capability approach draws a clear line at 
the principle of each person as an end, that is, in the endorsement of 
normative individualism. The principle of normative individualism is 
clearly a core principle of liberal theories. Yet it is also a core principle 
of some non-liberal theories that do not give higher priority to agency 
or autonomy (e.g. capability theories that merge insights from care 
ethics, and which give moral priority to protecting the vulnerable 
over enhancing and protecting agency). However, if a theory endorses 
functionings and/or capabilities as the relevant normative metric, yet 
violates the principle of each person as an end, it would not only not 
qualify as a liberal theory, but it would also not qualify as a capability 
theory. At best, it would qualify as e.g. a hybrid capabilitarian-
communitarian theory.
4.9 Why ‘human development’ is  
not the same idea
Some believe that the terms ‘human development approach’ and ‘the 
capability approach’ are synonymous, or else scholars talk about the 
‘capability and human development approach’. Although I will argue 
that this usage is misleading, the equation of ‘human development’ 
with ‘capability approach’ is often made. Why is this the case? And is 
that equation a good thing?
First, the Human Development Reports and their best-known 
index, the Human Development Index, have been vastly influential in 
making the case for the capability approach, and in spreading the idea 
of ‘functionings’ and ‘capabilities’ both inside and outside academia 
(UNDP 1990). In other words, one of the main series of publications 
within the human development approach, and the corresponding 
analyses and indexes, is arguably one of the most politically successful 
applications of the capability approach. However, it doesn’t follow from 
this that they are the same thing.
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A second possible explanation for this misleading equation is that 
both the international association and the current name of the main 
journal in the field have merged both terms: the Human Development 
and Capability Association (HDCA) and the Journal of Human Development 
and Capabilities. This seems to suggest that ‘human development’ and 
‘capabilities’ necessarily go together. But this need not be the case: the 
use of a particular title doesn’t make the two things the same (and in a 
moment, I will give a few examples in which this isn’t the case). 
Thirdly and most importantly, the equation of ‘human development 
approach’ and ‘capability approach’ shouldn’t be surprising because 
human development aims to shift the focus of our evaluation of the 
quality of life and the desirability of social arrangements, from material 
resources or mental states to people’s functionings and capabilities. The 
capability approach is thus a central and indispensable element of the 
human development paradigm. 
Finally, one may believe that the two terms are equivalent given that 
some influential authors in the capability literature equate the two terms, 
or merge them into one idea (Alkire and Deneulin 2009a, 2009b; Fukuda-
Parr 2009; Nussbaum 2011). Let me highlight two examples. Sabina Alkire 
and Séverine Deneulin (2009a, 2009b) do not distinguish between the 
reach of the capability approach and the human development approach; 
instead, they merge them into one term, “the human development and 
capability approach”. More recently, Martha Nussbaum (2011) has 
written on the distinction in her Creating Capabilities. Nussbaum has 
suggested that ‘human development approach’ is mainly associated, 
historically, with the Human Development Reports, and that the term 
‘capability approach’ is more commonly used in academia. Nussbaum 
prefers the term ‘capabilities approach’ since she also likes to include 
non-human animals in her account. However, for those of us, like 
me, who are using the capability approach to analyse and evaluate 
the quality of life as well as the living arrangements of human beings, 
this is not a valid reason to make the distinction between ‘the human 
development approach’, and ‘the capability approach’. 
So, should we use ‘human development approach’ and ‘capability 
approach’ as synonyms, and merge them together into ‘the human 
development and capability approach’? I believe we shouldn’t. I think 
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there are at least four valid reasons why we should make a distinction 
between the two ideas. 
The first reason is historical: while the capability approach has 
been very important in the development of the human development 
paradigm, the human development paradigm has derived insights 
and concepts from several other theories and frameworks. Human 
development has been defined as “an expansion of human capabilities, 
a widening of choices, an enhancement of freedoms and a fulfilment 
of human rights” (Fukuda-Parr and Kumar 2003, xxi). There are 
important historical ideas in the human development paradigm that 
are to a significant extent based on Sen’s capability approach. And Sen 
was closely involved in the development of the Human Development 
Reports that have been key in the maturing of the human development 
paradigm. Yet as some key contributors to this paradigm have rightly 
pointed out, it had other intellectual roots too, such as the basic needs 
approach (Streeten 1995; Fukuda-Parr 2003; Sen 2003a). 
The second reason is intellectual. The capability approach is used for 
a very wide range of purposes, as the account I presented in chapter 2 
makes amply clear. These include purposes that are only tangentially, or 
very indirectly, related to human development concerns. For example, 
the philosopher Martin van Hees (2013) is interested in the structural 
properties of capabilities, especially how the formal analysis of rights 
fits into the capability concept. This research allows us to see how 
capabilities, as a concept, would fit in, and relate to, the existing literature 
on the structure of rights. But it would be a big stretch to say that this is 
also a contribution to the human development literature; in fact, I would 
find such a statement an implausible inflation of what we understand 
by ‘human development’. Rather, it is much more plausible to say that 
the study by Van Hees is a contribution to the capability literature, but 
not to the human development literature. If we were wrongly to equate 
the capability approach with the human development paradigm, this 
would create problems for understanding such a study as part of the 
capability approach. 
The third reason is practical. Those who have written about the 
human development paradigm stress that ‘development’ is about all 
people and all countries, and not only about countries which are often 
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called ‘developing countries’, that is, countries with a much higher 
incidence of absolute poverty, and often with a less developed economic 
infrastructure. For example, Paul Streeten (1995, viii) writes: 
We defined human development as widening the range of people’s 
choices. Human development is a concern not only for poor countries and 
poor people, but everywhere. In the high-income countries, indicators of 
shortfalls in human development should be looked for in homelessness, 
drug addiction, crime, unemployment, urban squalor; environmental 
degradation, personal insecurity and social disintegration.
The inclusion of all human beings within the scope of ‘human 
development thinking’ is widely endorsed within human development 
scholarship and policy reports. However, it is also a matter of fact that 
most people, including policy makers, associate the term ‘development’ 
not with improvements to the lives of people living in high-income 
countries. This is unfortunate, but it is a fact one needs to reckon with. In 
high-income countries, some of the terms often used for what could also 
be called ‘human development interventions’ are ‘policies’, ‘institutional 
design’, or ‘social transformations’. While it is laudable to deconstruct 
the term ‘development’, at the same time we should be careful about 
using words that would lead to scholars and policy makers in high-
income countries to neglect the capability approach if they (mistakenly) 
believe that it is a framework only suitable for ‘developing countries’ (as 
they would use the term). 
The final reason is political. There are many capability scholars 
who would like to develop an alternative to neoliberalism, or, more 
specifically when it concerns development policies, to the ‘Washington 
consensus’. While more sophisticated analyses of both doctrines have 
been put forward, both doctrines focus on private property rights; the 
primacy of markets as an allocation mechanism; the focus in macro-
economic policies on controlling inflation and reducing fiscal deficits; 
economic liberalisation with regard to free trade and capital flows; 
and, overall, restricted and reduced involvement of governments in 
the domestic economy, such as markets in labour, land and capital (the 
so-called ‘factor markets’) (Gore 2000; Fukuda-Parr 2003; McCleery and 
De Paolis 2008). The ‘Washington consensus’ refers to the development 
 2014. Critiques and Debates
policy views propagated by the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (two international institutions based in Washington, 
D.C., hence its name). The ideas of the Washington consensus spread in 
the 1980s and were endorsed as the consensus view by the IMF and the 
World Bank by 1990, and they dominated for at least two decades. Over 
the last decade, neoliberalism and the Washington consensus have been 
heavily criticised from many different corners, and there is a renewed 
recognition of the importance of considering the historical, cultural 
and institutional specificity of countries when deciding what good 
development policies look like; but it seems too early to conclude that 
any of those alternative views is now more influential then neoliberalism 
and the Washington consensus. Many citizens, scholars, policy makers 
and politicians are searching for alternatives, and some hope that the 
capability approach can offer such an alternative.
My suggestion would be that if one’s goal is to develop a powerful 
alternative to neoliberalism and the Washington consensus, one has to 
look at the human development paradigm, rather than the capability 
approach. The human development paradigm includes many specific 
explanatory theories that stress the importance of historical paths and 
local cultural and social norms in understanding development outcomes 
and options in a particular country. The human development paradigm 
is, therefore, much more powerful than the capability approach for this 
specific purpose. 
Recall the modular view of the capability approach that I presented 
in chapter 2. The human development paradigm is a capabilitarian 
theory or capability application, because it endorses all the elements 
from module A. In addition, it has made particular choices in modules 
B, such as a strong notion of agency (B3) as well as an elaborate account 
of social structures (B4), and, importantly, it has chosen anti-neoliberal 
ontological accounts of human nature and explanatory theories about 
how the economy and societies work (C1), as well as the endorsement 
of additional normative principle and social ideals (C4) such as human 
rights and ecological sustainability. Hence the human development 
paradigm is much more powerful as a policy paradigm than the 
capability approach, since it is much more comprehensive (taking 
many more aspects into account then merely people’s functionings and 
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capabilities) and it is much more powerful in policy or political terms 
(being informed about what works and what doesn’t). 
In sum, I think it is not correct to equate the capability approach 
and the human development approach. The two are theoretically and 
historically related, but they are not exactly the same. For those who work 
within development studies and are endorsing a critical assessment of 
the development policies that have been pursued as part of the so-called 
‘Washington consensus’, it is understandable that the two may seem to 
be the same, or at least so close that they can be merged. But that is only 
if one looks at the two notions from a specific perspective. Merging the 
two would do injustice to the work of other thinkers using the capability 
approach, and it would also ultimately hamper the development of the 
capability approach over its full scope. 
4.10 Can the capability approach  
change welfare economics?
Of all the (sub)disciplines where the capability approach is relevant, 
welfare economics may well be the one where it is most difficult 
to describe its impact. The reason is that the capability approach 
could be seen in two very different lights, depending on one’s own 
position towards the current state of economics: either as an improved 
modification of mainstream welfare economics, or else as a path that 
could lead us to a very different type of welfare economics, which would 
radically break with some mainstream assumptions and practices. 
One could say that the welfare economists interested in the capability 
approach have two very different agendas: the first group only wants 
some changes in the normative focus, and possibly in some of the 
ontological and behavioural assumptions in the theory development, 
but no methodological or meta-theoretical changes, whereas the second 
group wants a paradigm change or a scientific revolution, in which there 
would be meta-theoretical and methodological pluralism (module B7) 
and much richer or thicker accounts of human agency (module B3) and 
structural constraints (module B5). In addition, it makes a difference 
whether we analyse the possibilities for a capabilitarian theoretical 
welfare economics or for a capabilitarian empirical welfare economics. 
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4.10.1 Welfare economics and the economics discipline
Before analysing the reach and limit of the capability approach in 
these various endeavours, a few general comments are in order 
about economics in general, and welfare economics in particular. 
Let us first ask: what is welfare economics? As Sen (1996, 50) writes, 
“Welfare economics deals with the basis of normative judgements, 
the foundations of evaluative measurement, and the conceptual 
underpinnings of policy-making in economics”. While, in practice, 
much of the economics discipline is concerned with policy advice, 
welfare economics is nevertheless a small subfield of economics, and 
is by some prominent welfare economists seen as unduly neglected 
or marginalised by mainstream economics (Atkinson 2001). One 
important reason is that welfare economics makes explicit the inevitable 
normative dimensions of economic policy analysis and evaluations, 
and most economists have been socialised to believe that ‘modern 
economics’ is value-free, and that anything to do with normativity can 
be outsourced to ethics or to a democratic vote. In reality, however, the 
imaginary science-value split that mainstream economists would wish 
for is, for many economic questions, impossible (Reiss 2013; Hausman, 
McPherson and Satz 2016). It would therefore be much better to face 
this inevitability upfront, and understand economics as a moral science 
(Boulding 1969; Atkinson 2009; Shiller and Shiller 2011) rather than as 
applied mathematics or a form of value-free modelling. But in economics, 
as in any other discipline, there are complicated sociological processes 
conveying views about authority and status, as well as unexamined 
beliefs about what ‘good science’ is and which type of objectivity is most 
desirable: one is not born an economist, but becomes one through one’s 
training, which is in part also a socialisation process (Colander and 
Klamer 1987; McCloskey 1998; Nelson 2002). Unfortunately, there is 
empirical evidence that many economists are unwilling to engage with 
these fundamental questions and hold on to the belief that economics 
is superior to other social sciences and has little to learn from other 
disciplines (Fourcade, Ollion and Algan 2015). Many economists who 
are interested in economic questions but are not endorsing the myth 
of value-free social science, or who crave more methodological and 
meta-theoretical freedom, have left for another discipline that offers 
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them those liberties.15 After all, economists do not have a monopoly on 
economic topics, and there are many questions about such topics that 
are analysed by economic sociologists, economic historians, political 
economists, economic geographers, and economic philosophers. In my 
view, one cannot analyse the reach and limits of the capability approach 
in welfare economics if one does not acknowledge the high levels of 
discontent and methodological conservatism within economics, which 
cannot be found in any other discipline that engages with the capability 
approach. 
With this background in mind, we can now proceed to ask whether 
the capability approach can make a difference to welfare economics. 
First, in section 4.10.2, we will look at the main theoretical contribution 
of the capability approach to welfare economics: its contribution to the 
development of non-welfarist welfare economics. In section 4.10.3 we 
will analyse what kind of empirical analyses a capabilitarian welfare 
economics could make, and what its challenges and possibilities are. 
Finally, in section 4.10.4, we analyse what challenges the development 
of a heterodox capabilitarian welfare economics would face. 
4.10.2 Non-welfarism
The main theoretical contribution of the capability approach is that 
it contributes to the development of post-welfarism or non-welfarism in 
welfare economics. Welfarism is the position that social welfare depends 
exclusively on individual utilities, which are either understood in a 
hedonic or in a desire-satisfaction sense, and this has been the dominant 
position in economics for a long time. Post-welfarism broadens the 
informational basis of interpersonal comparison with non-utility 
information, such as deontic rights, or objective information such as 
people’s functionings and capabilities. In a series of publications, Sen 
has offered strong theoretical arguments to move from welfarism to 
non-welfarism (sometimes also called ‘post-welfarism’) and has inspired 
other welfare economists to work on a post-welfarist welfare economics 
15  There are plenty of academic economists who have moved to history, development 
studies or philosophy in order to enjoy the greater methodological and paradigmatic 
freedoms in those disciplines. 
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(e.g. Gaertner and Xu 2006, 2008; Gotoh and Yoshihara 2003; Gotoh, 
Suzumura and Yoshihara 2005; Pattanaik 2006; Pattanaik and Xu 1990; 
Suzumura 2016; Xu 2002). Some reasons for this move are the same as the 
arguments against desire-satisfaction theories or the happiness approach 
that we reviewed earlier in sections 3.7 and 3.8. Another argument is 
that relevant information is left out of the informational basis. If two social 
states have exactly the same utility levels, but social state A has also 
a set of legal and social norms that discriminate against one group of 
people, whereas in social state B, the principles of moral equality and 
non-discrimination are protected, then surely, we should prefer social 
state B over social state A. But welfarism, because of its exclusive focus 
on utilities, is unable to take any type of non-utility information into 
account, whether it is the violation of deontic principles, information on 
rights, liberties and justice, or information on inefficient or unsustainable 
use of common resources. Many of the welfare economists who have 
embarked on the development of a post-welfarist welfare economics 
have focussed on the importance of freedom as an important part of the 
widening of the informational basis. 
Non-welfarist welfare economics requires some changes to our 
approach to welfare economics. As Sen (1996, 58) noted in his discussion 
of the contribution of the capability approach to non-welfarist welfare 
economics, if we move to an informational basis with multiple 
dimensions of different types (as in the capability approach) then this 
requires explicit evaluations of the different weights to be given to the 
contributions of the different functionings and capabilities to overall 
(aggregate) social welfare. For Sen, the way to proceed is by public 
reasoning about those weights. This should probably not be seen as the 
only and exclusive way to determine them, since not all work in welfare 
economics is suited for public discussion — for example, it often entails 
desk-studies of inequalities or the analysis of the welfare effects of certain 
policy measures, and it is practically impossible to organise an exercise 
of public reasoning for every desk study that welfare economists make. 
Luckily, as the survey by Decancq and Lugo (2013) shows, there are 
various weighting systems possible that can give us the weights that are 
needed if one wants to aggregate the changes in different functionings 
and capabilities. For example, Erik Schokkaert (2007) has suggested that 
we derive the weights of the functionings from the contribution they 
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make to the life-satisfaction of people, after those weights are cleaned of 
ethically suspicious information. 
However, as we saw in section 4.10.1, many (possibly most) 
economists are unwilling to engage in explicit evaluations, since they 
believe in the science/value split and believe that economics can be 
value-free. This makes it harder for welfare economics to engage in such 
normative work, since they run the risk that their peers will no longer 
accept their approach as ‘economics research’. But it is inconsistent to 
reject all explicit evaluative exercises. Economists are happy working 
with GNP per capita and real income metrics as proxies of welfare, 
which uses market prices as the weights. But this is equally normative: 
it is assumed that the welfare-value of a certain good for a person is 
reflected by the price that the good commands on the market. This is 
problematic, for reasons that have been explained repeatedly in the 
literature. For one thing, market prices reflect demand and supply 
(and thus relative scarcity of a good) — diamonds are expensive and 
water (in non-drought-affected places) is cheap — but this doesn’t say 
anything about their importance for our wellbeing. Moreover, market 
prices do not take into account negative or positive welfare effects on 
third parties, the so-called externalities, despite their omnipresence 
(Hausman 1992).
Of course, it may be that, upon reflection of the various weights 
available, some capability theorists will conclude that the set of 
market prices, possibly combined with shadow prices for non-market 
goods, is the best way to proceed. That is quite possible, and would 
not be inconsistent with the general claim in the capability approach 
that weights need to be chosen. The point is rather that the choice of 
weights needs to be done in a reflective way, rather than simply using the 
weighing scheme that is dominant or customary. I take it that this is the 
point Sen is trying to make when he argues that “Welfare economics is 
a major branch of ‘practical reason’” (Sen 1996, 61).16
16  Note also that for welfare economists, an important concern in examining and 
developing a capabilitarian welfare economics will be the question of how it can be 
formalized. On formalizations of the capability approach, see Sen (1985a); Kuklys 
and Robeyns (2005); Basu and López-Calva (2011); Bleichrodt and Quiggin (2013).
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4.10.3 Empirical possibilities and challenges
When Amartya Sen introduced the capability approach in economics, 
there was some scepticism about its potential for empirical research. For 
example, Robert Sugden (1993, 1953) famously wrote: 
Given the rich array of functionings that Sen takes to be relevant, given 
the extent of disagreement among reasonable people about the nature 
of the good life, and given the unresolved problem of how to value 
sets, it is natural to ask how far Sen’s framework is operational. Is it 
a realistic alternative to the methods on which economists typically 
rely — measurement of real income, and the kind of practical cost-benefit 
analysis which is grounded in Marshallian consumer theory?
What Sugden and other early welfare economic critics of the capability 
approach, such as John Roemer (1996, 191–93) were looking for, is 
a theory that is fully formalised and provides a neat algorithm to 
address questions of evaluation and/or (re-)distribution, resulting in 
a complete ranking of options. That requires two things: first, to be 
able to put the capability approach in a fully formalized model which 
can be econometrically estimated. This requires us to move beyond 
the welfare economic models as we know them, and may also require 
the collection of new data (Kuklys 2005). In addition, it requires us to 
accept that the different dimensions (functionings and/or capabilities) 
are commensurable, that is, have a common currency that allows us to 
express the value of one unit of one dimension in relation to the value 
of one unit of another dimension. One-dimensional or aggregated 
evaluative spaces are, ultimately, a necessary condition for conducting 
empirical work in contemporary mainstream welfare economics. Yet 
there may well be a trade-off between the number of dimensions and the 
informational richness of the evaluative space on the one hand, and the 
degree to which the theory can be formalised and can provide complete 
orderings of interpersonal comparisons on the other hand. Some 
welfare economists are working on the question of how to aggregate 
the many dimensions such that one has, in the end, one composite 
dimension to work with, but it should be obvious that this is not the 
only way to develop capabilitarian welfare economics. The alternative 
is to stick to the view that wellbeing is inherently multidimensional, 
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which requires other methods and techniques that allow for fuzziness, 
vagueness and complexity (Chiappero-Martinetti 2008, 2000, 1994, 2006; 
Clark and Qizilbash 2005; Qizilbash and Clark 2005). One could also 
advance work on dominance rankings or incomplete rankings, which 
Sen has been defending in his social choice work for several decades 
(e.g. Sen 2017). As a consequence, there are several ways to develop a 
capabilitarian welfare economics, and to make the capability approach 
“operational” (Atkinson 1999, 185).
Sugden’s objection can be best answered by looking at the applications 
that have already been developed, and which have been listed in 
several overviews of the empirical literature (e.g. Kuklys and Robeyns 
2005; Robeyns 2006b; Chiappero-Martinetti and Roche 2009; Lessmann 
2012).17 However, whether the applications discussed in those surveys 
satisfy the critics depends on what one expects from empirical work in 
capabilitarian welfare economics. As was already shown in chapter 1, 
empirical applications of the capability approach do make a substantive 
difference to research using other normative frameworks, such as 
income-based metrics. But from that it doesn’t follow that capabilitarian 
welfare economics will be able to deliver alternatives for each and every 
existing welfarist study in economics. It may well be that sometimes the 
informational riches of the capability approach clash with requirements 
regarding measurability that certain empirical applications put upon 
the scholar. 
4.10.4 Towards a heterodox capabilitarian  
welfare economics?
In the last two sections, we discussed how the capability approach can 
make a difference to contemporary welfare economics both theoretically 
and empirically. Those debates by and large stay within the mainstream 
of contemporary welfare economics, even though as Amartya Sen (1996, 
61) notes, they require us “to go more and more in these pluralist and 
17  In addition to the first, rather rough empirical application in the Appendix of Sen’s 
(1985a) Commodities and Capabilities, the literature on empirical applications in 
welfare economics that used individual-level data started off with the paper by 
Schokkaert and Van Ootegem (1990), in which they showed that unemployment 
benefits may restore an unemployed person’s income level, but do not restore all of 
her functionings to the level they were at before she become unemployed. 
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heterodox directions, taking note of a variety of information in making 
the wide-ranging judgements that have to be made”. The reference 
to ‘heterodoxy’ that Sen makes here is limited to the informational 
basis of evaluations, yet in other work he has challenged some of the 
behavioural assumptions underlying mainstream welfare economics 
(e.g. Sen 1977a, 1985b). However, other economists believe that we need 
a much more radical heterodox and pluralist turn in economics, which 
would also affect meta-theoretical views, the range of methods that can 
be used (e.g. including qualitative methods), giving up on the belief that 
economics can be value-free, and engaging much more — and much 
more respectfully — with the other social sciences, and indeed also with 
the humanities. What can these heterodox economists expect from the 
capability approach? 
The answer to that question flows from the description of the 
state of economics that was given in section 4.10.1. The unwillingness 
of mainstream welfare economics to genuinely engage with other 
disciplines (Fourcade, Ollion and Algan 2015; Nussbaum 2016) clashes 
with the deeply interdisciplinary nature of the capability approach. The 
modular view of the capability approach that was presented in chapter 2 
makes it possible to see that a heterodox capabilitarian welfare economics 
is certainly possible. It could not only, as all non-welfarist welfare 
economics does, include functionings and/or capabilities as ends in the 
evaluations (A1) and possibly include other aspects of ultimate value 
too (A6), but it could also include a rich account of human diversity 
(B3), a richly informed account of agency and structural constraints 
(B4 and B5) and it could widen its meta-theoretical commitments 
(B7) to become a discipline that is broader and more open to genuine 
interdisciplinary learning. Yet the modular account also makes it very 
clear that mainstream welfare economists can make a range of choices 
in those modules that are more in line with the status quo in current 
welfare economics, which would result in a very different type of 
capabilitarian welfare economics. 
In short, while both types of capabilitarian welfare economics will 
depart in some sense from welfarist welfare economics, we are seeing 
the emergence of both mainstream capabilitarian welfare economics and 
heterodox capabilitarian welfare economics. The problem for the first 
is that it will have few means of communication with other capability 
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theories, since it does not adopt many of the interdisciplinary choices 
that most other capability theories make. The problem for the latter is 
that it will not be taken seriously by mainstream economics, since it 
does not meet the narrow requirements of what counts as economics 
according to the vast majority of mainstream economists. Taking 
everything together, a capabilitarian welfare economics is possible, 
but (a) it will be harder to develop the capability approach in welfare 
economics than in some other disciplines because of the methodological 
and meta-theoretical clashes and restrictions, and (b) the difficult 
position that welfare economics occupies within mainstream economics 
will become even more challenging, since moving in the direction of the 
capability approach conflicts with the criteria that the gatekeepers in 
mainstream economists impose on anyone who wants to do something 
considered ‘economics’. This may also explain why there is much less 
work done in welfare economics on the capability approach, compared 
to some other disciplines or fields in which the capability approach has 
made a much bigger impact. 
4.11 Taking stock 
In this chapter, we have engaged with a range of critiques that have 
been voiced about the capability approach, or debates that have 
developed in the capability literature. While I hope that I have been 
fair in representing all viewpoints, I have in many cases argued for a 
particular way of looking at the problem, and in a significant number of 
cases argued that critiques must be reformulated in order to be sound, 
or did not sufficiently appreciate the modular structure of the general 
capability approach or the distinction between the capability approach 
and capability theories. Several of the critiques presented in this chapter 
had bite as a critique of a particular type of capability theory, but not of 
the capability approach in general. 
The next and final (and very short!) chapter will not provide a 
summary of the previous chapters, but rather offer some thoughts and 
speculations on what the future of the capability approach could look 
like, which issues will need to be addressed to unlock its full potential, 
and which limitations will always need to be reckoned with. 
5. Which Future for the 
Capability Approach?
In the last two decades, much time and intellectual energy has been spent 
on trying to answer some basic questions about the capability approach. 
What difference does it make to existing normative frameworks? Can 
it really make a difference to welfare economics as we know it? How 
should we select capabilities, and how should these dimensions be 
aggregated? Is the capability approach not too individualistic? Can 
it properly account for power? And can it properly account for the 
importance of groups and the collective nature of many processes that 
are crucial for people’s capabilities? 
I believe that many of the debates that kept capability scholars busy 
in the last two decades have been settled, and we can move to another 
phase in developing the capability approach and using it to study 
the problems that need addressing. As many capability scholars have 
acknowledged (sometimes implicitly) for a very long time, and as this 
book has illustrated in detail, there are a variety of capability theories 
possible. As a consequence, one capability theory does not need to be 
a direct rival of another capability theory: we do not necessarily need 
to choose between them, and it will often be a mistake to see them 
as rivals. Many different capability theories can coexist. This theory-
pluralism should be embraced, rather than attacked by trying to put the 
capability approach into a straightjacket. There is, of course, the real risk 
that any theory that is somehow ‘broadening’ the informational basis 
of evaluations and comparisons is seen as a capability theory — hence 
a real risk of inflation. However, the modular understanding of the 
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capability approach clearly lays out the properties that every capability 
theory, application or analysis should meet, and thereby provides a 
powerful response to the risk of the inflation of the term ‘capability 
theory’.
Having sorted all of this out, we are free to put the capability approach 
to good use. It is impossible for one person to know all the interesting 
paths that the capability approach should take (even if that one person 
benefited from comments and many helpful discussions with others). 
But as a start, let me just mention some lines of further thinking, research 
and interventions that would be interesting to explore. 
First, within the disciplines in which the capability has been discussed 
and developed, there are plenty of opportunities to see what difference 
it can make if pushed all the way to its limits. In some fields, such as 
educational studies, the capability approach is well-developed and 
widely applied. But there are others in which the capability approach 
has so far merely been introduced, rather than being used to develop 
mature and complete theories. One question, which remains unanswered 
after our discussion in section 4.10, is whether the capability approach 
can provide an equally powerful alternative to utility-based welfare 
economics. In the literature on theories of justice, which we discussed 
in section 3.13, the capability approach is widely debated, but there 
are hardly any fully developed capabilitarian theories of justice, apart 
from Nussbaum’s (2006b) and the theory of disadvantage by Wolff 
and De-Shalit (2007). We need book-length accounts of capabilitarian 
theories of justice, capabilitarian theories of institutional evaluation, 
capabilitarian theories of welfare economics, and so forth. 
Second, the capability approach is, so far, almost exclusively used 
for evaluative and normative purposes — such as studies evaluating 
whether certain people are better off than others, studies trying to 
propose a certain policy or institution (for the effect it has on people’s 
functionings and capabilities) rather than others, or studies arguing 
for justice in terms of people’s capabilities. But one could also use 
the capability approach for explanatory studies, e.g. to examine which 
institutions or policies foster certain capabilities, or using the notions of 
functionings and capabilities in the analysis of people’s behaviour and 
decision making. For example, labour economists model the decision 
about a person’s labour supply — how many hours she would be 
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willing to work — by looking at the costs and benefits of working more 
or fewer hours, but wouldn’t it make much more sense to also ask how 
the capabilities of different options compare? For example, many adults 
are happy to work an equal number of hours for less pay if the work is 
more intrinsically rewarding or if it contributes to the creation of a public 
good. Another example is how we explain a parent’s decision not to use 
formal child care, or to use it only for a very limited number of hours. 
If we explain this exclusively in terms of financial costs and benefits (as 
some policy analysts do) we don’t capture the fact that the capabilities 
of affiliation and social relations are very different in the two scenarios. 
A general model of people’s behaviour and decision-making should 
therefore not only look at the pecuniary costs and benefits of different 
options, but also at the different levels of valuable functionings, and the 
absence of functionings with a negative value, that the different options 
offer. The challenge of this approach is, of course, that capabilities are 
often merely qualitative variables, and this hampers the explanatory 
models that many social scientists use. But if our decision-making and 
behaviour is largely influenced by the capabilities that characterize 
different options, then surely, we should prefer (i) a more muddy and 
vaguer explanatory model that takes all important aspects into account 
above (ii) a more elegant and neat model that gives us a distorted 
picture of how persons act and live.1 Some of this is already done, of 
course, since there is a large literature about certain functionings taken 
individually, e.g. in explanatory research on people’s health. The 
suggestion I’m making here is to look at those functionings in a more 
systematic way, and to integrate functionings and capabilities as general 
categories in theories of behaviour and decision making, next to other 
categories such as resources and preference-satisfaction. 
Third, the capability approach may well have a very important role 
to play in the current quest for a truly interdisciplinary conceptual 
framework for the social sciences and humanities. Despite the fact 
that universities are still to a large extent organized along disciplinary 
lines, there is an increasing recognition that many important questions 
cannot be studied properly without a unified framework or conceptual 
language in which all the social sciences and humanities can find their 
1  This is a methodological point that Amartya Sen has been pressing for a very long 
time.
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place. The capability approach may well form the nexus connecting 
existing disciplinary frameworks, precisely because its concepts bring 
together people’s wellbeing and the material resources they have, the 
legal rules and social norms that constrain their capability sets, and so 
forth. The approach thereby offers important conceptual and theoretical 
bridges between disciplines. And it could also link evaluative and 
normative frameworks to descriptive and explanatory frameworks, 
rather than leaving the normative frameworks implicit, as is now too 
often done in the social sciences. 
Fourth, the capability approach should be more extensively used in 
designing new policy tools. Citizens who endorse a broad understanding 
of the quality of life that gives non-material aspects a central place have 
been annoyed for many years by the constant assessment of economic 
growth as an end in itself, rather than as a means to human flourishing 
and the meeting of human needs. They have been saying, rightly in my 
view, that whether economic growth is a good thing depends, among 
other things, on how it affects the overall quality of life of people, as 
well as how other public values fare, such as ecological sustainability, 
and that we have very good reasons to take seriously the limits to 
economic growth (Jackson 2016). But those who want to put the ends of 
policies at the centre of the debate, and focus policy discussions more 
on these ultimate ends rather than on means, need to move from mere 
critique to developing tools that can fashion constructive proposals. 
The alternatives to GDP, which I briefly discussed in chapter 1, are one 
element that can help, but other tools are also needed. 
Fifth, we have to investigate which capability theories are logically 
possible, but empirically implausible. The argument in this book has 
been that the capability approach can be developed in a wide range of 
capability theories and applications, and is not committed to a particular 
set of political or ideological commitments. But that is as far as its logical 
structures go, and it doesn’t take a stance on empirical soundness. We 
need to investigate which capability theories may be logically possible, 
but nevertheless should be ruled out, given what we know about 
the plausibility of our empirical assumptions regarding conversion 
factors, human diversity, and structural constraints. It is highly likely 
that there are capability theories that are logically conceivable, yet 
inconsistent with some ‘basic facts’ about human nature and societies. 
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This is especially important since we want to avoid the hijacking of the 
capability approach by powerful societal actors or organisations who 
will start to propagate a very uncritical and reductionist version of 
the approach, and push that as the only right interpretation of it. The 
general account of the capability approach that I have defended in this 
book tries to be as politically and ideologically neutral as possible; but 
that doesn’t mean that I personally, as a scholar who has written a lot 
on questions of injustice, believe that all possible capability theories are 
equally plausible. In fact, my own substantive work in which I have 
used the capability approach confirms that I do not, and that I think that 
a critical account of social structures and power is needed (e.g. Robeyns 
2003, 2010, 2017b, 2017a). But I think we should then argue directly about 
the unjust nature of social structures, economic institutions, or social 
norms. I hope that the modular view presented in this book makes clear 
that many of the intellectual and ideological battles actually take place 
in arguing about the B-modules and the C-modules. 
Sixth and finally, the capability approach should be used in guiding 
existing practices on the ground, in many different segments of society, 
and in many different societies of the world. This is not easy, since there 
are quite significant challenges for theorists to bridge the gap between 
their work and practices on the ground, as several theorists who 
engaged in such theory-practice collaborations have pointed out (e.g. 
Koggel 2008; Wolff 2011). Yet if the capability approach aspires to make 
a difference in practice — which many capability scholars do — then 
thinking carefully about how to move to practice without diluting the 
essence of the framework is crucial. Luckily, there are signs that more 
of these ‘on-the-ground applications’ are being developed, and that the 
capability approach is not only of interest to scholars and policy makers, 
but also for practitioners and citizens. One example is Solava Ibrahim’s 
(2017) recent model for grassroots-led development, which is primarily 
a conceptual and theoretical framework, yet is also based on ten years 
of fieldwork. Another example is the practical field of social work in 
the Netherlands, where social work professionals have recently argued 
that the field is in need of a new moral compass, in order to counter the 
technocratic developments that, it is argued, have dominated changes in 
social work in recent decades. Some social workers argue that the human 
rights framework could provide a useful theory (Hartman, Knevel and 
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Reynaert 2016), while others believe that capabilities could be helpful in 
restoring ethical and political dimensions to the practice of social work 
(Braber 2013). As the discussion in section 3.14 has shown, there need 
not be a conflict between those two frameworks. Yet it remains to be 
seen in the years to come if and how the capability approach is able to 
guide the effective change of the entire sector of social work in countries 
where the traditional welfare state is under pressure. 
However, with all these future extensions of the capability approach, 
it remains important to explicitly acknowledge its limitations. This 
book has shown what the capability approach has to offer, but also 
what needs to be added before the vague and underspecified capability 
framework can be developed into a more powerful capability theory or 
capability application. Especially the choices made in the B-modules, 
but also the additions made in the C-modules C1 (additional 
explanatory and ontological theories) and C4 (additional normative 
claims and principles) will be crucial for many capabilitarian theories 
and applications to become powerful.
There is no point in pretending that the capability approach can do 
more than it is able to do, since this would blind us to the necessary 
collaborations with other theories and insights that are needed. It is 
in those collaborations with complementary powerful theories and 
frameworks that the success of the future of the capability approach lies. 
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